Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant crashed into a car driven by a seventeen-year-old. The victim suffered several injuries, including a shattered ankle. Defendant subsequently entered a guilty plea to felony criminal endangerment and was sentenced to ten years' incarceration with all but 180 days suspended. The district court also ordered Defendant to pay restitution for the victim's summer wages, the victim's father's lost wages, and unpaid medical expenses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly imposed restitution for lost wages, and (2) the district court did not exceed the bounds of reason or act arbitrarily under the circumstances in imposing the maximum length sentence allowed under statute. View "State v. Dodson" on Justia Law

The district court terminated Mother's rights to her two minor children after determining that Mother had willfully surrendered custody of her children for a period of six months and that Mother had abandoned her children in accordance with Mont. Code Ann. 41-3-609(1). Mother appealed, contending that she could not surrender custody because she never possessed custody. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that Mother abandoned her children under the circumstances where (1) Mother had physical custody of her children until 2006, and (2) Mother made no manifestation of an intent to resume custody of the children. View "In re E.M.S." on Justia Law

Riley Styren's vehicle was struck by Sherry Roos's vehicle. Styren and the owner of her vehicle (collectively, Styren) filed a complaint against Roos, Roos's mother, Julia, and Curtis Stordahl, who together owned the car Roos was driving. The complaint alleged claims of negligence against Roos and negligent entrustment and liability under the family purpose doctrine against Julia and Stordahl. The district court granted summary judgment for Julia and Stordahl. A jury then found Roos was not negligent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly (1) granted summary judgment to Julia on the negligent entrustment claim as there was no evidence that Julia knew that Roos was an incompetent driver or that Roos would drive in a manner that created an unreasonable risk to others; (2) granted summary judgment to Julia on the family purpose doctrine claim where Styren did not meet her burden to raise genuine issues of material fact in opposition to Julia's motion; and (3) denied Styren's motion for a new trial where Styren did not meet her burden on appeal to demonstrate that the district court erred and the jury's verdict was legal and supported by substantial evidence. View "Styren Farms v. Roos" on Justia Law

The State charged Michael Hass with three offenses, one of which was a DUI. The Stated alleged that Hass had three prior DUI convictions, making the DUI a felony. Hass filed a motion challenging the validity of one of his prior DUI convictions, arguing that his constitutional rights to counsel and to due process were violated when the trial judge in that case allowed Hass's counsel to withdraw on the day of trial and then proceeded to try and convict Hass in absentia. In the instant case, pursuant to a plea agreement, Hass pleaded guilty to fourth-offense DUI, and the remaining counts were dismissed. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision denying Hass's motion challenging the validity of his earlier DUI conviction and vacated the felony DUI sentence imposed by the district court, holding that the prior DUI conviction was constitutionally infirm and could not be used for sentence enhancement purposes. Remanded with instructions to resentence Hass for misdemeanor DUI. View "State v. Hass" on Justia Law

Husband and Wife's marriage was dissolved by a decree that included a settlement agreement and parenting plan. The agreement provided that the parties would share joint parenting of the children but that Wife would be the primary residential parent. The agreement was later amended to provide for alternating custody between Wife and Husband on a weekly basis. Husband subsequently filed a motion to modify child support, alleging that there had been a substantial and continuing change of circumstances as to make the existing terms unconscionable. The district court (1) granted Husband's motion, (2) denied Wife's motion to amend the parenting plan, and (3) ordered that Wife pay Husband's attorney's fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in (1) granting Husband's motion to modify child support where the court's findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence and its determination that the changes in circumstances in this case met the statutory requirements; (2) awarding Husband attorney's fees where the parties' agreement specifically provided for an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party in subsequent proceedings; and (3) determining the amount and reasonableness of the attorney's fees awarded. View "In re Marriage of Damschen" on Justia Law

