Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Montana Supreme Court
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To help finance her purchase of a condominium (condo) for $395,000, Mary McCulley sought a residential loan from Heritage Bank (Bank) for $300,000. American Land Title Company (ALTC) provided a commitment for title insurance. McCulley signed a promissory note and signed a deed of trust as collateral. Subsequently, ALTC changed the designated use of the condo in the deed from residential to commercial. After closing, McCulley discovered the Bank had issued her an eighteen-month, $300,000 commercial property loan rather than the thirty-year residential property loan for which she applied. When she was unable to obtain long-term refinancing on the property, McCulley signed a warranty deed transferring ownership of the condo to the Central Asia Institute and used the proceeds to pay off the loan. McCulley then sued ALTC and the Bank (collectively, Defendants) for, inter alia, negligence, breach of contract, slander of title, and fraud. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the district court's order of summary judgment in favor of the Bank on the issue of fraud, as genuine issues of material fact existed relative to McCulley's claim of fraud on the part of the Bank; and (2) otherwise affirmed. View "McCulley v. Am. Land Title Co." on Justia Law

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This dispute stemmed from the actions of a former Bank employee, Diane Becker, who pleaded guilty to federal fraud and money laundering charges. Becker had previously assisted Marilyn Feller with her banking and finances. Feller filed a complaint against the Bank, alleging, inter alia, negligent supervision, wrongful conversion, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, claiming that her financial standing and credit reputation were damaged by Becker and the Bank. The district court entered summary judgment for the Bank, determining (1) Feller's state law causes of action were preempted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act, (2) Feller failed to provide sufficient evidence to support her emotional distress claims, and (3) Feller failed to establish the element of unauthorized control on her conversion claim. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in entering summary judgment in favor of the Bank on all of Feller's claims. View "Feller v. First Interstate Banksystem, Inc." on Justia Law

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The State petitioned the district court to involuntarily commit Appellant to the Montana State Hospital (MSH) for ninety days. The district court appointed counsel to represent Appellant and informed her of her right to be present at the commitment hearing. Appellant did not appear at the commitment hearing. The district court proceeded with the hearing and committed Appellant to MSH for a period not exceeding ninety days. Appellant appealed, contending that the district court erred and violated her due process rights by proceeding with the commitment hearing without first "obtaining a valid waiver" of her right to be present under Mont. Code Ann. 53-21-119. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, while Appellant's attorney could inform the district court of Appellant's desire to waive her right to be present, the district court should have made further inquiry to determine whether Appellant was capable of making an intentional and knowing waiver decision. View "In re P.A.C." on Justia Law

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K.E.G., a fifteen-year-old male, admitted to committing acts of vandalism on two consecutive nights. The county attorney then filed a petition alleging that K.E.G. was a delinquent youth for having committed criminal mischief. Other youths involved in the vandalism were similarly charged. K.E.G. admitted to the allegations. At issue before the youth court was whether the State should hold K.E.G. jointly and severally liable for all damages caused by the vandalism, given that K.E.G. participated in only two of the eleven nights of vandalism. The youth court adjudicated K.E.G. a delinquent youth and ordered him to pay $78,702 in restitution, concluding that K.E.G. was jointly and severally liable for the full amount of restitution for damages caused by the youths. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the youth court's failure to fully consider K.E.G.'s ability to pay prior to imposing aggregate restitution constituted plain error. Remanded for a new restitution hearing. View "In re K.E.G." on Justia Law

