Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Montana Supreme Court
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Petitioner Dustin Robison appealed a district court order which reversed the findings of the State Tax Appeals Board (STAB) and reinstated the findings of the Montana Department of Revenue (DOR). This case concerned whether Petitioner was allowed to claim a deduction on his Montana income taxes for certain mileage as a business travel expense. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Department of Revenue's decision. View "Robison v. Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Billie L. Redding asked the Supreme Court to exercise supervisory control over the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, and to conclude it was error for the District Court to grant partial summary judgment to Defendants Timothy Janiak; Anderson ZurMuehlen & Co., P.C.; Ray E. Petersen; and Rick Ahmann. Petitioner's case arose from a series of real estate transactions by which she sold her property to Defendants for which she would receive payments from them which would serve as her monthly income. The scheme by which Defendants paid Petitioner and their other real estate clients collapsed in 2008 (as a Ponzi scheme), and they filed for bankruptcy. Petitioner sued, alleging: (1) unlawful sale of securities; (2) negligence; (3) negligent misrepresentation; (4) breach of fiduciary duty; (5) breach of contract; and (6) tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Petitioner sought damages in the amount of $4,635,485.51, plus additional amounts for punitive damages, emotional distress, loss of established course of life, and consequential damages. Petitioner moved for summary judgment on several issues, the only issue before the Court was whether the "investments" Petitioner made with Defendants qualified as "securities" under the state Securities Act. The district court found that Petitioner "did not engage in a common enterprise," an essential element of an investment contract (i.e. a security), because she "did not share the risks of the investment with other investors because she agreed upon a contractually set return on her investment." Upon review, the Supreme Court determined that supervisory control was appropriate in this case and that the real estate transactions in question here were indeed securities. Accordingly the Court granted Petitioner's request for a Writ of Supervisory Control. View "Redding v. Montana 1st Jud. District" on Justia Law

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The United States District Court for the District of Montana, Helena Division certified the following question to this Court: "Is obesity that is not the symptom of a physiological condition a 'physical or mental impairment' as it is used in Montana Code Annotated 49-2-101(19)(a)?" Respondent Eric Feit filed an administrative complaint with the Montana Department of Labor and Industry (Department) alleging that Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company (BNSF) illegally discriminated against him because of perceived disability. A hearing officer for the Department entered summary disposition in favor of Respondent, concluding that "BNSF engaged in and is liable for a discriminatory refusal to hire Feit because it regarded him as disabled" and awarded damages for lost wages and benefits, prejudgment interest, and emotional distress. BNSF filed an unsuccessful appeal with the Montana Human Rights Commission, which was then presented to the U.S. District Court. Upon review, the Montana Supreme Court accepted the certified question and answered it "yes." View "BNSF Railway Co. v. Feit" on Justia Law

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Respondent-Appellant Chad Cringle appealed a district court order that remanded his case to the Montana Human Rights Commission for further proceedings in his discrimination complaint against Petitioner-Appellee BNSF Railway Company (BNSF). The issue on appeal was whether BNSF demonstrated sufficient grounds to excuse its noncompliance with a fourteen-day filing deadline. In 2008, Respondent filed a complaint with the Montana Department of Labor and Industry charging that BNSF had illegally discriminated against him in employment. Following proceedings on the issues of damages and affirmative relief, the hearing officer issued a final decision in Respondent's favor. That same day, the hearing officer issued notice of his decision by mail to the parties. BNSF received the decision the next day. A legal secretary discovered the decision under papers on her desk nineteen days after it was received. By that time, the decision had become final and "not appealable." BNSF filed a notice of appeal, asking for an extension of time in which to file its notice of appeal. Respondent objected to the request. The Commission denied BNSF's appeal. BNSF sought judicial review; The Commission and Respondent filed separate motions to dismiss BNSF's petition. BNSF then appealed the district court's dismissal of its petition, arguing that the district court erred in interpreting the fourteen-day filing deadline as "jurisdictional" and asked the Supreme Court to hold that the Commission had authority to extend the deadline to file the appeal. The case came before the Supreme Court a second time, the last issue to decide was whether BNSF had shown good cause for its untimely filing. Upon review, the Court concluded BNSF failed to justify relief from the deadline. View "BNSF Railway Co. v. Cringle" on Justia Law

