Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Leslie Staebler was convicted by a jury in municipal court of misdemeanor driving while intoxicated and violation of the seatbelt law. The district court affirmed, holding that Staebler's fundamental right to a fair trial was not violated. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding that the district court did not err in affirming the municipal court where (1) the City attorney did not unfairly imply that Staebler's conduct was worse than it actually was; (2) comments of one juror did not inflame or prejudice other members of the jury against Staebler; (3) the City attorney did not err during rebuttal to Staebler's closing argument when she inferred that because Staebler was not able to brake appropriately for oncoming traffic, he would not have been able to brake properly had a child been playing in the road; and (4) the evidence was sufficient to support Staebler's conviction.

Harley Howard was charged with incest and was sentenced to forty years' incarceration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Howard was not denied effective assistance of counsel where he did not meet his burden of showing deficient performance by counsel's failure to challenge the competency of the State's two child witnesses or the admission of their hearsay statements; and (2) the district court's sentence was not augmented because Howard maintained his innocence, but rather, the sentence was within the statutory parameters for incest and was based on ample testimony relating to Howard's treatment potential, risk to his children, and numerous psychosexual evaluations.

Gary Myers owned landlocked property across property owned by Stephen and Victora Dee. Myers' property contained several dilapidated buildings that had not been inhabited for several decades. Myers filed an action against the Dees, asking the district court to grant him access to his property across the Dees' property based on the right of eminent domain. Myers based his claim on Mont. Code Ann. 70-30-102(36), which states that eminent domain may be exercised to create a private road leading from a highway to a residence or farm. The district court granted the Dees' motion for summary judgment on the basis that the buildings on Myers' property did not qualify as a residence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the term "residence" in the statute refers to a habitable structure or dwelling place, i.e., a place where people are living; (2) in this case it was undisputed that the buildings on Myers' property were uninhabitable and that no one had lived in them for several decades; and (3) therefore, because there was no residence on Myers' property, access could not be granted across the Dees' property based on the eminent domain statute.

The district court terminated the parental rights of Mother and Father to their three Children after concluding that (1) Mother and Father had subjected two of the children to chronic and severe neglect under Mont. Code Ann. 41-3-423(2)(a), and (2) the Department of Public Health and Human Services was not required to make reasonable efforts to reunify the children with their parents. Mother and Father appealed the court's failure to require reunification efforts or to order a treatment plan prior to terminating their rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court was within its discretion in finding chronic, severe neglect and terminating the parental rights of Mother and Father without requiring reunification efforts.

Meril Curtis's houseguest took his credit card and made over $7,000 in unauthorized charges. After acknowledging that the charges were unauthorized and that Curtis was not personally liable for the charges, Citibank referred the account to a collection agency called Professional Recovery Services (PRS). Curtis filed suit against Citibank, alleging libel and credit libel and violation of the Montana Consumer Protection Act (MCPA). The district court granted summary judgment to Citibank, finding that Curtis's claims were preempted by the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in finding that Curtis' state law claims were preempted by the FCRA because the FCRA does not regulate collection agencies such as PRS. Remanded.

Appellant Angela O'Connell was involved in a theft scheme whereby Appellant's husband would steal property from a local business and sell the stolen goods for cash. Appellant pled guilty to accountability for theft pursuant to a plea agreement. Upon sentencing, Appellant was prohibited from entering bars and casinos and consuming alcohol, and was ordered to pay restitution to the business she stole from in the amount of $159,606. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) because the district court's determination of lost profits in this matter was based upon speculation and not supported by substantial evidence, the district court erred by ordering payment of lost profits, in addition to the replacement value of the stolen property, as part of Appellant's restitution obligation, and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting Appellant from entering bars as a condition of her sentence because the restriction furthered Appellant's rehabilitation. Remanded for recalculation of restitution based upon the replacement value of the stolen property.

Sellers entered an alleged contract with Buyer for the sale of property. After the parties failed to complete the sale, Buyer sued Sellers, seeking specific performance of the alleged contract. Buyer filed an amended complaint that added as a defendant Attorney, who had served as counsel for Sellers in the failed transaction, alleging fraud and other tortious conduct. Attorney filed a motion to substitute the district court judge, which the district court denied after finding Attorney's motion was untimely. At issue on appeal was whether Attorney qualified as a third-party defendant who possessed an independent right of substitution as opposed to a subsequently joined defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Attorney and Buyer qualified as adverse parties, and therefore, Attorney was a third-party defendant; and (2) Attorney timely filed his motion of substitution. Remanded.

Before their divorce, Scott Weiss borrowed $280,000 from Rayna Weiss for an ownership interest in a brokerage service. Upon dissolution of the marriage, the district court determined the loan from Rayna was interest-free. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the loan required the payment of interest at the rate of ten percent a year and remanded to the district court for calculation of interest from the time Rayna transferred the funds to Scott until the amount was paid in full. Upon remand, the district court concluded that Scott owed Rayna $49,954 in interest on the loan with postjudgment interest accruing at the rate of ten percent per annum until paid. Rayna appealed the district court's determination that the principal of the loan was paid back in full and the court's subsequent calculation of interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly determined that the loan was paid off in full by Scott, and (2) district court's subsequent calculation of simple interest on the loan was correct.

Robert Riggs was convicted by a jury of incest, sexual intercourse without consent, and two counts of sexual assault. Riggs filed an amended petition for postconviction relief, alleging approximately eighty claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court partially denied Riggs' petition, finding many of the claims were barred for various reasons. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Riggs' remaining twelve claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that counsel was not ineffective in his pretrial work, and counsel did not make the errors alleged by Riggs during trial. Because the Court found no ineffective assistance of counsel on Riggs' individual claims, the Court found there was no cumulative error.

Frederick and Mandelena Harmon bought a home pursuant to a buy-sell agreement that realtor Dianne Burright, a licensed real estate salesperson who worked for Fiscus Realty, prepared at the Fiscus Realty office. The home was built by Dianne's husband, Jerry. The Harmons subsequently discovered numerous construction problems. The Harmons sued Defendants Jerry and Dianne Burright and Fiscus Reality, raising several causing of action, including a claim under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (the Act). A jury returned a verdict against the Burrights on breach of warranty and negligent misrepresentation claims and held for Defendants on all other claims. After trial, Defendants filed motions for attorney fees as prevailing parties under the Act, which the district court denied. Fiscus Realty appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an award of attorney fees to Fiscus Realty as the Harmons' claims had a basis in fact and law and were not frivolous, unreasonable or unfounded.