Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Daughter was injured in an automobile accident caused by an uninsured motorist. Father and Daughter were insured by two Farmers Insurance Exchange automobile insurance policies, each providing uninsured motorist protection of $25,000. After the accident, in exchange for a full release signed by Daughter, Farmers paid $25,000 in uninsured motorist coverage under Father's policy insuring the vehicle involved in the accident. Later, Daughter and Father (Plaintiffs) sued Farmers, seeking uninsured motorist benefits under Father's second policy. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Farmers. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) dismissing Plaintiffs' claim for stacking of uninsured motorist coverage; (2) ruling that neither Plaintiff had standing to bring a claim for medical pay coverage; and (3) declining to certify a putative class for claims of unjust enrichment and disgorgement of premiums.

After a fire damaged a building the Hinebauchs purchased from the McRaes, the Hinebauchs filed a complaint against the McRaes, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The district court granted the McRaes' motion for summary judgment, determining (1) because no evidence was presented showing that the McRaes agreed to obtain insurance for the building naming the Hinebauchs as an insured party, there was a lack of mutual consent and the agreement was unenforceable; and (2) the Hinebauchs did not establish any requisite misconduct or fault on the part of the McRaes, and the Hinebauchs had unclean hands in seeking equitable relief on the claim for unjust enrichment. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) the statute of frauds precluded the Hinebauchs from enforcing any promises ostensibly made to them by the McRaes; and (2) the Hinebauchs wholly failed to show any misconduct or fault on the part of the McRaes, and therefore, the Hinebauchs' claim for unjust enrichment was without merit.

Dane Shattuck died from injuries after being hit by an automobile. Dane received medical care at Hospital for his injuries. Dane was enrolled in a children's health insurance program (CHIP), administered by the department of public health and human services (DPHHS). Hospital submitted the bill for Dane's care to Blue Cross and Blue Shield (BCBS), which served as third-party administrator of the CHIP program for DPHHS. Hospital then asserted a lien for the full bill amount against recoveries Gail Shattuck, as personal representative of Dane's estate, may obtain against third parties. Shattuck sued Hospital, BCBS, DPHHS, and the State, asserting that Defendants unlawfully acted to avoid application of "made whole" rules and that Hospital could not foreclose the lien because Shattuck had not been made whole. The district court granted partial summary judgment to Shattuck. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the district court erred by determining that CHIP constitutes insurance and was governed by the made whole doctrine, and (2) the district court did not err by determining that BCBS was not an insurer in its role here and, therefore, was not subject to the made whole statute. Remanded.

After Homeowners' house burned down, Homeowners' insurer denied coverage, stating that payment was not timely delivered, the money order was not signed, and the damaged house was the secondary house and Insurer's underwriting policies required insurance on the primary house also to be purchased through Insurer in order to have coverage in place for the secondary residence. Homeowners filed suit, asserting that no reasonable basis in fact or law existed for denial of the claim and seeking damages and a declaratory judgment that the loss was covered. The district court granted Insurer's motion for summary judgment and denied Homeowners' motion for partial summary judgment with respect to their declaratory judgment action. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Insurer as genuine issues of material fact remained, and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Homeowners' motion for partial summary judgment.

Following an automobile crash for which United Tool Rental (UTR) and DeLyle Paulsen admitted negligence, UTR and Paulsen sought contribution from the state DOT and several construction entities (construction parties), alleging their negligent design, construction, and maintenance of the highway contributed to the crash. After a jury trial, the district court determined UTR and Paulsen were entirely at fault for the crash and rejected their contribution claim. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence the DOT erected a "no left turn" sign after the crash and a post-crash memorandum prepared by the highway patrol; (2) the district court did not deprive UTR and Paulsen a fair trial by allowing the construction parties' counsel to inquire what caused Paulsen to drive inattentively; and (3) the jury's verdict was not defective.

Stephen and Dawn Steadele contracted with Montana Component Housing Corporation (MCHC) to construct a home. MCHC did not complete the home by the deadline and eventually abandoned the project without completing the home. The Steadeles filed suit against MCHC. The district court entered a default judgment against MCHC when it failed to respond to the suit. The Steadeles then requested payment from Colony Insurance Company, MCHC's insurer. Colony denied coverage and refused to pay because MCHC never notified it of the Steadeles' claim. The Steadeles then filed this action, arguing that Colony's refusal to issue payment on the underlying judgment was a violation of Mont. Code Ann. 33-18-201, which prohibits unfair claim settlement practices. The district court granted summary judgment to Colony. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Colony because MCHC's failure to notify Colony of the Steadeles' claim was a material breach of MCHC's obligations under the policy.

Timothy Hop's automobile was damaged in an accident with a driver insured by Safeco Insurance Company. In addition to the costs of repair, Hop sought "residual diminished value" (RDV) for his vehicle. When Safeco failed to pay RDV, Hop filed a class action complaint for declaratory relief in the district court, seeking a declaration that Safeco was required to investigate and pay class members, people whose vehicles were damaged by a Safeco insured and who were not paid RDV by Safeco, for RDV of their vehicle. The district court granted Hop's motion for class certification. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion in certifying a class action before Hop had satisfied the statutory requirements to bring an individual third party action against Safeco. Remanded with instructions to dismiss Hop's class action without prejudice.

Gregory Ternes purchased a residential property from Keith and Sue Eberhard. The Eberhards were insured by State Farm when the house received water damage. Sue reported the damage, and State Form listed the claim on a website report. The Ternes purchased the home without being aware of the website report. The Ternes later attempted to sell the property to the Giardinos, who backed out of the deal. Afterwards, Ternes learned of the website report. Ternes filed a complaint with the state commissioner of insurance, alleging that State Farm put false information on the website, causing the sale of the residence to the Giardinos to fall through. The commissioner advised Ternes that State Farm had not submitted a false report as per State Farm's understanding at the time of the loss. Ternes then filed an action in the district court against State Farm and the Eberhards. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for State Farm and the Eberhards because there were no genuine issues of material fact and both defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The Montana Department of Revenue (Department) issued final ad valorem assessments of Puget Sound Energy (Puget) for several tax years, after which Puget petitioned the State Tax Appeal Board (STAB) for review of the Department's assessments. STAB determined the Department inaccurately assessed Puget's value and assessed Puget's value in excess of the Department's original assessment. Puget petitioned the district court for review, and the court concluded that STAB could not adopt an assessment value exceeding the Department's original assessment. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court incorrectly concluded that STAB may not assess Puget's market value in an amount that exceeds the Department's original assessment. The Court held that STAB has the constitutional and statutory duty to hear Puget's appeal and make an independent determination of Puget's market value even if STAB's assessment exceeds the Department's original assessment. Remanded.

David Johnson, a life and disability insurance provider, entered a plea agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to two counts of felony theft and to pay restitution for the loss incurred as a result of his fraudulent acts. At an evidentiary hearing to determine restitution, the state did not present sworn affidavits from victims. The district court ultimately adopted the rationale for calculating restitution proposed by the state and ordered that Johnson pay $71,374 in restitution. On appeal, Johnson argued that without victim affidavits the restitution order was unlawful and his sentence must be corrected. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Johnson failed to preserve his objection to the omission of victim affidavits. Except for his objection on the date of sentencing, Johnson did not alert the trial court to any claim that victim affidavits were required for an order of restitution, and Johnson's plea agreement expressly consented to the court's determination of restitution upon hearing.