Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant appealed from his conviction in the district court of one count of felony aggravated assault. Appellant argued (1) his conviction should be reversed under the plain error doctrine because law enforcement failed to investigate his claim of justifiable use of force as required by Mont. Code Ann. 45-3-112; and (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to move for dismissal of his charge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant failed to establish that any alleged failure of law enforcement officials to comply with section 45-3-112 prejudiced his defense requiring the Court to exercise plain error review; and (2) Appellant failed to establish that his counsel's representation was ineffective. View "State v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant Bobby Cooksey was convicted of deliberate homicide. The district court sentenced Appellant to a term of fifty years in prison with credit for time served. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly denied Appellant's motion for a new trial; (2) the district court properly excluded Appellant's offered evidence concerning the presence of the drug Paxil in the deceased's blood; (3) the investigation of the crime was conducted in compliance with Mont. Code Ann. 45-12-112; and (4) Appellant failed to establish that the prosecution's statements during closing argument constituted unfairly prejudicial misconduct. View "State v. Cooksey" on Justia Law

In this real property dispute about asserted easement rights, the district court ruled in favor of Defendant and in favor of Plaintiff on others. The court concluded neither party had "prevailed" as required by Mont. Code Ann. 70-17-112(5) and declined to award attorney fees and costs. Plaintiff appealed the district court's rulings in favor of Defendant but did not appeal the court's ruling pertaining to attorney fees. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's ruling in favor of Defendant. On remand, the district court denied Plaintiff's request for attorney fees and costs, holding (1) Plaintiff should have appealed the issue of attorney fees on the first appeal, and (2) Plaintiff had not prevailed on all issues raised under section 70-17-112, and therefore was not entitled to fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Plaintiff did not prevail on all claims, it was not entitled to fees and costs under section 70-17-112. View "Musselshell Ranch Co. v. Joukova" on Justia Law

C.R., D.B.J.'s step-father and guardian, appealed the termination of his guardianship of D.B.J, who was adjudicated to be a youth in need of care. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not violate C.R.'s right to due process by excluding him from a show cause hearing and a permanency plan hearing; (2) the district court complied with the requirements of Mont. Code Ann. 41-3-432 by holding an initial show cause hearing nineteen days after the filing of the initial abuse and neglect petition; and (3) the district court properly removed C.R. as a guardian pursuant to the best interests of the child standard at Mont. Code Ann. 72-5-234. View "In re D.B.J." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an action against a district court judge, seeking damages for the judge's acts or omissions while presiding over a telephone pretrial conference in a civil action then pending before him. At all relevant times the judge was acting in his official capacity as a district court judge with regard to that case and the pretrial conference. The district court granted the judge's motion to dismiss on the grounds of judicial immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the acts of which Plaintiff complained occurred while the judge was conducting the pretrial conference and were clearly within the authority and responsibility of a district court judge, the judge was immune from suit, and the district court properly dismissed Plaintiff's complaint. View "Hartsoe v. McNeil" on Justia Law

Employer terminated Employee's employment after receiving complaints regarding poor service and use of inappropriate language by Employee. The Department of Labor & Industry concluded Employee was not qualified for unemployment insurance benefits because she had been discharged for misconduct. A hearing officer awarded unemployment benefits to Employee, concluding that Employee had not been deliberately rude and thus had not engaged in misconduct. The Board of Labor Appeals affirmed. Employer petitioned for judicial review. The Department and Board filed a notice of non-participation indicating they would not participate in the proceeding but reserved the right to intervene if issues arose pertaining to them. The district court reversed, holding that Employee's conduct as established by the hearing officer's findings of fact constituted misconduct as a matter of law under the carelessness standard of Admin. R. M 24.11.460(1)(d). The Department appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Department did not preserve its evidentiary arguments for appeal; and (2) the district court did not err by determining that the evidence found by the Department constituted misconduct as a matter of law under the carelessness standard. View "Gary & Leo's Fresh Foods v. Dep't of Labor & Indus." on Justia Law

Johnson Farms, Inc. and Floyd Johnson filed a complaint against Ethel Halland alleging (1) in her capacity as secretary of Johnson Farms, Inc., Ethel breached her fiduciary duties by diverting corporate funds to herself and others; and (2) Ethel conferred gifts to herself and other family members in contravention of a written trust agreement. The district court granted Ethel's motion for summary judgment, finding that the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations and that equitable estoppel did not toll the statute of limitations. The district court also awarded Ethel attorneys' fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Johnson's claims were barred by the statute of limitations; and (2) the district court did not err in awarding Ethel attorneys' fees and costs. View "Johnson Farms, Inc. v. Halland" on Justia Law

James Turner and Julie Viers opened a line of credit with Wells Fargo Bank and granted Wells Fargo a deed of trust on property they owned as security for the line of credit. Later, John Turner, Christina Turner, and Sandy Couch (the John Turners) purchased the property. Julie and James paid off the entire outstanding balance under the credit line agreement using the proceeds from the sale of the property to the John Turners, but Julie subsequently borrowed $169,090 under the credit line agreement secured by the property. Thereafter, Wells Fargo refused to release the deed of trust. The John Turners then filed a complaint to quiet title to the property. The district court granted Wells Fargo's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the John Turners could not enforce the terms of the credit line agreement because they were not intended beneficiaries of the agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded (1) the John Turners were not entitled to judgment requiring Wells Fargo to release the deed of trust the bank held on the property; and (2) the John Turners failed to establish prima facie claims of promissory or equitable estoppel. View "Turner v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

LR-123 was enacted by the Montana Legislature in 2011. It proposed a vote in the November 2012 general election on whether to provide a tax credit and potential tax refund, or outright State payment, to individuals in years in which there is a certain level of projected surplus revenue. Plaintiffs filed a complaint contending LR-123 was unconstitutional because it unlawfully delegated legislative powers. The constitutional issue in this case turned upon whether LR-123 impermissibly delegated legislative power to an employee (the legislative fiscal analyst) of one of the Legislature's committees. The district court found that LR-123 unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the legislative fiscal analyst. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that LR-123 was unconstitutional on its face and therefore may not appear on the ballot in November 2012. View "MEA-MFT v. McCulloch" on Justia Law

Sarah Wheeldon petitioned for dissolution of her marriage to Corey Wheeldon on April 20, 2009. Following a bench trial, the district court issued findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a decree of dissolution that dissolved the parties' marriage and divided the remaining marital estate. Corey appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding (1) based on all the evidence, the district court acted within its discretion by granting Sarah primary residential custody of the children; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in its division of the parties' marital assets and liabilities. View "In re Parenting of Wheeldon" on Justia Law