Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of deliberate homicide and solicitation to tamper with physical evidence. The convictions were based on an incident in which a three-year-old died after Defendant shoved her into a wall. For the deliberate homicide conviction, the district court sentenced Defendant to one hundred years incarceration with a twenty-five year parole restriction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) properly concluded that assault on a minor is a forcible felony under the deliberate homicide statute; and (2) properly denied Defendant's motion in limine to exclude from evidence a portion of the police's videotaped interrogation of Defendant. View "State v. Hicks" on Justia Law

Appellant owned 5,400 contiguous acres of mostly undeveloped farmland in Chouteu County. Appellant filed a claim seeking declaratory relief regarding whether the entire length of a road that ran through Appellant's property, Lippard Road, constituted a public roadway. The district court determined that the entire length of Lippard Road constituted a public roadway. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly viewed the record as a whole, pursuant to the principles of Reid v. Park, to determine whether the County had established a public road; and (2) the district court properly determined that the entire length of Lippard Road constitutes a public roadway. View "Sayers v. Chouteau County" on Justia Law

Bostwick Properties (Bostwick) sought a water use permit from the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC), which was denied. The district court (1) agreed with DNRC that Bostwick failed to prove no net depletion of surface water and lack of adverse effect, and therefore Bostwick was required to mitigate its water usage in order to receive a water use permit; (2) determined that Bostwick had submitted an adequate mitigation proposal, and therefore, ruled that DNRC improperly had denied Bostwick's permit application; and (3) determined that DNRC exhibited bias toward BNRC, but any bias did not prejudice Bostwick. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) DNRC and the district court properly required Bostwick to mitigate its water usage; (2) the district court properly determined Bostwick's mitigation proposal was adequate as a matter of law; and (3) DNRC bias did not substantially prejudice Bostwick. View "Bostwick Props., Inc. v. Dep't of Natural Res. & Conservation" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with violating the Privacy in Communications statute by using obscene, lewd, and profane language. The charges arose from an incident in which Defendant called an employee of the county Victim Assistance Program a "fucking cunt" over the telephone. Defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge. Defendant appealed and filed a motion to dismiss in the district court. The district court denied the motion, finding (1) Defendant's utterance constituted unprotected speech in the form of "fighting words," and (2) the Privacy in Communications statute was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the district court's conclusion that Defendant's speech constituted "fighting words," as the interaction was not face-to-face or in a circumstance likely to cause an immediate breach of the peace; and (2) struck the prima facie portion of the Privacy in Communications statute as unconstitutionally overbroad. Remanded to the district court to allow Defendant to withdraw his nolo contendere plea and proceed to trial. View "State v. Dugan" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of sexual intercourse without consent and partner/family member assault. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) his due process rights were violated when a portion of the trial was not recorded during the State's case in chief and effective appellate review was now unavailable, and (2) the district court erred by admitting evidence of his prior assault on the victim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the record was of sufficient completeness to afford effective appellate review, Defendant's right to due process was not compromised by the failure to record a portion of the State's case in chief; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that this was an appropriate case for introduction of evidence of a previous assault on the issue of consent and that the relevance of the evidence was not outweighed by unfair prejudice. View "State v. Caswell" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two misdemeanor sexual assaults following pleas of guilty to both offenses. In sentencing Defendant, the municipal court imposed a condition of probation that required Defendant to obtain a psychosexual evaluation and to follow through with a minimum of six months of therapy unless sooner released by a counselor or therapist. The district court upheld the requirement that Defendant undergo a psychosexual evaluation and receive counseling. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the municipal court (1) acted within its authority by requiring Defendant to obtain a psychosexual evaluation as a condition of probation; and (2) imposed a releasable condition of probation by requiring Defendant to obtain a psychosexual evaluation following his conviction. View "City v. Cantu" on Justia Law

Peter Carter was driving a Ford Explorer rented from Overland West when Todd Durham's vehicle collided with Carter's vehicle. The impact caused the Explorer to roll five times, partially ejecting Carter and killing him. Carter's estate filed a wrongful death and survival claim against Ford, Overland, and Durham (collectively, Defendants) under strict products liability and negligence theories. After a jury trial, the district court concluded that Durham was liable in negligence and that Ford and Overland were not liable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by (1) denying the estate's motion for default judgment on liability as a sanction against Ford for withholding evidence of other incidents; (2) excluding the estate's proffered evidence of other incidents; (3) excluding evidence related to Ford's actions in making a Safe Canopy System a standard feature in the United States in 2007 and some other countries in 2002, and by permitting Ford to present a "consumer-choice" defense; and (4) excluding an indemnity agreement between Ford and Overland and limiting questioning about the agreement and the parties' prior adversarial position. View "Stokes v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol. The district court affirmed the municipal court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress that had challenged the particularized suspicion to stop Defendant based on the obstruction of a license plate. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction but vacated his sentence, holding (1) the municipal court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress, as Defendant's right to be free from unreasonable searches was not violated; (2) counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to elicit certain testimony from the arresting officers at trial and not renewing the motion to suppress once those facts were elicited; but (3) Defendant's sentence violated his due process rights because it was based on his indigency. Remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Haldane" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs acquired the assets of a restaurant. Defendant owned the real property on which the building was located. Plaintiffs and Defendant entered into an agreement granting Plaintiffs a ten-year lease of Defendant's real property. The lease granted Plaintiffs the option to purchase Defendant's real property in 1999 at the expiration of the lease. Plaintiffs claimed they provided written notice to Defendant of their interest in purchasing the property and that Defendant agreed to the appointment of an independent appraiser in 2000, but Defendant never followed through in procuring an appraisal. In 2009, Plaintiffs filed a complaint requesting a declaratory judgment and order requiring Defendant to select an independent appraiser and sell the property. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint on statute of limitations grounds and granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment on her unlawful detainer counterclaim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a set of facts that would enable them to equitably estop Defendant from raising her statute of limitations defense; and (2) the district court did not improperly consider matters outside the pleadings in reaching its decision to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint. View "Situ v. Smole" on Justia Law

This was the fourth appeal involving public access across Appellee's Teton County property. In previous litigation, Public Land/Water Access Association established public prescriptive easements over two roads and a bridge connecting the roads, which together formed a route across the property. In this appeal, the Association challenged a decision of the district court denying its petition for supplemental relief and dismissing its complaint against Appellee for damages resulting from his removal of the bridge. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred by dismissing the Association's claims and denying its petition for supplemental relief after Appellee removed the bridge, as (1) the district court's dismissal of the Association's complaint was based on an incorrect legal interpretation; and (2) given the scope of the prescriptive easement, the Association was entitled to consideration of its petition for supplemental relief. View "Pub. Land/Water Access Ass'n, Inc. v. Jones" on Justia Law