Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a bench trial, Appellant was convicted of exploiting an older person, a felony. Prior to the commencement of the trial, the district court held a hearing on the competency of the victim to testify at trial. The court determined that the victim was competent to testify, but by the time of trial, the victim’s health had deteriorated and she was unable to testify. At trial, Appellant asked the district court to admit a transcript of the victim’s testimony at the competency hearing. The district court denied the request, determining that the victim’s competency hearing did not pertain to the issues in the bench trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly applied Mont. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) and did not abuse its discretion in determining that the prior testimony was not sufficiently reliable to come within the exception to the rule excluding hearsay. View "State v. Homer" on Justia Law

To secure a loan, Plaintiff executed a promissory note naming ABN AMRO Mortgage Group (ABN) as the note holder. ABN later merged with CitiMortgage, Inc., which became the holder of Plaintiff’s note. CitiMortgage notified Plaintiff that her balloon payment was due and that she could either make the payment or exercise her “reset option.” Plaintiff did not notify CitiMortgage of her intent to exercise the reset option and did not make the payment. The property was foreclosed. CitiMortgage purchased the property and conveyed it to Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA). Plaintiff filed a complaint against FNMA and CitiMortgage (Defendants). Plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, asserting that no evidence of the transfer of the note from ABN to CitiMortgage had been produced during discovery. Defendants subsequently produced a copy of the certificate of merger between ABN and CitiMortgage. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that the untimely disclosure was harmless. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to impose sanctions against Defendants for discovery violations; and (2) the clause requiring Plaintiff to give written notice of her intent to exercise the reset option was not an unenforceable contract of adhesion or a violation of the Montana Consumer Protection Act. View "Doherty v. Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n" on Justia Law

After Petitioner was involved in an accident from allegedly hitting a building with his truck, Petitioner was cited for DUI, third offense. Petitioner’s driver’s license was seized based on his refusal to submit to a blood or breath test. Defendant subsequently filed a petition to reinstate his driver’s license. The hearing on Petitioner’s petition was continued several times. Meanwhile, a jury found Defendant not guilty of the underlying DUI charge. Based on this acquittal and “res judicata and/or collateral estoppel” principles, Petitioner filed a petition asking the district court to enter judgment against the State on his petition and to permanently reinstate his license. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in denying Petitioner’s petition for reinstatement of his driver’s license, as the acquittal in municipal court did not establish res judicata or collateral estoppel in Petitioner’s reinstatement proceeding. View "Ditton v. Dep't of Justice Motor Vehicle Div." on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant with aggravated assault against his wife and criminal endangerment. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of criminal endangerment and the lesser offense of assault. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) criminal endangerment is a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault, and charging both crimes is prohibited by statute, and (2) his counsel provided ineffective assistance when he failed to invoke Mont. Code Ann. 46-18-225, which requires a sentencing court to evaluate specific criteria when assessing imprisonment alternatives for non-violent offenders. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant was not simultaneously convicted on a lesser and greater offense; and (2) Defendant suffered no prejudice from his counsel’s conduct at sentencing. View "Zink v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of felony theft by insurance fraud. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the district court did not err when it instructed the jury that an insurance administrator is a person who adjusts or settles claims; (2) the Court declines to exercise plain error review of the State’s remarks during closing argument; (3) the district court did not err by ordering Defendant to pay restitution when the affidavit of loss was prepared by an independent adjuster; and (4) Defendant’s claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel must be raised in a postconviction proceeding before a district court, where an evidentiary record may be developed. View "State v. Schaeffer" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of incest in violation of Mont. Code Ann. 45-5-507. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the district court correctly interpreted the Court’s decision in State v. Anderson, and did not abuse its discretion, when it prohibited Appellant from examining the victim regarding alleged false accusations of sexual assault; (2) the jury instructions fairly and fully instructed the jury as to the applicable law; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion for a new trial on grounds of juror misconduct; and (4) several portions of Appellant’s sentence were illegal, including conditions of parole, the order to pay restitution, and the requirement to pay “all future costs of incarceration and medical costs while incarcerated.” View "State v. Ring" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of felony incest involving his fourteen-year-old son and six-year-old daughter and of tampering with the evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed. Defendant later petition for postconviction relief, setting forth three grounds upon which he claimed that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. The district court denied Defendant’s petition for postconviction relief, concluding that even if Defendant’s representation was deficient, it would not have created a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been any different. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in concluding that even if counsel’s conduct was constitutionally deficient, Defendant failed to show that he was prejudiced. View "Stock v. Montana" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident caused by another driver. As a result of the accident, Plaintiff sustained both bodily injury and property damage. Plaintiff carried an automobile insurance policy through United Services Automobile Association General Indemnity Company (USAA). USAA paid vehicle repair and car rental costs, after which it sought subrogation for the property damage expenses from the tortfeasor’s automobile liability insurer. Plaintiff subsequently filed an action on behalf of himself and a putative class of plaintiffs, alleging that USAA violated Montana law by seeking subrogation for property damage loss before its insured had been made whole with respect to related personal injuries. The U.S. district court certified a question to the Montana Supreme Court, which answered by holding that Montana law does not prohibit an insurer from exercising its right of subrogation under the limited, specific circumstances presented in the certified question. View "Orden v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of sexual assault, a felony, and sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the prosecutor’s statements during closing argument regarding the truthfulness of witness testimony did not rise to the level of plain error; and (2) the district court did not deny abuse its discretion when it determined that a new trial was not warranted in the interest of justice after the court sua sponte questioned a key defense witness, as the inquiry did not serve to deny Defendant a fair trial. View "State v. Walton" on Justia Law

Mid-Continent Casualty Company provided comprehensive general liability insurance to Scentry Biologicals, the manufacturer of NoMate, a pest control product designed to protect agricultural crops from destructive insects. Applewood Orchards purchased NoMate from Wilbur-Ellis (W-E), a distributor of NoMate, and used the product on its apple crop to protect against moths. After Applewood discovered significant moth damage, it filed a tort action against Scentry and W-E. Scentry and W-E requested that Mid-Continent defend them under Scentry’s policy. Mid-Continent agreed to defend Scentry, reserving its right to determine its coverage obligations later, but refused to defend W-E. Applewood settled with W-E, and a court ruled against Scentry and in favor of Applewood. Meanwhile, Scentry filed a declaratory judgment against against Mid-Continent seeking declaratory relief on coverage issues. W-E and Applewood intervened. The district court granted summary judgment for and awarded damages to Scentry, Applewood, and W-E. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting the summary judgment motions filed by Scentry, Applewood, and W-E. View "Scentry Biologicals, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co." on Justia Law