Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Rozell Cook pled guilty via an Alford plea to two charges of felony sexual assault. Cook was sentenced to two concurrent, twenty-year terms with ten years suspended. The State moved to revoke the suspended portion of Cook's sentence two days before he was scheduled to be released from custody. The district court revoked Cook's suspended sentence, sentenced him to two concurrent, ten-year commitments with five years suspended, and imposed new sentencing conditions. Cook appealed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's revocation of Cook's suspended sentence, but (2) reversed the district court's imposition of an illegal condition in the revocation order. Remanded to strike the illegal condition. View "State v. Cook" on Justia Law

Appellant Wesley Benn was convicted by a jury of sexual intercourse without consent and sexual assault. Benn appealed and then died the following month. Counsel for Benn filed a notice advising that Benn had passed away, and the State moved for dismissal, arguing that Benn's death had mooted the appeal. Benn's counsel filed a response opposing the State's motion, suggesting that the Supreme Court's precedent was unclear about the effect of a defendant's death upon the proceeding. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding (1) abatement of the proceeding ab initio is an inappropriate resolution of a case when the defendant has died; (2) a criminal case is not moot if the appeal involves concrete interests which are not individual to the defendant and survive the defendant; and (3) in this case, Benn's appeal was moot because his challenge to his sexual assault conviction and his contention that his counsel was ineffective were individual to him, and therefore, the Court could not grant effective relief. View "State v. Benn" on Justia Law

Jerome Dubiel (Jerome) was traveling on a Montana highway during a high wind event that caused numerous trees to blow down. Jerome was stopped temporarily by a Montana Department of Transportation (MDT) employee who was clearing highway debris when a tree fell on Jerome's car, inflicting a fatal injury. Keevy, Jerome's wife (Dubiel), sued MDT, claiming it had negligently failed to close the highway prior to Jerome's death. Dubiel did not retain an expert to establish MDT's standard of care regarding highway safety under the circumstances leading to Jerome's death. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of MDT, finding that expert testimony was required in this case to establish the standard of care to which MDT was required to conform under the circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting MDT's motion for summary judgment on the ground that Dubiel could not prove the applicable standard of care and breach thereof without expert testimony. View "Dubiel v. Mont. Dep't of Transp" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Richard Covington was convicted of robbery and deliberate homicide. The court issued a life sentence without the possibility of parole based on Covington's two previous robbery convictions pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 56-18-219(1)(b)(iv). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Covington failed to meet his burden of establishing that the district court infringed on an enhanced right to a jury trial under the Montana Constitution in his argument that the existence of facts, including a prior conviction, that triggers the application of the sentence enhancement process of section 46-18-219(1)(b)(iv) must be submitted to the jury; and (2) the district court did not err by refusing to suppress evidence obtained from Convington's binder and notebooks. View "State v. Covington" on Justia Law

Appellant Charles Clary was charged with aggravated burglary and assault with a weapon. The day before the omnibus hearing, Clary's attorney filed a motion to have Clary transported to the proceeding. The district court did not rule on the motion, and the omnibus hearing proceeded without Clary present. Clary subsequently insisted on proceeding pro se, which the district court allowed. The jury found Clary guilty as charged. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) Clary's right to be present at all critical stages of his criminal proceeding was not violated by his absence from the omnibus hearing where the hearing did not constitute a critical stage requiring Clary's presence; and (2) the district court did not err in allowing Clary to continue pro se without conducting further inquiry into Clary's complaints regarding his attorney where substantial evidence supported the court's finding that Clary made a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel and Clary did not request substitute counsel. View "State v. Clary" on Justia Law

Lila Clavin (Lila) and Robert Gilbert founded Pastimes and executed an operating agreement (Agreement) that provided that Pastimes would terminate upon the death of a member unless at least two members remained who agreed to continue the business. After Lila died in 2000, Gilbert and Tim Clavin, Lila's son, could not agree on the value of Lila's share of Pastimes at the time of her death. This disagreement led Tim and Gilbert to conclude that Gilbert should continue to operate Pastimes. Gilbert filed a complaint for declaratory relief on behalf of Pastimes in 2005, requesting a date-of-death valuation for Lila's interest in 2005. The district court valued the Estate's interest at the date of trial rather than at the time of Lila's death. The Supreme Court affirmed in relevant part, holding that the district court properly valued the Estate's interest at the date of trial rather than at the time of Lila's death because Gilbert's and Tim's agreement and Gilbert's continued operation of Pastimes constituted a fully executed oral agreement that modified the dissolution provision of the Agreement. View "Pastimes v. Clavin" on Justia Law

After giving birth to a newborn who suffered severe developmental issues resulting from a lack of glucose, Joe and Kathryn Norris (Norris) filed a medical malpractice action against, among others, Dr. Blayne Fritz, a physician who cared for the newborn. The morning before trial, Fritz moved to limit the scope of the testimony of Dr. Tom Strizich, the treating pediatrician, arguing that Norris failed to provide sufficient notice as to Strizich's opinions regarding a newborn's blood glucose level. The district court granted Fritz's motion, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Fritz. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to the district court to vacate its judgment and order a new trial, holding that the district court abused its discretion when it excluded Strizich's testimony regarding the appropriate standard of care where (1) Strizich was a hybrid witness for purposes of standard of care testimony; and (2) Fritz could not reasonably claim surprise or prejudice from Strizich's proposed testimony. View "Norris v. Fritz" on Justia Law

Burglington Northern & Sante Fe Railway Company (BNSF) contaminated the environment surrounding the Livingston Rail Yard (Yard). Plaintiffs, individuals who owned property adjacent to the Yard, sued BNSF in federal court for damages to their property based on claims of, inter alia, nuisance, negligence, and trespass. The magistrate judge granted summary judgment in favor of BNSF, finding that the applicable statute of limitations barred Plaintiffs' claims. The federal district court certified to the Supreme Court the question of whether the continuing tort doctrine should apply to the claims presented by Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court held (1) the continuing tort doctrine in Montana tolls the statute of limitations for property damage claims of nuisance and/or trespass resulting from contamination that has stabilized, continues to migrate, and is not readily or easily abatable; and (2) the limitations period begins to run when abatement is not reasonable or complete abatement cannot be achieved, and a permanent injury exists. View "Burley v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Susan Miner was convicted of the offense of assault on a peace officer, a felony. Miner appealed, arguing that she received ineffective assistance of counsel because her counsel did not move for a mistrial when two consecutive prosecution witnesses inadvertently mentioned Miner's potential DUI charge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Miner was not prejudiced by the statements, there was no reasonable possibility that the testimony of the witnesses contributed to Miner's conviction; and (2) therefore, the second prong of Strickland v. Washington was not met because Miner was not prejudiced by her counsel's failure to make a motion for a mistrial, and her trial was fundamentally fair. View "State v. Miner" on Justia Law

Carl Murphy was injured while shopping at Home Depot. Murphy subsequently sued Home Depot. Counsel for both parties then began negotiating a settlement offer, but no settlement documents were executed. Home Depot moved to enforce the settlement agreement, arguing that Murphy's counsel agreed to a "global settlement" via his correspondence with Home Depot's counsel. The district court granted Home Depot's motion, determining that the parties formed a binding settlement agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no mutual consent between Murphy and Home Depot because there was no agreement on the essential terms of the settlement agreement, and therefore, no settlement agreement was ever reached between the parties. Remanded. View "Murphy v. Home Depot" on Justia Law