Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This appeal pertained to the location of a partially-constructed horse barn in a planned unit development (PUD). Plaintiffs were the owner of the barn, the owner's contractor, and FPR Properties. After it was notified that the barn did not comply with the regulations and covenants and must be removed, FPR submitted an application to modify the conditional use permit of the PUD development to bring the location of the barn into compliance. The planning and zoning commission affirmed the code compliance specialist's determination that the barn violated zoning regulations and applicable covenants. The commission also denied FPR's request to modify the conditional use permit for the PUD. On appeal, the district affirmed the commission's rulings and dismissed FDR's takings claim without conducting a trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) affirming the commission's determination that the partially-constructed barn violated applicable zoning regulations and covenants and must be removed; (2) affirming the commission's denial of FPR's application to modify the PUD's conditional use permit; and (3) dismissing FPR's constitutional takings claim. View "Botz v. Bridger Canyon Planning & Zoning Comm'n" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of attempted sexual intercourse without consent, a felony. The district court sentenced Defendant to Montana State Prison for a term of fifteen years, with five suspended. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court did not violate Defendant's right to due process by excluding evidence of alleged sexual conversations between the complainant and Defendant and photos of third parties allegedly sent by the complainant to Defendant on the basis that they were irrelevant or more prejudicial than probative under the rules of evidence; and (2) Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was better examined within a postconviction relief proceeding. View "State v. Bishop" on Justia Law

The district court involuntarily committed and authorized the involuntary medication of thirty-year-old C.R. after it determined that he suffered from a mental disorder and that his condition met the statutory criteria for involuntary commitment to the Montana State Hospital. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly disregarded C.R.'s hearing testimony, as substantial evidence supported the court's findings that the testimony was unreliable; (2) the district court's failure to offer C.R. a court-appointed friend did not violate C.R.'s statutory or constitutional rights, as the appointment of a friend was not statutorily mandated; and (3) C.R. received effective assistance of counsel. View "In re C.R." on Justia Law

Katherine Beehler-Goodson was the mother of minor children E.G. and R.G., the wife of Plaintiff Robert Goodson, and the sister of Plaintiff Tony Beehler. While Katherine was undergoing a myelogram, bacteria were introduced into her cerebrospinal fluid, resulting in a meningitis infection, which caused her death. Plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice claim against Eastern Radiological Associates; Dr. Anne Giuliano, the radiologist who performed the myelogram; and St. Vincent Healthcare, alleging that Dr. Giuliano negligently failed to wear a mask during the myelogram, which resulted in bacteria traveling from Dr. Giuliano's uncovered mouth into Katherine's spinal column. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, finding (1) Plaintiff's proposed expert witness, Dr. Patrick Joseph, was not qualified to offer expert testimony on the applicable standards of care, breach, or causation; and (2) without Dr. Joseph's expert testimony, Plaintiffs lacked the necessary expert witness to establish the elements of medical negligence. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the court abused its discretion by excluding Dr. Joseph's testimony on the applicable standards of care and causation. View "Beehler v. E. Radiological Assocs., P.C." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of deliberate homicide stemming from the shooting death of his former roommate. On appeal, Defendant contended that the district court erred by instructing the jury it was prohibited from considering Defendant's intoxication when rendering its verdict in accordance with Mont. Code Ann. 45-2-203 because the statute violated a criminal defendant's due process right to present a defense. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the instructions given by the court fully and fairly instructed the jury on the applicable law and did not prejudice Defendant's right to present a defense, and therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by giving the instruction to the jury. View "State v. Myran" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant with DUI and two drug counts. The DUI count was charged as a felony because the State maintained that Defendant had three prior DUI convictions. Defendant had been convicted of DUI twice in Idaho and once in Montana. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the felony DUI charge arguing that his two Idaho DUI convictions should not be counted because the Idaho DUI statute was not similar to Montana's DUI statute. The district court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss, determining that while the statutes were not precisely identical, they were similar because they had characteristics in common and were alike in substance. Thereafter, pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to felony DUI, and the State dismissed the drug charges. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding that the district court did not err in determining that Idaho's DUI statute was similar enough to Montana's DUI statute to allow the enhancement of a Montana DUI to a felony. View "State v. Young" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was convicted for driving under the influence. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the district court erroneously allowed the results of a horizontal gaze nystagmus and preliminary breath test to be admitted at trial without expert testimony to establish the reliability of the tests, but the cumulative evidence of Defendant's intoxication presented at trial overcame any reasonable probability that the indirect admission of the test results contributed to Defendant's conviction; and (2) the district court properly exercised its discretion in excluding cross-examination regarding Defendant's blood alcohol content at the time that Defendant had been driving. View "State v. Chavez-Villa" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants asserting that a tree on Defendants' property was a nuisance and trespass because it blocked Plaintiff's view. The district court dismissed the complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) the district court properly granted Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's nuisance claim, as the naturally growing tree that obstructed Plaintiff's view did not constitute, as a matter of law, conduct that was "intentional, negligent, reckless, or ultrahazardous," "an inherently injurious act," or a condition which "obviously exposes another to probable injury;" but (2) the complaint adequately stated a legal claim for trespass because it alleged that the roots of Defendants' tree entered, remained on, and damaged Plaintiff's property. View "Martin v. Artis " on Justia Law

After Donald and Lora Wyrick filed for dissolution of their marriage, the district court struggled to resolve a convoluted child support arrangement that festered for nearly twenty years. Donald filed a motion for modification of child support in April 2009. Donald apparently signed an affidavit for his lawyer in October 2008 in support of the motion to modify child support, but Donald's lawyer failed to file the motion until April 2009. In December 2011, the district court determined it could not modify the amount of Donald's payments back to 2008 because Donald had failed to file his motion for modification until April 2009. The court ultimately ordered that Donald pay arrearages and concluded that he continued to owe child support. However, in an earlier order, the court declared that Donald owed no future obligation of child support to Lora and that Donald had overpaid child support. The Supreme Court (1) held that the district court lacked authority to extend the modification date to any date before April 2009, but (2) remanded the case because the district court offered no new finding of fact in its latter finding to support the change from its earlier finding. View "Wyrick v. Wyrick" on Justia Law

This was Defendant's second appeal to the Supreme Court. In the prior appeal, the Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of two counts of felony sexual assault and remanded the case for resentencing. The district court subsequently granted Defendant's petition for postconviction relief on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. In this interlocutory appeal, Defendant challenged the district court's order denying his motion to dismiss the criminal charges for which the State intended to re-prosecute him on double jeopardy grounds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant's constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy did not prohibit the State from re-prosecuting him after his conviction was overturned by the postconviction court's determination of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel. View "State v. Duncan" on Justia Law