Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Slacks sued the County for damages due to the County's alleged failure to comply with its statutory obligation to notify the Slacks that the home they purchased was once the site of a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory. After a trial, the jury found the County was negligent and awarded the Slacks $563,592 in damages. The Supreme Court affirmed on all issues, holding (1) the County waived all the issues it raised on appeal; and (2) the district court properly denied the Slacks' motion for attorneys' fees because simply including attorneys' fees in a bill of costs does not entitle a party to recover attorneys' fees, and the County's defense was not frivolous or pursued in bad faith. View "Slack v. Landmark Co." on Justia Law

After Decedent died, Decedent's wife moved to admit his will to probate. Decedent's son, Bruce, filed an objection, alleging that Decedent lacked testamentary capacity to enter into the will, and that another of Decedent's sons, Neil, exerted undue influence over Decedent. Bruce further sought to set aside a cattle sale and options agreement and lease-cattle agreement, alleging that Decedent's lack of capacity to contract voided the agreements and that the agreements were the product of Neil's undue influence over Decedent. The district court granted the Estate's motion to dismiss, concluding that Bruce lacked standing to contest the will and agreements. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Bruce's allegations that a previous will existed that devised to him a larger portion of Decedent's estate than did the disputed will created a sufficient basis for Bruce to establish standing to contest the will; and (2) Bruce possessed standing to challenge the validity of the agreements to the extent that they concerned real property. Remanded with instructions for the district court to vacate its order to dismiss and to permit the parties to engage in discovery. View "In re Estate of Glennie" on Justia Law

Susan Overfield was charged with assault and disturbing the peace after appearing to speak at a City Commission meeting about perceived conflicts of interest between City officials and the Animal Foundation of Great Falls. Overfield subsequently sued the City. Before the City and Overfield settled the case, the district court concluded (1) the Animal Foundation, its trustee, and its attorney (Petitioners), who were non-parties in the underlying case, were in contempt for wrongfully redacting information from documents produced to Overfield, and (2) the Foundation was in contempt for failing to appear at a deposition with subpoenaed documents. After the case was settled, the district court entered an order awarding Overfield attorney fees against the Petitioners based on the contempt orders. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the contempt orders of the district court, holding that the district court properly considered and decided the contempt issues below without referral to another judge, and the contempt orders were supported by substantial evidence; but (2) vacated the district court's order to arrest the trustee, the court's imposition of sanctions against an attorney who filed a protective order on behalf of the Foundation, and the court's order awarding attorney fees. Remanded. View "Animal Found. of Great Falls v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

After the State petitioned for L.L.A.'s involuntary commitment to the Montana State Hospital (MSH), the district court held a hearing, at the conclusion of which it pronounced L.L.A. would be committed to MSH for a period not to exceed ninety days. L.L.A. appealed, claiming the district court erred in making insufficient findings of fact supporting her commitment. The Supreme Court reversed the order involuntarily committing L.L.A., holding that the district court erred in failing to provide a detailed statement of facts supporting its commitment order as required by Mont. Code Ann. 53-21-127(8)(a). Because the district court's findings contained no indication of the facts upon which it found that, because of her mental disorder, L.L.A. was substantially unable to protect her life and safety or that imminent threat of injury to herself or others would result if she was left untreated, the district court failed to follow the statutory requirements for involuntary commitment proceedings. View "In re L.L.A." on Justia Law

Charley Johnson entered a nolo contendere plea to intimidation for repeated sexually assaultive behavior against his stepdaughter. During sentencing, the district court (1) sentenced Johnson to a ten-year commitment to the department of corrections, (2) required Johnson to pay for counseling costs previously incurred by his stepdaughter as well as an undetermined amount for future counseling costs she would incur the period of Johnson's sentence, and (3) imposed a condition restricting Johnson from places where children can congregate. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed, holding that Johnson failed to preserve for appellate review the issue of whether the district court erred in imposing restitution for past and future counseling expenses incurred by the victim, but (2) remanded for calculation for future restitution in compliance with Mont. Code Ann. 46-18-244. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

After a police officer arrested Jason Jenkins for driving a motorcycle under the influence of alcohol, Jenkins agreed to a breath test. Jenkins was subsequently convicted of driving under the influence (DUI). On appeal, Jenkins contended that the district court erred by admitting field certification documents as part of the foundation for the admission of the results of his breath test, alleging that they were hearsay because the officer who submitted the documents was not the author or custodian of the documents. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the results of the breath test because case law has established that when a district court is determining whether there is adequate foundation for admission of breath test results in a DUI prosecution, Mont. R. Evid. 104(4)(a) authorizes the court to do so without regard to whether the certification forms are hearsay. View "State v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

Husband and Wife's marriage was dissolved by the district court. The order included an allocation of Husband's state employee retirement plan, which Wife appealed. At issue on appeal was whether Wife was entitled to fifty percent of what the account would be worth if Husband were to liquidate it immediately or fifty percent of the marital portion of Husband's benefits at the time he would begin receiving them after retirement. The Supreme Court (1) concluded that Karen was entitled to a percentage at the time of payout under the "time rule" for deferred distribution of pension plans as set forth in Rolfe v. Rolfe, and (2) ordered that the account should be divided by awarding Wife a fraction of each pension payment that represents the amount earned during the marriage. Remanded for a new distribution of the marital estate. View "In re Marriage of Spawn & McGowan" on Justia Law

Bill Thomas was convicted and sentenced for deliberate homicide. Thomas subsequently field a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the district court denied. Thomas filed a notice of appeal. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Court would continue to consider a party's appeal from a district court's denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus as an original petition. The Supreme Court held (1) a district court's denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus in a criminal proceeding is not appealable to the Court; (2) because a writ of habeas corpus may be granted by either a district court or the Supreme Court, the district court's denial of such a writ is not res judicata because it does not divest the Court of jurisdiction to grant a subsequent petition; and (3) a party must file an original petition for writ of habeas corpus for the Court to consider it. The Court then (1) granted Thomas's motion to proceed on appeal without payment of a filing fee; and (2) ordered that Thomas's appeal from the district court's order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus be dismissed with prejudice. View "Thomas v. John Doe" on Justia Law

Brent Wilson appealed from his conviction for involvement in a fraudulent scheme to illegally take possession of real property. Prior to and throughout the jury trial, Wilson invoked his constitutional right to represent himself. On appeal, Wilson argued, inter alia, that he was not competent to waive his constitutional right to counsel and the district court should have compelled standby counsel to represent him. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was substantial credible evidence that Wilson unequivocally waived his right to counsel knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently; and (2) Wilson's sentence was legal because the length of the commitment was within the district court's statutory authority, the court took the sentencing criteria of Mont. Code Ann. 46-18-225(2) into account, and the court did not punish Wilson for refusing to confess to his crimes. View "State v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Ross Habets pled guilty to aggravated assault. The district court sentenced Habets to a one-year commitment to the Department of Corrections followed by placement at the state prison for nineteen years. Habets appealed, arguing that (1) the district court failed to account for Habets's mental illness and his attempts to seek health treatment before the incident in violation of Montana's sentencing policy and principles, and (2) the court failed to comply with the rehabilitative section of the sentencing policy statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court followed the law in this case by properly considering the necessary factors in sentencing Habets. View "State v. Habets" on Justia Law