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The Medical Marijuana Growers Association, Inc., Courier 1, Courier 2, Caregiver 1, Caregiver 2, and Caregiver 3 (collectively referred to as Plaintiffs) appealed an Order and Rationale on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Order), entered by the Eleventh Judicial District Court of Flathead County, Montana. The Order determined that caregivers, as providers of medical marijuana to qualifying patients under Montana’s 2009 Medical Marijuana Act, were not permitted to engage in marijuana transactions with or provide cultivation services to other caregivers or their agents or contractors. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the plain language of the statute clear and unambiguous: "A caregiver is authorized to provide marijuana to qualifying patients only. The 2009 MMA does not provide for the transfer of marijuana or paraphernalia from caregiver to caregiver or among their agents, nor is there a provision allowing for a caregiver to cultivate marijuana for other caregivers or for their agents or contractors." Therefore, the Court affirmed the determination of the District Court that the 2009 MMA does not permit the exchange of marijuana among caregivers, nor does it permit a caregiver to cultivate or manufacture marijuana for another caregiver. View "Medical Marijuana Growers Association, Inc. v. Corrigan" on Justia Law

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Mary and David W. Johnson were married on June 12, 1993. In May 2003, David filed a petition for dissolution and in June 2003 the parties entered a Settlement Agreement, which distributed the marital estate. Mary was served and defaulted. A decree of dissolution was entered on June 23, 2003, incorporating the provisions of the parties’ Settlement Agreement and finding it was not unconscionable. The decree stated that “there are no minor children of the parties hereto, and [Mary] is not pregnant at this time.” In 2007, Mary filed an action to set aside the decree, alleging that David had failed to disclose and list properties in the Settlement Agreement, and requesting that the marital estate be re-distributed. On November 25, 2008, in response to Mary’s motion for summary judgment, the district court entered an order setting aside the marital property division. The court concluded that David “knowingly failed to disclose material items of property and assets” and made affirmative misrepresentations to Mary to induce an uncontested judgment, which “constitute[d] extrinsic fraud sufficient to warrant setting aside of the resulting void property rights judgment as a matter of equity in order to fairly and properly account for, value, characterize, and equitably distribute the undisclosed property and assets in consideration of the parties’ prior settlement agreement.” The court ultimately determined that Mary was entitled to a total payment in the sum of $69,948.65 for the value of undisclosed assets, with interest thereon at 10 percent per annum from June 23, 2003. The court ordered each party to bear his or her own attorney fees and costs. The court gave brief mention to frozen embryos the parties had prepared for purposes of in vitro fertilization, stating that Mary testified that she should receive the embryos and that David testified that he objected to Mary receiving the embryos and requested they be donated to science. The court ordered that they be donated to science. On appeal, Mary challenged the District Court’s property distribution and assessment of attorney fees. David cross-appealed the court's grant of some of his pre-marital property. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Mary failed in various respects to carry her burden of proof on many property issues and the attendant issue of attorney fees. Further, the Court concluded the district court did not err in awarding some of David’s pre-marital property to Mary. With regard to the embryos, the Court concluded that the issue was not properly before the courts within this proceeding. The Court reversed the district court's order donating the embryos to science and left the issue to be addressed in the appropriate proceeding. View "Marriage of Johnson" on Justia Law

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Defendant-Appellant Robert Shipley appealed a district court order which granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee BNSF Railway Company. BNSF leased commercial property in Miles City, Montana, to Shipley. The lease provided that either party could terminate the lease upon 30 days written notice. Shipley failed to pay rent to BNSF for a number of years. This failure by Shipley resulted in overdue rent payments of $17,700. BNSF notified Shipley on January 7, 2011, that the Lease Agreement would be cancelled and terminated in 30 days, effective on February 10, 2011. The Lease Agreement also required that Shipley remove all improvements and personal property from the leased premises within the 30 days of the lease termination. Shipley failed to remove the items. BNSF provided Shipley with a 60 day extension to remove the items. Shipley again refused to remove the items. Shipley’s refusal prompted BNSF to file a complaint to quiet title to the improvements and personal property, a declaratory judgment that BNSF had terminated the lease validly, trespass, unlawful detainer, and claim for reasonable rent. Shipley acknowledged that he owed $17,700 in rent. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that no genuine issue of material fact existed and that the district court correctly granted summary judgment. View "BNSF v. Shipley" on Justia Law

