Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Donald Puhto and his sister, Janet Barrett, commenced an action against Defendant Smith Funeral Chapels, alleging negligence and misrepresentation in the handling of their deceased uncle's remains. Counsel for Puhto and Barrett withdrew from the representation. Defendant's counsel then sent Puhto and Barrett a notice of removal of attorney for plaintiffs informing them of the need to appoint a new attorney or appear in person at a show cause hearing. After Puhto and Barrett failed to respond to the notice of removal and failed to appear at the hearing, the district court dismissed the case with prejudice. The court subsequently set aside the dismissal as to Barrett. The court then denied Puhto's motion to set aside the dismissal and request for an evidentiary hearing, finding that Puhto did not raise sufficient indications of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect under Mont. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Puhto had not shown the district court abused its discretion in determining he had not proven excusable neglect.

Following a jury trial, Larry Daniels was convicted of deliberate homicide. In defense, Daniels asserted justifiable use of force. Daniels' arguments on appeal pertained to the 2009 legislative changes to the justifiable use of force statutes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) justifiable use of force is still an affirmative defense, and the defendant has the initial burden of providing evidence to raise the defense, and then the burden of proof shifts to the State; (2) the district court correctly disallowed cross-examination concerning specific instances of the victim's violent acts under Mont. R. Evid. 405(a); (3) proper foundation was necessary before the victim's character evidence could be admitted, and under the facts of this case, the district court correctly required Daniels to lay a proper foundation by testifying; and (4) the district court correctly refused Daniels' proposed jury instructions on justifiable use of force in defense of an occupied structure and burglary as a forcible felony.

Rodrick Cameron was charged with driving under the influence (DUI). Cameron filed a motion to suppress, claiming that the deputy sheriff that stopped Cameron's vehicle lacked particularized suspicion to stop him. The justice court denied Cameron's motion. Cameron entered a guilty plea to DUI while reserving his right to appeal the justice court's denial of his motion to suppress. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the district court did not err in affirming the justice court's denial of Cameron's motion to suppress because, based on the totality of the circumstances, the deputy sheriff had sufficient facts to form a particularized suspicion of wrongdoing to initiate an investigative stop.

NorthWestern Energy proposed constructing an electric transmission line from Montana to Idaho and submitted its application for a certificate from the Montana Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ). While preparing a draft of the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), Jefferson County informed DEQ that it expected DEQ to consult with the County in determining the route. Jefferson County subsequently filed a petition for writ of mandamus and injunction relief against DEQ, (1) seeking an order requiring DEQ to comply with the Montana Environmental Policy Act and other environmental legislation, and (2) requesting DEQ be enjoined from releasing a draft EIS. NorthWestern subsequently intervened. The district court ruled in favor of Jefferson County after determining that DEQ had not satisfied its duty to consult with Jefferson County under Mont. Code Ann. 75-1-201(1)(c) and enjoined DEP from releasing the Draft EIS until it had done so. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) at this stage in the process, DEQ had not violated a clear legal duty to consult with the County prior to issuing its draft EIS; and (2) because the County had adequate legal remedies once DEQ rendered a final agency action, the County was not entitled to mandamus or injunctive relief.

After a fire damaged a building the Hinebauchs purchased from the McRaes, the Hinebauchs filed a complaint against the McRaes, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The district court granted the McRaes' motion for summary judgment, determining (1) because no evidence was presented showing that the McRaes agreed to obtain insurance for the building naming the Hinebauchs as an insured party, there was a lack of mutual consent and the agreement was unenforceable; and (2) the Hinebauchs did not establish any requisite misconduct or fault on the part of the McRaes, and the Hinebauchs had unclean hands in seeking equitable relief on the claim for unjust enrichment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statute of frauds precluded the Hinebauchs from enforcing any promises ostensibly made to them by the McRaes; and (2) the Hinebauchs wholly failed to show any misconduct or fault on the part of the McRaes, and therefore, the Hinebauchs' claim for unjust enrichment was without merit.

Terry Richerson died after being backed over by a truck owned by United Materials. Richerson's estate requested medical payments under the policy the Cincinnati Insurance Company issued to United Materials for the truck involved in the accident. Cincinnati denied the claim because the policy provided coverage for injuries suffered by a claimant while "occupying" a covered auto. The district court concluded that Richerson was not occupying the auto as defined in the policy and, accordingly, granted summary judgment in favor of Cincinnati. Richerson's estate appealed, arguing that because Richerson was caught in and transported by the truck, he was "upon" it, and therefore he was "occupying" the truck. the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Cincinnati, holding that Richerson's contact with the truck was insufficient to trigger coverage under the definition of "occupying" in the policy.

Employee brought an action under the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, alleging that he was wrongfully discharged from employment. Employer moved for summary judgment, contending that it had good cause to terminate Employee. The district court granted Employer's motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Employer because disputed issues of material fact still existed as to whether Employer violated the express provisions of its written personnel policy by failing to apply it consistently and equally to all of its employees, whether Employee wrongfully demoted and transferred Employee, and whether this demotion and transfer was directly linked to Employee's discharge.

Miles Kingman was charged with attempted deliberate homicide for the brutal assault of a man outside a bar. A jury acquitted Kingman of the homicide charge but convicted him of aggravated assault, a lesser-included offense. Kingman was sentenced to twenty years' incarceration. On appeal, Kingman (1) claimed that the publicity surrounding the incident had prejudiced the community to such an extent that he could not get a fair trial by jurors drawn from that community, and (2) argued that the prosecutor improperly characterized him at the sentencing hearing as an "animal" that "needed to be caged." The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Kingman did not show a sufficient basis for presuming that the entire community jury pool was corrupted by the pre-trial publicity; and (2) although the prosecutor's remarks were inappropriate, there was no indication that the remarks had factored into the district court's decision to impose the maximum sentence for aggravated assault.

Daughter was injured in an automobile accident caused by an uninsured motorist. Father and Daughter were insured by two Farmers Insurance Exchange automobile insurance policies, each providing uninsured motorist protection of $25,000. After the accident, in exchange for a full release signed by Daughter, Farmers paid $25,000 in uninsured motorist coverage under Father's policy insuring the vehicle involved in the accident. Later, Daughter and Father (Plaintiffs) sued Farmers, seeking uninsured motorist benefits under Father's second policy. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Farmers. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) dismissing Plaintiffs' claim for stacking of uninsured motorist coverage; (2) ruling that neither Plaintiff had standing to bring a claim for medical pay coverage; and (3) declining to certify a putative class for claims of unjust enrichment and disgorgement of premiums.

After a fire damaged a building the Hinebauchs purchased from the McRaes, the Hinebauchs filed a complaint against the McRaes, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The district court granted the McRaes' motion for summary judgment, determining (1) because no evidence was presented showing that the McRaes agreed to obtain insurance for the building naming the Hinebauchs as an insured party, there was a lack of mutual consent and the agreement was unenforceable; and (2) the Hinebauchs did not establish any requisite misconduct or fault on the part of the McRaes, and the Hinebauchs had unclean hands in seeking equitable relief on the claim for unjust enrichment. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) the statute of frauds precluded the Hinebauchs from enforcing any promises ostensibly made to them by the McRaes; and (2) the Hinebauchs wholly failed to show any misconduct or fault on the part of the McRaes, and therefore, the Hinebauchs' claim for unjust enrichment was without merit.