Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Bryan LeMay was convicted of numerous offenses ranging from disorderly conduct to assault with a weapon, in three separate causes of action. The Supreme Court consolidated the causes of action into this opinion and affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err when it denied LeMay's motion to dismiss on the grounds of outrageous government conduct; (2) the assistance of LeMay's counsel was reasonable considering all the circumstances; (3) the district court properly denied LeMay's motion to withdraw his nolo contendere pleas, as they were voluntarily entered; (4) the district court did not err when it denied LeMay's motion to suppress because the officer had sufficient facts to form a particularized suspicion of wrongdoing to initiate an investigative stop; and (5) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied LeMay's motion to dismiss for lack of state criminal jurisdiction. View "State v. LeMay" on Justia Law

Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Montana (BCBS) and New West Health Services (collectively TPAs) administered a self-funded employee healthcare benefit plan for the State's employees. Jeannette Diaz and Leah Hoffmann-Bernhardt (Plaintiffs), who were both injured in accidents, filed suit against the state, BCBS, and New West for allegedly violating their made-whole rights by failing to conduct a made-whole analysis before exercising subrogation rights. Plaintiffs moved for class certification seeking to include in the lawsuit individuals who had their benefits reduced under the State plan, as well as individuals who had their benefits reduced under policies independently issued and administered by the TPAs. The district court denied class certification and determined that Montana's made-whole laws did not apply to TPAs. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's finding that BCBS and New West, in their capacities as TPAs in the present case, were not subject to the made-whole laws under either the subrogation statutes or under a third-party beneficiary theory; and (2) reversed the district court denial of class certification, as Diaz and Hoffmann-Bernhardt demonstrated that the requirements of Mont. R. Civ. P. 23 were met. View "Diaz v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield" on Justia Law

Late one night, a Jefferson County reserve deputy came upon a car parked in a posted "day use only" fishing access site in Madison County. The deputy made contact with the car's driver, Floyd Updegraff, and ascertained that Updegraff was intoxicated. A second deputy Jefferson County deputy responded to the scene and placed Updegraff under arrest for DUI. A jury ultimately convicted Updegraff of felony DUI and other offenses. Updegraff appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence because (1) if the deputies were acting under color of law, they had no authority to make an arrest in Madison County, or (2) the deputies were acting as private citizens, in which case they failed to comply with the private person arrest statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in order to make a warrantless arrest, an out-of-jurisdiction officer must meet the arrest standard that would apply to a private person in the same circumstances, but if this standard is met, the officer may then follow the procedures applicable to peace officers in processing the arrest; and (2) applying this approach to the circumstances in this case, Updegraff's arrest was legal. View "State v. Updegraff" on Justia Law

Jesse Kirk was convicted by a jury of burglary and criminal possession of dangerous drugs. The district court issued a pre-trial order denying Kirk's motion to sever the counts, concluding that the counts in the amended information were properly joined and that severance was not required to avoid an unfair trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the burglary and drug charges were linked by a common motive and because the burglary occasioned the second charge of criminal possession of dangerous drugs, the counts in the amended information were properly joined; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that severance was not required to avoid an unfair trial where Kirk did not prove that, while he may have faced some prejudice as a result of the joint trial, the prejudice was so great that it prevented a fair trial. View "State v. Kirk" on Justia Law

Mother and Father's twin sons were born with physical and mental disabilities and required full-time care and supervision. Upon his divorce from Mother, Father was ordered to pay child support. Father's obligation to provide child support ceased upon the twins' graduation from high school. Mother later requested continued child support from Father once the twins turned nineteen. The district court concluded that Mont. Code Ann. 40-6-214 did not allow an order imposing such support but that the statute provided the court with authority to order a parent to support an adult child who is poor and unable to maintain himself if the parent does not do so. Mother subsequently filed a second petition, and the district court found it had the authority to order Father to support the twins based on information he was not providing for them to the extent of his ability. The Supreme Court consolidated the two proceedings on appeal and affirmed, holding that the district court had the statutory authority to order Father to support the twins and that section 40-6-214 imposed a duty on Father to support the twins "to the extent of his ability." View "In re M.A.S." on Justia Law

