Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The State charged Anthony Leyva with sexual intercourse without consent. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the State dismissed the charge and filed an amended information charging Leyva with burglary by remaining unlawfully in the victim's home with the purpose to commit a sexual assault therein. Defendant was subsequently convicted of burglary following his plea of guilty. The district court sentenced him to twenty years in prison, fifteen years of which the court suspended on numerous conditions. Leyva appealed the conditions of his suspended sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court erred in imposing a condition designating Leyva as a Level II sexual offender, as, pursuant to controlling precedent, a district court cannot attach a sexual offender designation to a burglary conviction. Remanded for correction of the sentence. View "State v. Leyva" on Justia Law

The district court determined that Plaintiffs Nigel and Jami Davis held an easement over the properties of Defendants, four property owners, and that the Davises could use the easement for the purpose of accessing their nearby property. The district court permanently enjoined Defendants from placing any gate across the easement unless they provided the Davises with a means to pass through the gate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a 1974 declaration of easements and a 1974 certificate of survey referenced in the declaration were sufficient to create an access easement benefitting the Davises' off-survey property; and (2) an express easement may be appurtenant to noncontinguous property if both tenements are clearly defined and it was the parties' intent that it be appurtenant. View "Davis v. Hall" on Justia Law

Defendant entered into a contract for deed for the sale and purchase of Plaintiffs' building. After Defendant discontinued making payments and failed to pay property taxes as required by the contract, Plaintiffs obtained Defendant' quit claim deed from escrow, recorded it, retook possession of the building, and resold the contract. Plaintiffs then filed suit against Defendant for breach of contract. Defendant moved to summary judgment, arguing that because Plaintiffs chose to terminate the contract, take possession, and retain contract payments as liquidated damages rather than sue for the accelerated balance and additional damages under the contract, their breach of contract action was precluded under the election of remedies doctrine. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs elected to invoke the remedy of terminating the contract and retaking possession of the property, and that election, under the contract provisions at issue, precluded the additional relief sought here. View "Kaufman Bros. v. Home Value Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant Cale Hauer was convicted of unlawful restraint, assault with a weapon, partner or family member assault, and aggravated assault. Hauser was sentenced to eighteen months' incarceration and forty-five years' imprisonment. The convictions stemmed from three separate arrests occurring in Missoula. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err when it prohibited Hauer from testifying that an altercation leading to the first arrest was caused by Hauer walking in on the victim purposely cutting herself; and (2) Hauer was not prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel agreed not to introduce evidence of the victim's intentional cutting. View "State v. Hauer" on Justia Law

Cassadie and Chris Parish were injured in a motor vehicle accident when their vehicle was struck by an uninsured driver. United Financial Casualty Insurance Company (UFC) provided insurance coverage to the Parishes, including uninsured motorist (UM) coverage. The Parishes, who had two vehicles insured on their UFC policy at the time of the accident, argued they should be permitted to stack the UM benefits provided in their policy. UFC refused, stating that the Parishes' policy did not allow stacking. The Parishes sued seeking declaratory judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of UFC. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting UFC's motion for summary judgment, as, inter alia, the policy was unambiguous and UFC's insurance agreement did not create a reasonable expectation of stacked UM coverage. View "Parish v. Morris" on Justia Law

In 1976 Cecilia Kincaid Bates, grantor, and co-trustees George Kincaid and Richard Peterson entered into a trust agreement establishing the Cecilia Kincaid Gift Trust for George. George was Cecilia's son and died in 2009. In 2010 the co-trustees filed a final account, petition for settlement, distribution, and termination of the trust. When distributing the proceeds of the trust, the district court determined that Jennifer, George's child who was born and given up for adoption after the trust was established, should be included in the trust distribution. The trustees appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the plain language of the trust, Jennifer was not a descendant of George because she was adopted and was therefore regarded as the lawful blood descendant of the adopting parent or parents. Remanded. View "In re Kincaid Gift Trust" on Justia Law

Thomas Evans pleaded guilty to felony issuance of bad checks and received a suspended sentence. Evans was subsequently charged with misdemeanor partner or family member assault. As a result, the district court revoked Evans' suspended sentence after revocation proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court did not lack jurisdiction to conduct the revocation proceedings; (2) Evans received due process of the law; (3) the State established grounds for revocation by a preponderance of the evidence; but (4) the district court erred in failing to award Evans credit for time served in jail prior to the revocation of his suspended sentence. Remanded. View "State v. Evans" on Justia Law

While driving his motorcycle, William Cleary struck a deer. Cleary was transported to the hospital, where a consensual blood alcohol content test revealed a BAC of .18. The State filed an information charging Cleary with felony driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs (DUI). The felony charges were based upon Cleary's Montana driving record, which reported three previous DUIs, two in Montana and one in South Dakota. Cleary moved to have the felony dismissed, arguing that he should not be subject to the enhanced felony charges because the DUI issued in South Dakota was not a "prior conviction." The district court denied his motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Cleary's South Dakota offense was neither a conviction nor a sentence for Montana purposes, and the expungement of the charge precluded it from being counted as a previous conviction for sentence enhancement purposes. Remanded. View "State v. Cleary" on Justia Law

Appellee Dawn Lewton filed a petition for separation in the district court from Appellant John Lewton. The petition for separation was converted into a petition for dissolution. Following a trial, the district court distributed the marital property, awarded Dawn attorney fees, and awarded Dawn back child support owed by John. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err (1) by failing to make a finding of the net worth of the marital estate and when apportioning the marital estate; (2) by awarding attorney fees to Dawn; (3) by awarding maintenance to Dawn; and (4) in awarding back support to Dawn. View "In re Marriage of Lewton" on Justia Law

The Montana Legislature enacted Senate Bill 268 (SB 268), which submitted to the electorate the question whether certain statutory changes should be made regarding the election of justices to the Montana Supreme Court. SB 268 was to be submitted to the voters at a special election and was to appear on the ballot as Legislative Referendum No. 119 (LR-119). Plaintiffs, Montana citizens, taxpayers, and electors, sought a declaratory judgment that LR-119 was constitutionally defective. The district court granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs and ordered the Secretary of State to decertify LR-119 and enjoined the Secretary from presenting LR-119 on the election ballot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the non-retiring justices on the Court were not required to recuse themselves from participating in the decision of this appeal; (2) Plaintiffs' constitutional challenge to LR-119 was justiciable; (3) LR-119's proposed amendments to the qualifications and structure of the Supreme Court were facially unconstitutional; and (4) the constitutionally infirm provisions of LR-119 were not severable from the remainder of the referendum. View "Reichert v. State" on Justia Law