Husband and Wife entered into a property settlement agreement (PSA) pursuant to their divorce in which Wife transferred all of her interest in two corporations the parties owned to Husband in exchange for Husband's payment to Wife of $250,000. The parties subsequently agreed that Wife would assume managerial and operational control of the businesses. The district court ordered Husband to provide Wife with access to the businesses' accounts and financial information and to return possession of the business records. Because of Husband's noncompliance with the court order, Wife ultimately was forced to file for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. The district court subsequently (1) found Husband to be in contempt, (2) awarded Wife sole possession of one of the businesses, (3) ordered Husband to pay Wife the receiver fees he had accumulated during his operation of the business, and (4) ordered Husband to pay Wife's attorney's fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not (1) err by refusing to send the dispute to arbitration and by holding Husband in contempt; (2) deny Husband due process; and (3) err in awarding attorney's fees to Wife. Remanded for a determination of Wife's attorney's fees and costs on appeal. View "In re Marriage of Cini" on Justia Law

The Heins rented a house from Julia Benintendi and the Perkerwicz family (hereinafter B&P). B&P alleged the Heins caused considerable damage to the property when they vacated the premises. The Heins countered that B&P unlawfully retained their security deposit and refused to reimburse the Heins for home and lawn improvements. B&P sued and obtained a default judgment. The district court subsequently set aside the default judgment and held a jury trial. B&P were awarded damages but not attorney fees or costs. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorney fees to both parties; (2) the district court incorrectly required each party to bear its own costs because, as the prevailing party, B&P was entitled to its costs under Mont. Code Ann. 25-10-101; and (3) the district court did not manifestly abuse its discretion in setting aside the default judgment because it had good cause to do so. View "Benintendi v. Hein" on Justia Law

In previous workers' compensation cases, the Montana Supreme Court had determined that its decisions apply retroactively to claims that are not "final" or "settled" at the time the decision was issued. Under statute, two types of claims fall under the definition of "settled," (1) claims where there has been a formal settlement agreement, and (2) claims that are "paid in full." In this case, the workers' compensation court (WCC) defined "paid in full" to mean that an injured worker received all the applicable benefits prior to a new judicial decision and had not received subsequent benefits on his or her pre-judicial decision claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the WCC properly applied retroactivity law in formulating its definition of "paid in full." View "Flynn v. Mont. State Fund" on Justia Law

The City Police Department conducted an internal investigation of an administrative coordinator, who was placed on administrative leave after she allegedly misused public funds. The Department created a sixteen-page due process letter detailing the evidence against the coordinator, who subsequently resigned. The Billings Gazette requested the letter, but the City declined to release it. The Gazette sued the City. The district court ordered that the document be provided to the Gazette. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) where two constitutional rights are implicated, including the public's right to know about the actions of public agencies and employees and the employees' right to privacy, the district court must balance the two rights to determine whether the employees' right to privacy outweighs the public's right to know; (2) in this case, the coordinator did not have a reasonable expectation of individual privacy to the document because she held a position of trust with the Department and she was accused of breaching that trust; and (3) the mere prospect of a criminal case will not deprive the public of its right to access a public document once that right has been balanced against the right to privacy. View "Gazette v. City of Billings" on Justia Law

Employee worked as a shareholder accountant for Employer. Employee's employment contract contained a covenant not to compete. After Employer ended its employment relationship with Employee, Employee began working at Employer's competitor, where she provided accounting services for a few of Employer's former clients in violation of the restrictive covenant. Employee sought a declaration that the covenant was unenforceable. The district court determined that the covenant was reasonable and enforceable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Employer's covenant was unenforceable because (1) Montana law requires that an employer establish a legitimate business interest in a restrictive covenant, which demands that the restriction on post-employment activities be necessary to protect an employer's good will, customer relationships, or trade information; (2) an employer lacks a legitimate business interest in a covenant when, under ordinary circumstances, it ends the employment relationship with the employee; and (3) Employer in this case elected to end its employment relationship with Employee without any misconduct on the part of Employee. View "Wrigg v. Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C." on Justia Law