The Fronks (Fronks) purchased two pieces of property from the Collinses (Collins), and the parties entered into an oral agreement whereby Collins would acquire horses and Collins would be entitled to keep the first foal from each mare as payment for their services. Fronks later transferred $215,000 to Collins for the acquisition of the horses. Fronks later deeded the properties back to Collins with the understanding that Collins would reconvey the land back to Fronks within five years. The parties subsequently signed an agreement setting forth each party's obligations. When Collins did not comply with the agreement, Fronks brought an action for breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and misrepresentation seeking, inter alia, to enforce the agreement and recover damages, obtain ownership of the real property, and recover attorney fees. The district court determined that the agreement was a valid, enforceable contract and granted summary judgment to Fronks. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the agreement was a valid contract and the agreement did not suffer from a lack of consent by virtue of duress or menace. View "Fronk v. Collins" on Justia Law

Husband and Wife had been married for almost seventeen years when Wife petitioned for the dissolution of the marriage. A temporary order of protection was issued against Husband to protect Wife and the couple's three children. The district court subsequently issued a final order of protection (FOP) requiring that Husband stay 300 feet away from Wife at all times and that he have only telephonic and supervised in-person contact with the children. The marriage was then dissolved. Husband later filed a motion to dissolve the FOP. The district court left the FOP in effect, reasoning that under Mont. Code Ann. 40-15-204(5), it did not have the legal authority to terminate the FOP without Wife's request for termination. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court misinterpreted the law as set forth in section 40-15-204(5), as a district court has the authority to continue or terminate an order of protection notwithstanding the petitioner's desires. Remanded. View "Albrecht v. Albrecht" on Justia Law

Mother and Father's parental rights to their children were terminated by the district court. Before the district court's judgment, Mother had moved to transfer to the case to a tribal court as allowed under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). However, the case was never transferred. The district court maintained jurisdiction and denied Mother's request to continue the termination hearing and appoint counsel for the children. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court did not comply with the jurisdictional ICWA transfer requirements where the court misinterpreted the ICWA requirement to require an affirmative acceptance of the transfer by the tribe; and (2) because there was an apparent conflict between the children's wishes and what the guardian ad litem concluded to be in the children's best interests, counsel for children should be appointed on remand. Remanded. View "In re J.W.C." on Justia Law

Husband and Wife's marriage was dissolved in Mississippi. The decree awarded Husband custody of Son and Wife custody of Daughter. Subsequently, Husband and Son moved to Montana, and Wife and Daughter moved to Arizona. Husband petitioned the district court in Montana to modify the child support award for Son. The district court denied the petition and declined to exercise further jurisdiction on the basis that it was an inconvenient forum because Husband and Son had moved back to Mississippi and Wife and Daughter were residing in Arizona. The court then relinquished jurisdiction of Son to the Arizona. Husband and Son later moved back to Montana, and Husband petitioned the district court to reduce accrued child support to a money judgment. The district court noted jurisdiction had been relinquished to the Arizona court and declined to exercise further jurisdiction on the basis that it was an inconvenient forum. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court improperly applied the Montana Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) in determining it did not have jurisdiction over the matter because the UCCJEA applies to child custody matters, not child support matters. Remanded. View "Ervin v. Ervin" on Justia Law

Marjorie Ward established a trust that devised $100,000 to her stepdaughter, Joan, and provided that the trust residue be distributed in equal shares to Ward's sons, Jack and James. Ward also instructed that before Jack would receive any distributions from the trust, his share would be decreased, and Joan's increased, by any amount he owed Joan. After Ward died, the district court concluded Jack's share would be reduced by $298,356, the amount he owed Joan on the date of Ward's death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court complied with the requirements of Mont. R. Civ. P. 52(a) by orally stating its findings of fact and conclusions of law; and (2) the district court did not err in ordering that Jack's share of the trust be reduced by the amount he owed his stepsister, pursuant to Ward's instructions contained in the trust, even though that debt was previously discharged in bankruptcy proceedings. View "Ward v. Ward" on Justia Law