Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Without entering a plea bargain agreement with the State, Defendant pled guilty to a felony DUI charge and admitted he violated the terms of the suspended sentence he was serving for a previous DUI conviction. The district court accepted Defendant's guilty plea and revoked Defendant's sentence. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, asserting he received ineffective assistance of counsel in the proceedings because his court-appointed attorney allegedly told him "just prior to sentencing" that the State had made a more favorable plea offer before he changed his plea to guilty that would have resulted in a shorter sentence. The district court dismissed Defendant's petition for failing to provide factual support for his claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by dismissing Defendant's postconviction relief petition as insufficiently pled, as there was no record evidence of a formal plea offer or of Defendant's lawyer's failure to inform him of a plea offer, other than an insufficient affidavit submitted by Defendant. View "Kelly v. State" on Justia Law

After Mother filed a petition for dissolution of her marriage to Father, the parties entered a marital dissolution agreement and parenting plan providing that the parties would share alternate two weeks of parenting with the minor children. Mother subsequently filed a motion to modify the parenting plan, stating that she and Father had not followed the plan due to Father's business activities and personal trips. The district court ultimately amended the prior parenting plan and granted primary custody of the children to Mother. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not clearly err in determining that Mont. Code Ann. 40-4-219 did not apply in its case and did not abuse its discretion in relying on the factors listed in Mont. Code Ann. 40-4-212 when deciding the best interest of the children; and (2) did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that the wishes of the children, continuity of and stability of care, and other factors weighed in favor of modifying the parenting plan. View "In re Marriage of Klatt" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was employed by the Department of Corrections (DOC) as a correctional officer at the Montana State Prison. After a taser training was held at the DOC Center, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the State, the DOC, and several fictitious defendants (collectively, Defendants), alleging that he suffered an intentional infliction of personal injury by his fellow employee when he was tased at the training. Plaintiff also raised a spoliation of evidence claim for the alleged loss or destruction of the DOC's video recording of the training session. The district court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in determining (1) the Workers' Compensation Act was the exclusive remedy for Defendant's injuries; and (2) there was no independent cause of action for Defendant's spoliation of evidence claim. View "Harris v. State" on Justia Law

Brent Anderson purchased life insurance from Insurer and named three beneficiaries under the policy: (1) his then-wife, Lucia, (2) his parents, and (3) his sister. Brent and Lucia subsequently divorced. Later that year, Mont. Code Ann. 72-2-814 became effective. The statute provides that a divorce revokes "any revocable disposition or appointment of property made by a divorced individual to the individual's former spouse in a governing instrument." Brent died several years later without having changed his designation of Lucia as primary beneficiary under the life insurance policy. Insurer filed an interpleader action to determine the rightful beneficiary under Brent's policy. The district court ruled in favor of Lucia based in part on the fact that section 72-2-814 became effective after Brent and Lucia's divorce. The Supreme Court accepted a certified question from the U.S. court of appeals and answered that section 72-2-814 applies to a divorce that pre-dates the statute's enactment. View "Thrivent Fin. for Lutherans v. Andronescu" on Justia Law

After a justice court bench trial, Defendant was convicted and sentenced for partner or family member assault. The district court affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the justice court jury was properly called pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 3-15-313; (2) the court's determination that the charging documents in this case were sufficient under the law was not an abuse of discretion; and (3) the district court correctly affirmed the decision of the justice court to reject Defendant's proposed jury instructions on disorderly conduct as a lesser-included offense, which would have allowed the jury to convict Defendant of disturbing the peace instead of partner or family member assault. View "State v. Fehringer" on Justia Law

Brandon Davis was killed when the vehicle that he was driving collided with a small bus, owned by Defendant, that was parked in the middle of the interstate. Defendant was convicted of felony criminal endangerment, failing to use a lamp on a parked vehicle, failure to display warning devices on a disabled vehicle, and failure to park as close as practicable to the edge of the shoulder, among other things. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) sufficient evidence supported Defendant's criminal endangerment conviction; (2) Defendant was not denied her right to be personally present at all critical stages of the trial; (3) Defendant was given effective assistance of counsel during trial; (4) the district court did not impose a greater sentence based on Defendant's refusal to admit guilt; but (5) the district court exceeded its authority when it restricted Defendant's eligibility for parole because it did not sentence Defendant to incarceration in a state prison. View "State v. Bekemans" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested and charged with violating a permanent order of protection. While incarcerated, Defendant was charged with tampering with a witness. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted on both counts. Defendant's written sentence contained terms and conditions that were not expressly stated during oral pronouncement of sentence. Defendant appealed, claiming his attorney was ineffective in offering erroneous jury instructions and in failing to file a motion to conform the written sentence to the orally-pronounced sentence. The Supreme Court held that Defendant's trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance, as (1) Defendant was not prejudiced in the giving of the disputed instructions; and (2) the cause was remanded for another sentencing hearing in which Defendant would be presented with and allowed to respond to the additional terms and conditions contained in his written sentence that were not listed by the court during the sentencing hearing. View "State v. Andress" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a construction contract dispute between Total Industrial Plant Services, Inc. (TIPS) and Turner Industries Group, LLC (Turner). Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland (Fidelity) was the surety for Turner's substitution bond filed in lieu of TIPS's construction lien. TIPS filed a complaint against Turner and Fidelity, alleging various causes of action. The trial court granted TIPS's motion for partial summary judgment and ordered Turner to return the retainage it had withheld. After a trial, the district court found in favor of Defendants and dismissed TIPS's remaining claims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court did not err by (1) denying TIPS's claim for additional compensation under a theory of either quantum meruit or breach of contract; (2) failing to find that TIPS was the prevailing party and awarding costs and fees to Turner; (3) finding TIPS's construction lien was barred by the ninety-day statute of limitations; (4) granting partial summary judgment to TIPS and ordering Turner to return the retainage; and (5) dismissing Turner's bill of costs for being untimely. The Court, however, found the district court erred by denying TIPS prejudgment interest on the retainage. Remanded. View "Total Indust. Plant Servs. v. Turner Indust. Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Terance Perry filed for dissolution of his marriage to Karen Perry. Terance named Gail Goheen as his counsel of record. Karen filed a motion to disqualify Goheen after speaking with Goheen over the telephone. Before the disqualification hearing, Karen filed a motion to strike office memorandums and affidavits filed by Terance regarding Goheen's conversation with Karen as privileged communications between attorney and client. The district court denied Karen's motion to disqualify, finding no attorney-client relationship existed between Karen and Goheen. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by (1) denying Karen's motion to disqualify; (2) permitting Goheen to testify at the disqualification hearing; (3) relying on communications between Goheen and Karen in making its decision; and (4) determining that Karen abused the rules of disqualification. The court also found that Goheen did not violate her duty to Karen under Rule 19 of the Montana Rules of Professional Conduct. View "In re Marriage of Perry" on Justia Law

Defendant owned a building and leased spaced in the building to Company. Plaintiff worked as an independent contractor for Company, providing cleaning services. After Plaintiff injured himself while working in Defendant's building, Plaintiff sued Defendant. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in applying construction industry liability standards to this case and in determining that Defendant owed no duty that Defendant as a property owner had a duty of care to Plaintiff because Plaintiff was an independent contractor working for Company; and (2) the court further erred in granting summary judgment to Defendant based upon the determination that "no reasonable jury" could find that Defendant had breached the duty of ordinary care under the facts of the case. View "Steichen v. Talcott Props., LLC " on Justia Law