Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of incest. The district court sentenced Defendant to 100 years in the Montana State Prison with a possibility of parole after fifty years. The district court designated Defendant a Level 3 sexual offender. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to conduct cross-examination of the State' witnesses at the sentencing hearing or failing to call any witnesses on Defendant's behalf; and (2) trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by making no alternative sentencing recommendation. View "State v. Peart" on Justia Law

In this dispute over real property, Roslyn Shephard, in her capacity as personal representative of the estates of real property owners (Lessors), terminated the third lease of Lessees based on an alleged violation of the terms of the lease. Shephard then sued Lessees, seeking to invalidate Lessees' third lease due to the fact that she had not signed it on Lessors' behalf. Shephard alternatively sought an order declaring that Lessees had breached the terms of the lease. Lessees counterclaimed, alleging that Shephard had breached the terms of the lease by wrongfully terminating the lease and by failing to provide notice to them of the alleged breach. The district court found in favor of Lessees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly determined that the lease was valid without Shephard's signature; (2) substantial evidence supported the district court's finding that Lessees had not violated the lease; and (3) the district court correctly determined that the terms of the lease entitled Lessees to notice of their alleged breach and an opportunity to cure. View "Shephard v. Widhalm" on Justia Law

Brenette Garrett and Jason LeProwse were the biological parents of T.G. In September 2011, the justice court issued a temporary order of protection (TOP) against LeProwse pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 40-15-201. Shortly thereafter, the justice court case was removed to the district court where the parties had been involved in a parenting action since 2008. The district court held a hearing on the TOP in October 2011 at which it heard considerable testimony from numerous witnesses. In January 2012, the court dissolved the TOP. The Supreme Court dismissed Garrett's appeal without prejudice, holding that the order dissolving the TOP was not immediately appealable because a final decision and resolution of all issues raised in the case had not yet been rendered. View "LeProwse v. Garrett" on Justia Law

Helena Sand and Gravel, Inc. (HSG) challenged Lewis and Clark County's decision to adopt a citizen-initiated proposal to configure a zoning district that favored residential uses and prohibited mining. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the County, concluding that the County had properly adopted the zoning pattern and regulations creating the district, and the County's zoning decision did not constitute a taking of HSG's property. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and remanded, holding (1) the County's decision to adopt the zoning pattern and regulations for the district was not clearly unreasonable or an abuse of discretion; (2) the County's adoption of zoning regulations prohibiting sand and gravel mining did not constitute illegal reverse spot zoning; and (3) because HSG had a constitutionally protected property interest in property within the district, the Court granted HSG's request for remand to the district court for the parties to brief the Penn Central takings test, narrowly limited to whether the County's adoption of the zoning pattern and regulations in the district constituted a taking of HSG's real property interest without just compensation. View "Helena Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought a declaratory ruling that Mont. Code Ann. 13-35-227(1) violated their constitutional rights to free speech by prohibiting political expenditures by corporations on behalf of or opposing candidates for public office. Plaintiffs argued that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United v. FEC barred Montana from prohibiting independent and indirect corporate expenditures on political speech, and that Montana's century-old ban on independent corporate expenditures therefore was invalid. The district court granted ATP's motion for summary judgment on the merits of its constitutional claim, declared section 13-35-227(1) unconstitutional, and denied ATP's request for attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding (1) the statute was constitutional; and (2) Plaintiffs' cross-appeal on the attorneys' fee issue, therefore, was moot. The Court's decision thereafter was reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Montana Supreme Court then returned to ATP's cross-appeal on the issue of attorneys' fees and affirmed the district court's order declining to award attorneys' fees to Plaintiffs, holding that equitable considerations did not require the district court to award fees against the State under either the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act or the private attorney general doctrine. View "W. Tradition P'ship, Inc. v. Attorney Gen." on Justia Law

