Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Leonards entered into contracts with Centennial for the sale of a log home kit and construction of a custom log home. The Leonards later released Centennial from any claims for damages for defective construction or warranty arising out of the home's construction. Greg and Elvira Johnston held a thirty-six percent interest in the property at the time the release was signed. Eventually, all interest in the property was transferred to the Elvira Johnston Trust. A few years later, because of a number of construction defects affecting the structural integrity of the house, the Johnstons decided to demolish the house. The Johnstons sued Centennnial for negligent construction, breach of statutory and implied warranties, and other causes of action. The district court granted summary judgment for Centennial, finding that the Johnstons' claims were time-barred and were waived by the Leonards' release. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the court's ruling that the Johnstons' claims were time-barred and directed that the decision on remand apply only to the interest owned by the Johnstons at the time the release was executed; and (2) affirmed the district court's conclusion that the release was binding on the Leonards' sixty-four percent interest, later transferred to the Trust. View "Johnston v. Centennial Log Homes & Furnishings, Inc." on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of negligent vehicular assault and driving while suspended. The district court sentenced Defendant to a six-year deferred sentence. Defendant, who lived in Oregon, expected to immediately return to Oregon but was informed by his probation officer that he must complete ninety days on supervision before he was permitted to leave Montana. Defendant moved to withdraw his plea. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Defendant's plea was entered voluntarily because defense counsel never promised that Defendant would be allowed to reside in Oregon. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly concluded that Defendant failed to demonstrate defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance; and (2) the district court correctly concluded that Defendant's plea was not involuntarily entered where defense counsel's failure to accurately predict that Defendant would have to complete ninety days in Montana on good behavior before returning to Oregon did not rise to the level of gross mischaracterization. View "State v. Prindle" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendants were convicted of aggravated cruelty to animals, a felony, for knowingly mistreating or neglecting several cats in the form of cruel confinement and/or inadequate nourishment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State presented sufficient evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendants, without justification, knowingly subjected their animals to mistreatment or neglect; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendants' motion for a mistrial, as the prosecutor's remarks during closing argument were not so egregious as to render the juror incapable of judging the evidence fairly. View "State v. Criswell" on Justia Law

Respondent purchased a 240-acre parcel of land in Gallatin County in 1980 that he rented out for grain and hay production. Respondent subdivided a thirty-acre parcel of the property in 1995. The subdivision was known as Bridger Lake Meadows (BLM). Respondent adopted covenants for BLM at the time he subdivided the property reflecting his intent that the lots be used for private residential purposes. However, Respondent sold no lots in BLM, which remained in hay and grain production. In 2009, the Department his Revenue (DOR) reclassified BLM from agricultural land to residential land. Respondent requested an informal review with DOR on the grounds that nothing had changed on the land or its usage. DOR denied the request due to the restrictions imposed by the covenants. The State Tax Appeal Board (STAB) determined that Respondent's property satisfied the statutory test for agricultural classification. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Respondent's continued use of the land for agricultural purposes belied any claim that the covenants "effectively prohibit" agriculture as contemplated by the amendment to Mont. Code Ann. 15-7-202(5). View "State Dep't of Revenue v. Heidecker" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Granite County Commissioners (County) created a Georgetown Lake zoning district and adopted Georgetown Lake zoning regulations. Plaintiff filed this action to declare void the County's resolution to create the zoning district and to adopt the zoning regulations. The district court entered summary judgment that the County had properly enacted the Georgetown Lake zoning and determined Plaintiff to be a vexatious litigant. The Supreme Court affirmed except for the portion of the judgment requiring Plaintiff to pay the County's attorneys' fees, holding that the district court (1) correctly ruled that the County properly enacted the zoning; (2) did not err in determining that Plaintiff was a vexatious litigant; but (3) erred in its award of attorneys' fees to the County, as this case was not a case in which extraordinary circumstances justified the award of attorneys' fees. View "Motta v. Granite County Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Julie petitioned for dissolution of her marriage to William. Because he did not object to the dissolution of their marriage or to Julie's proposed distribution of assets, William elected to default. The district court subsequently issued a final decree of dissolution. Thereafter, William filed a Mont. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion to set aside the judgment, arguing that the decree should be set aside as void because the district court awarded Julie more than she had prayed for in her original pleading in violation of Mont. R. Civ. P. 54(c). The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the district court surprised William by not giving him advance notice that it might award Julie more than she had requested in her petition and by not giving William a meaningful opportunity to contest the distribution of assets before rendering a final judgment; and (2) the district court should have set aside the judgment under Rule 60(b)(1) due to William's surprise. View "In re Marriage of Steyh" on Justia Law

Decedent's will named her daughter Dawn as personal representative of her estate. After the clerk of court accepted Dawn's application for informal probate, Dawn issued a notice to heirs and devisees specifying that the estate was being administered without supervision of the court. Decedent's son, William, subsequently filed a motion for substitute of judge in the proceeding pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 3-1-804. The district court denied the motion as untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the substitution statute did not apply to the informal probate matter because the matter was not under the supervision of the district court and therefore not a "civil action" for purposes of section 3-1-804; and (2) although the proceeding was later converted into a court-supervised administration under which section 3-1-804 would apply, William's motion for substitution was filed prematurely, and was therefore not timely and void. View "In re Estate of Greene" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute between Johnny Hughes and his parents, Jack and Shirley Hughes, regarding borrowed money, the partition of jointly owned real property and accompanying water rights, and a contested pasture lease. The district court ruled in favor of Johnny on all of the issues except for the water rights. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) the jury's determination that Johnny paid interest on a promissory note executed in favor of Jack and Shirley in 1989 restarted the statute of limitations on the note, and therefore, the matter was remanded to consider the amount of principal and interest Johnny owed on the note; (2) the partition agreement between the parties dissolved whatever right Jack and Shirley may have possessed in a life estate on a house on the land Johnny received pursuant to the agreement or to insurance proceeds Johnny received after the house was destroyed by fire; (3) Jack was entitled to an easement for stock water across Johnny's property; and (4) the arbitrator who arbitrated the pasture lease did not exceed his authority or miscalculate damages. View "Hughes v. Hughes" on Justia Law

Defendant, a sexual offender, was charged with failing to provide notice of his change of residence. Defendant pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. The district court imposed a four-year sentence and imposed several probation conditions recommended in Defendant's presentence investigation report. The district court also required Defendant to pay the costs of his court-ordered evaluations and treatment. The Supreme Court affirmed the sentence, holding (1) Defendant's failure to object to the district court's requirement that he pay the costs of his court-ordered evaluations and treatment in the district court precluded Defendant from raising the issue on appeal; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing certain conditions, which relate specifically to sexual offenders, as part of Defendant's probation. View "State v. Bullplume" on Justia Law

After the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services (DPHHS) was granted temporary legal custody of Child, DPHHS petitioned for termination of Mother and Father's parental rights. After a hearing, the district court terminated both Mother's and Father's parental rights to Child. The Supreme Court affirmed the termination order, holding (1) DPHHS made reasonable efforts to reunite Mother with Child; (2) the district court did not err in concluding that Mother's drug addiction rendered her unfit to parent Child and that her condition was unlikely to change within a reasonable time; (3) the district court had jurisdiction to terminate Father's parental rights; (4) Father's attorney rendered effective assistance; (5) the district court did not err in terminating Father's parental rights based upon his incarceration for mitigated deliberate homicide; and (6) the district court correctly concluded that termination of Mother's and Father's parental rights was in Child's best interest. View "In re A.D.B." on Justia Law