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Appellants James J. and Linda L. Clark appealed a district court order that approved the filing of an amended certificate of survey, approved a settled agreement, and required each party to pay one-half of the fees and costs relative to a surveyor agreed upon by the parties. Appellees Bill and Katy Martin purchased the Fishtail General Store from Clarks in May 2000. The sewer system for the Fishtail General Store failed in July 2005. Keith Brown, a licensed Professional Engineer, designed a replacement septic wastewater disposal sewer system. The Stillwater County Health Department issued a replacement sewer system permit, and the Martins installed the new sewer system north of the Fishtail General Store on "Tract 2-A." A number of unresolved issues remained between Clarks and Martins. Clarks and Martins ultimately jointly petitioned to relocate the boundary lines between Tract 2-A and property owned by Clarks. The District Court approved the boundary line relocation. This relocation reduced the size of Tract 2-A. The new sewer system failed again in 2009. Martins requested that Clarks allow Martins to use land located outside the adjusted boundary line to install the two additional laterals. Clarks refused. Martins filed a motion pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) for relief from the district court’s order of June 7, 2006 that had approved the boundary line relocation. The parties advised the District Court at the conclusion of a pre-trial conference that they had reached a settlement. The court ordered the parties to hire Tom Kelly, a licensed surveyor, to prepare a certificate of survey that would implement the Septic System Easement Agreement. Martins then filed a motion asking the court to approve a Corrected Tract 2-A Amended Certificate of Survey prepared by Kelly. Clarks argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the District Court incorrectly determined that the Corrected Tract 2-A'a Amended COS did not change the boundaries between the Clarks’ and Martins’ tracts. Clarks further contended that the District Court improperly concluded that Martins’ proposed septic system agreement accurately reflected the agreement of the parties. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that there was substantial evidence in the district court record to support the court's ultimate decision in this case. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Clark v. Martin" on Justia Law

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Pro se Defendant Ronald Petersen appealed a district court order that denied his petition for post-conviction relief and his motion to suppress his confession. In January 2009, Defendant pled guilty to Deliberate Homicide in the shooting death of Clyde Wilson. After initially pleading not guilty, Defendant executed an Acknowledgment of Rights and Plea Agreement wherein he agreed to plead guilty to the charge of Deliberate Homicide in connection with Wilson's death, and the State agreed to recommend a sentence of 100 years with no time suspended. Defendant changed his mind on the plea agreement: he claimed that he was manipulated and pressured into pleading guilty. In addition, Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress Confession claiming that his confession was coerced. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Defendant's claim that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because the District Court rejected the plea agreement, was already decided against him in his direct appeal to the Supreme Court. The doctrine of res judicata barred relitigation of that issue when it was adequately raised on direct appeal. Moreover, the Court found that Defendant waived the right to raise his remaining claims when he pled guilty. Accordingly the Court held that all of Defendant's claims raised on appeal were procedurally barred, and affirmed the district court's denial of his petition for relief. View "Petersen v. Montana" on Justia Law

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Defendant Thomas Evans appealed the revocation of his suspended sentence. In 2003, Defendant pled guilty to issuing bad checks for which he was sentenced to a five-year commitment to the Department of Corrections. Defendant was given credit for nineteen days served pending final disposition. The sentence was suspended pursuant to conditions, and was to run consecutive to a prior Missioula County sentence, also for issuing bad checks. One of the conditions of his suspended sentence was that he “remain law-abiding.” Late 2010, Missoula law enforcement responded to a report that Defendant had assaulted his former girlfriend. The felony assault charge was eventually dismissed, but Defendant retained a misdemeanor PFMA count. The district court denied his motion to dismiss and revoked Defendant's suspended sentence. Defendant appealed and raised several issues on appeal: (1) the District Court lacked jurisdiction to conduct the revocation proceedings; (2) Defendant was denied due process; (3) Defendant challenged whether the State established grounds for revocation by a preponderance of the evidence; and (4) Defendant alleged that the District Court erred in failing to award him credit for time served in jail prior to the revocation of his suspended sentence. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court indeed miscalculated Defendant's credit for time served. The Court remanded the case so that the lower court could give Defendant additional credit for time served in the amount of ninety-five days for a total of 158 days. The District Court was affirmed in all other respects. View "Montana v. Evans" on Justia Law