Russell Sherman obtained loans for over $1,594,282 from the Whitefish Credit Union (WCU). Russell defaulted in paying the loans. WCU subsequently gave notice of default in a ten-day demand letter. Receiving no response from Russell or his wife, Joan, WCU waited an additional thirty days and then requested that the sheriff serve the Shermans. As it turned out, only Russell was served; Joan was not personally served with process. Russell failed to enter a timely appearance or answer WCU's complaint, and accordingly, the district court entered default judgment against the Shermans. Thereafter, the Shermans filed a motion to vacate and set aside the default judgment. The court denied the motion insofar as it applied to Russell but granted the motion insofar as it applied to Joan. Russell appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not slightly abuse its discretion in denying Russell's motion to vacate and set aside the default judgment entered against him. View "Whitefish Credit Union v. Sherman" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to felony arson for setting fire to a car and two dumpsters. After a sentencing hearing, the district court sentenced Defendant to a four-year suspended DOC commitment and required him to pay $1600 in restitution. It further imposed recommended probationary conditions, including that Defendant register as a violent offender and complete anger management classes and chemical dependency and mental health evaluations. Defendant challenged the sentencing condition requiring him to register as a violent offender. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court's sentencing condition requiring that Defendant register as a violent offender did not violate his constitutional right to privacy, as whatever limited expectation of privacy Defendant had as a violent offender in his whereabouts and residential information, the State's compelling interest in requiring that he register justified the enactment of the statute requiring registration. View "State v. Brooks" on Justia Law

Employee was injured while working for Employer. Because Employer failed to retain current worker's compensation insurance, Employee filed a claim with the Uninsured Employer's Fund, which the Fund accepted. The Fund sought indemnity from Employer for Employee's damages, and the parties agreed to an interim payment plan. However, the Fund ultimately turned Employer over to collection. Employer responded by suing the Fund for breach of contract. The district court granted Employer's summary judgment motion on the issue of whether the Fund had breached the repayment agreement. The district court then awarded damages to Employer in the amount of $198,749. The damages awarded largely centered on the court's implicit conclusion that the Fund's actions had interfered with Employer's ability to obtain financing, which, in turn, hurt Employer's sales. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly (1) determined Employer was entitled to summary judgment on the question of whether the Fund had breached the payment plan agreement; (2) determined Employer could receive consequential damages for the Fund's breach of contract; (3) denied the Fund's motion for post-trial relief; (3) calculated damages; and (4) denied Employer's damage claim for ten years of lost profits. View "Elk Mountain Motor Sports, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus." on Justia Law

Shortly after Defendant was charged with DUI, she notified the police department that she believed she had been given a "date rape" drug that caused her impairment. Before trial commenced, Defendant claimed she would assert the involuntary intoxication defense to show she did not commit a voluntary act by driving. The municipal court granted the City's motion to prevent Defendant from claiming involuntary intoxication as a defense and from calling witnesses about the use of "date rape" drugs in the City. The district court affirmed, concluding that involuntary intoxication can only be used where the mental state of the defendant is an element of the crime. Defendant appealed, contending that the lower court erred by failing to apply the voluntary act element of Montana's DUI statute. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the lower court erred by precluding Defendant from raising automatism as an affirmative defense to the DUI charge; and (2) if Defendant was able to lay the proper foundation, she could elicit from certain law enforcement officers evidence regarding their personal knowledge, opinions, and statements regarding whether Defendant was unknowingly drugged, and voluntarily drove a vehicle. View "City of Missoula v. Paffhausen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff commenced an action in the district court seeking a preliminary injunction preventing Defendants, their neighbors, from crossing Plaintiff's land, or in the alternative, a declaratory judgment stating that Defendants did not have a prescriptive easement. The district court granted a prescriptive easement in Defendants' favor but limited the width of the easement to twenty feet. Defendants appealed. Plaintiff cross-appealed, arguing that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact existed concerning whether Defendants' use was permissive, whether the prescriptive easement included residential and recreational uses, and the width of the prescriptive easement. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the existence of a prescriptive easement; (2) reversed and remanded the portion of the district court's judgment concluding that the prescriptive easement included residential and recreational uses; and (3) reversed and remanded the district court's decision to limit the width of the prescriptive easement to twenty feet for the purpose of trailing cattle. View "Brown & Brown of MT, Inc. v. Raty" on Justia Law