Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, the youth court found that E.M.R., a youth under the age of eighteen, had committed five misdemeanor offenses of "dog at large" and one felony offense of aggravated animal cruelty. The convictions stemmed from E.M.R.'s treatment of her dogs and horses. E.M.R. appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded, holding (1) the youth court's instruction to the jury on the legislative purpose of the Youth Court Act was prejudicial error and required reversal of the aggravated animal cruelty adjudication; and (2) the youth court correctly declined to dismiss the "dog at large" charges.View "State v. E.M.R." on Justia Law

MCR, LLC filed an action for condemnation of a compressor station site on property owned by Appellees. Appellees counterclaimed against MCR for damage to their property and claimed punitive damages. Appellees sought restoration costs as the measure of damages for their contract, trespass, and nuisance claims. The parties stipulated to the substitution of MCR Transmission, LLC (MCR-T) for MCR on the condemnation claim. The district court dismissed MCR-T's condemnation claim and granted Appellees' summary judgment motion allowing Appellees to seek restoration costs. The jury awarded restoration costs and punitive damages to Appellees. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding that the district court (1) erred in dismissing MCR-T's motion to condemn Appellees' property for a compressor station, as genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether Appellees' property was necessary for the compressor station; (2) properly determined that Appellees were entitled to seek restoration costs as the measure of their damages; and (3) properly admitted evidence at trial that MCR had jumped Appellees' bid on state trust land leases. View "McEwen v. MCR, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs commenced a lawsuit against several power companies alleging that the Colstrip power facility, which bordered land owned by Plaintiffs, contaminated groundwater under their property. The parties proceeded with mediation after three years of litigation. The mediation ended with the transmission of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to the parties' counsel. After some of Plaintiffs expressed reservations about accepting the settlement, the power companies filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement, arguing that the MOU was a written and signed settlement agreement. After a hearing, the district court granted the motion to enforce the settlement agreement, finding that the MOU was a binding, enforceable settlement agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err by finding the MOU was an enforceable settlement agreement; (2) did not err by allowing parol evidence to change an option to purchase into a right of first refusal; and (3) erred in admitting evidence protected by the mediation confidentiality statute, but the error was harmless. View "Kluver v. PPL Mont., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff The Big Sky Colony, Inc., a signatory to the Hutterian Brethren Church Constitution, organized itself as a religious corporation under Montana law. Plaintiff Daniel Wipf was the Colony's first minister and corporate president. Plaintiffs brought suit against the Montana Department of Labor and Industry, claiming that the requirement to provide workers' compensation coverage for the Colony's members engaged in certain commercial activities contained in HB 119 violated the Colony's rights under the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause and also violated the Colony's right to equal protection. The district court found in favor of the Colony. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the provisions of HB 119 that incorporated the Colony into the definition of "employer" and the Colony's members into the definition of "employee" under the Workers' Compensation Act did not violate the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, or the Colony's right to equal protection of the laws. View "Big Sky Colony, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus." on Justia Law

Boyne USA, Inc. filed an action for breach of contract against Blixseth Group, Inc. that covered a land sale for fifteen acres of property, seeking specific performance. Boyne joined Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC (Yellowstone) as a party due to Yellowstone's acquisition of the contested property. Meanwhile, Yellowstone conveyed the property to Spanish Peaks Development, LLC (SPD). SPD, in turn, conveyed the property to Lone Mountain Holdings, LLC (LMH). Boyne joined SPD and LMH as parties. Boyne further alleged abuse of the legal process and deceit. The district court dismissed Blixeth Group and Yellowstone due to Yellowstone's bankruptcy. After a jury trial, (1) the jury awarded Boyne $300,000 from each SPD and LMH based on its determination that Defendants had deceived Boyne and had abused the legal process, (2) the district court awarded Boyne specific performance on the agreement; and (3) the court awarded attorney fees to Boyne. The Supreme Court affirmed subject to one minor modification, holding that the district court did not err in its judgment, and that Boyne was entitled to legal fees on appeal. View "Boyne USA, Inc. v. Spanish Peaks Dev., LLC" on Justia Law

Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Montana (BCBS) signed an employment agreement with Plaintiff containing a clause to compel arbitration for any disputes regarding the employment agreement. After Plaintiff's employment was terminated, Plaintiff brought an action against BCBS claiming that BCBS violated the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act (WDEA). Plaintiff, however, could bring a WDEA claim only if she did not have a written contract of employment for a specific term. The district court compelled arbitration to allow the arbitrator to determine in the first instance whether Plaintiff had a term employment contract. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order to compel arbitration, holding that because the instant dispute implicated the terms or provisions of the employment agreement, the district court correctly determined that an arbitrator should decide, in the first instance, whether Plaintiff was an at-will employee or whether she had a term contract. View "Marsden v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mont., Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant's vehicle collided with Plaintiff's vehicle as Plaintiff was driving through an intersection. The collision damaged both vehicles and injured Plaintiff. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint against Plaintiff, alleging negligence. The district court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Defendant was not negligent nor did she proximately cause the accident, as the collision would not have occurred without Plaintiff's violation of the right-of-way statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, as (1) the evidence established factual issues concerning the parties' comparative negligence; and (2) the district court erred by concluding that the issue of whether Defendant was maintaining a proper lookout was not a genuine issue of material fact. View "Tonner v. Cirian" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of incest. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant was not entitled to a new trial due to law enforcement's warrantless monitoring and recording of his telephone conversations with his daughter, the victim, where (i) the recordings of Defendant's conversations with his daughter violated his rights under the Montana Constitution as interpreted by the Court in State v. Allen, but (ii) the admission of the recordings at trial was harmless error; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting sexually oriented photographs that Defendant took of his daughter. View "State v. Stewart" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with DUI, fourth or subsequent offense. The information provided that Defendant was previously convicted of qualifying DUI offenses in 2009, 1999, and 1992. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss due to invalidity of prior DUI convictions, challenging his 1992 DUI conviction on the basis of constitutional infirmity. The district court denied Defendant's motion, concluding that Defendant failed to meet his burden to come forward with affirmative evidence establishing that his 1992 conviction was obtained in violation of the Constitution. Defendant subsequently entered a no contest plea to the DUI charge, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order denying Defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that the court correctly concluded that Defendant failed to meet his burden to persuade the court that his 1992 conviction was constitutionally infirm. View "State v. Nixon" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to one count of sexual abuse of children pursuant to a plea agreement. The district court sentenced Defendant to the Department of Corrections (DOC) for seven years, with two years suspended upon several terms and conditions. The district court later revoked Defendant's suspended sentence after an evidentiary hearing at which it found Defendant in violation of the conditions of his sentence. The court then imposed a two-year commitment to the DOC and ordered that Defendant be designated a Level 3 sexual offender. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by elevating Defendant's sexual offender level designation from Level 1 to Level 3 upon revocation. View "State v. Claassen" on Justia Law