Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The child abuse and neglect proceedings (DN cases) at issue here commenced with the filing of a petition for emergency protective services, adjudication as youth in need of care and temporary legal custody. Parent was served with a show cause order on February 5, 2012. On February 7, the office of public defender filed a notice of appearance on behalf of Parent. The court continued the show cause hearing until February 22. On February 21, Parent filed a motion to substitute judge. The district court concluded that Parent's initial appearance under Mont. Code Ann. 3-1-804(1)(b) was February 7, the date of appearance of counsel, and therefore the motion for substitution was untimely and must be denied. Parent subsequently sought supervisory control. The Supreme Court granted Parent's petition, holding that the district court erred in determining that it was the date of appearance of counsel that started the clock running for purposes of a motion for substitution of judge in a DN proceeding, as it is the date upon which a parent first appears in court to answer the allegations of a DN petition that constitutes her initial appearance for purposes of the substitution statute. Remanded. View "A.C. v. Judicial Dist. Court " on Justia Law

Appellees, Kristine Kittleson and James Kurtzenacker, purchased property pursuant to a warranty deed that referenced surveys conducted by Davis Surveying. Appellants, Davis Surveying and Kenneth Davis claimed they had nothing to do with Appellees until after they had purchased their property. Appellees sued Appellants, alleging negligent misrepresentation, negligence, and breach of contract based on a third-party beneficiary theory and claiming that because of Clark's incorrect flagging, they trespassed on neighboring property and needed to remove part of their landscaping and construction work. The district court held that Appellants were liable for breach of contract under a third-party beneficiary theory and for negligent misrepresentation. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court erred in determining that Appellees were third-party beneficiaries of a contract for a prior survey, but while the court erred in this reasoning, it reached the right result under Appellees' negligent misrepresentation claim; (2) the court did not err in determining that Appellees were entitled to damages based on negligent misrepresentation; and (3) there was a lack of substantial evidence to support the court's determination that Davis was personally liable to Appellees for work done by Davis Surveying. View "Krutzenacker v. Davis Surveying, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in these two consolidated appeals was whether the district court properly calculated the time period in which to file a motion for substitution of district judge in youth court and on an appeal from justice court. Petitioners, two youths who appeared in court or detention hearings and a defendant who pled guilty in justice court to driving under the influence, petitioned for writ of supervisory control, claiming that the district court incorrectly denied as untimely their motions for substitution of district court judge in those cases. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the district court improperly determined that the youths had filed untimely motions for substitution of district judge; and (2) the district court properly calculated the time period in which to file a motion for substitution of district court on the appeal from justice court. View "Bledsoe v. Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Tristeana Johnson was found guilty of the charge of criminal possession of marijuana, a misdemeanor. Johnson appealed the court's order denying her motion to dismiss the charge of criminal possession of marijuana and the court's subsequent judgment and order convicting her of that charge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Johnson's motion to dismiss the charge of criminal possession of marijuana, as the Montana's Medical Marijuana Act (MMA) is clear and unambiguous on its face, and the district court's interpretation harmonized the statutes within the MMA; and (2) there was sufficient evidence for the district court to convict Johnson of the charge. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Jennifer and Elo Nielsen commenced an action against Andreas Hornsteiner seeking injunctive relief and damages for actions Hornsteiner took that allegedly interfered with the Nielsens' use of their easement. Horsteiner failed to file an answer within twenty days, and therefore, the district court entered a default judgment against Hornsteiner. Hornsteiner filed a motion to set aside the default for good cause. The district court denied the motion. Thereafter, the court permanently enjoined Hornsteiner from blocking the easement and awarded the Nielsens their costs and attorney's fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to set aside the entry of default against Hornsteiner; and (2) Hornsteiner waived his objection to the award of attorney's fees. View "Nielson v. Hornsteiner" on Justia Law

Appellant Daniel Burns pleaded guilty to one felony count of sexual abuse of children. The Supreme Court remanded for the purpose of striking a portion of the district court's restitution order. Burns subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel from his public defender. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Burns had not presented a sufficient argument to overcome the presumption that counsel's action and advice were outside the broad scope of reasonable professional conduct, and as Burns had not established that his counsel was ineffective, he had not presented good cause to withdraw his guilty plea. View "Burns v. State" on Justia Law

Trent Trier was charged with operating a motor vehicle with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent BAC or greater. The justice court explained that upon demand of a jury trial, the final pretrial conference required the physical appearance of Trier and his counsel and that default in appearance would effect a waiver of Trier's right to a jury trial. After Trier filed a demand for a jury trial, both Trier and his counsel failed to appear at the final pretrial conference. A non-jury trial was held, and the justice court found Trier guilty of operating a motor vehicle with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent BAC or greater. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the justice court correctly found Trier's non-appearance for a mandatory pretrial conference to be a waiver of his jury trial, and thereby properly dismissed Trier's appeal. View "State v. Trier" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Hardman was found guilty by a jury of deliberate homicide and tampering with the evidence. The district court sentenced Hardman to 110 years in prison with no parole eligibility for thirty years. Hardman appealed his conviction and sought a new trial, arguing (1) the district court made numerous erroneous evidentiary rulings amounting to cumulative error and requiring reversal, and (2) under the due process clause, the court's one-sided evidentiary rulings prevented him from effectively rebutting the State's case and presenting a defense, violating his right to a fair trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly exercised its discretion in all but one of its evidentiary rulings, and therefore, cumulative error did not warrant reversal of Hardman's conviction; and (2) since the holding on the first issue controlled, the constitutional argument was not considered. View "State v. Hardman" on Justia Law

Appellant Marla Ward filed suit seeking damages for personal injuries she sustained as she was sorting horses on Appellee Paul Johnson's property. Johnson resided in Pondera County. Johnson filed a motion to change venue, arguing that Pondera County was the appropriate place for trial because it was the only county where a defendant resided. Ward opposed the motion, asserting that case law permitted Ward to file her claim in Yellowstone County, her place of residence. The district court ruled in favor of Johnson. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Ward's decision to file her complaint in Yellowstone County was legally correct under Mont. Code Ann. 25-2-122(2)(b); and (2) the statute permitting Ward to file her action in the county of her residence did not deprive Johnson of the equal protection of the laws. View "Ward v. Johnson" on Justia Law

A jury convicted George Moore of felony driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. The district court sentenced Moore to thirteen months' incarceration followed by a suspended commitment to the department of corrections for five years. The court also imposed appointed counsel costs of $1,340, prosecution costs of $100, and jury costs of $1,447. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred by failing to investigate Moore's financial circumstances, including his ability to pay the jury costs, appointed counsel costs, and prosecution costs. Remanded to the district court for a determination as to whether Moore could afford the appointed counsel costs, prosecution costs, and jury costs. View "State v. Moore" on Justia Law