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Appellant rented second-floor office space and owned one of the upper-floor residential units in the Baxter Hotel. In 2008, the Baxter Homeowners Association (BHA) restricted access to the hotel's elevator by only permitting unit owners and their tenants to access the elevator via swipe key cards. After Appellant filed a complaint with the Montana Human Rights Bureau (Bureau), the BHA board installed a time clock system that would keep the elevator unlocked during business hours and locked at night. Appellant subsequently moved his law office out of the building. Ultimately, a hearing officer with the Bureau concluded that BHA violated Mont. Code Ann. 49-2-304(1)(a) when it failed to provide a reasonable alteration to the elevator to permit disabled persons to have unfettered access to the second floor business offices in the hotel during business hours, awarded $6,000 in damages to Appellant, and denied both parties' requests for attorneys' fees. The Human Rights Commission affirmed. The district court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant did not possess proper standing to file a complaint of discrimination on behalf of his unidentified and potential clients. View "Baxter Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Angel" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs were employed as by the Town of West Yellowstone. Plaintiff contended that the Town's on-call policy for police officers prior to 2009 was so restrictive that they could not engage in personal activities between shifts, and therefore, they should have been compensated for all their time spent on call, and not just for call outs, under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). After a jury trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the Town. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict in favor of the Town, and Plaintiffs failed to show that the jury's verdict was either inherently impossible to believe or that there was a complete absence of evidence in support of the verdict. View "Stubblefield v. Town of W. Yellowstone" on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of accountability for deliberate homicide, robbery, tampering with physical evidence, and burglary. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made during a custodial interrogation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant did not invoke his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent when he said "I don't really have anything to talk about" because he did not articulate a desire to remain silent sufficiently clearly that a reasonable officer in the circumstances would have understood Defendant's statements to be an invocation of his Miranda right to remain silent as required by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Berghuis v. Thompkins; and (2) the district court's finding that Defendant's Miranda waiver and subsequent statements to the police were voluntary was supported by substantial credible evidence, and its conclusions of law were correct. View "State v. Nixon" on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of negligent homicide and two counts of negligent endangerment. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's challenge of a prospective juror for cause; (2) did not err by excluding Defendant's expert witness from testifying on complex partial seizures; (3) did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant's request to instruct the jury on DUI as a lesser-included offense of vehicular homicide while under the influence; and (4) erred by ordering Defendant to pay $600 in restitution to the State and an undisclosed amount to the victims and their family members for mental health treatment. Accordingly, the Court vacated the $600 restitution award to the State and reversed the open-ended restitution award for the victims' mental health treatment. Remanded for entry of an amended judgment specifying the amount for such treatment. View "State v. Jay" on Justia Law

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Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of violating a permanent order of protection and tampering with a witness. Defendant's written sentence contained twenty-six terms and conditions that were not expressly stated during oral pronouncement of sentence. Defendant appealed, claiming his attorney was ineffective in ordering erroneous jury instructions and in failing to file a motion to conform the written sentence to the orally-pronounced sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) Defendant's counsel did not provide ineffective assistance with respect to proposed jury instructions; and (2) the district court's inclusion of five conditions in Defendant's written judgment and order were not sufficiently related to Defendant's charges nor were they reasonably related to the objectives of rehabilitation and protection of the victim and society. Remanded with instructions to strike the five conditions. View "State v. Andress" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, who operated a cattle ranch, owned a truck that had been modified with the attachment of a feedbox, hoist and tailgate. Plaintiff was cited for violating Mont. Code Ann. 15-70-330 after a Montana Department of Transportation (MDOT) officer discovered that the fuel in the tank of Plaintiff's vehicle was dyed and in excess of the legal concentration allowed to be in a fuel tank in a non-exempt vehicle being driven on a public highway. Plaintiff requested a review of his citation, arguing that the modifications made to his vehicle rendered its primary use off-road and off-highway, and therefore, he was entitled to a special exemption from the prohibition against dyed fuel on public roadways. After a hearing, MDOT determined Plaintiff was not entitled to any exemption. The State Tax Appeal Board (STAB) affirmed. The district court affirmed, determining that Plaintiff's vehicle's alterations simply enhanced its capability to transport property, whether on a public highway or on a ranch. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by affirming STAB's determination that Plaintiff violated section 15-70-330 and that his truck was not entitled to a special exemption under Mont. Admin. R. 18.10.110(1) and (2). View "Coleman v. State ex rel. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law