Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Cassadie and Chris Parish were injured in a motor vehicle accident when their vehicle was struck by an uninsured driver. United Financial Casualty Insurance Company (UFC) provided insurance coverage to the Parishes, including uninsured motorist (UM) coverage. The Parishes, who had two vehicles insured on their UFC policy at the time of the accident, argued they should be permitted to stack the UM benefits provided in their policy. UFC refused, stating that the Parishes' policy did not allow stacking. The Parishes sued seeking declaratory judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of UFC. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting UFC's motion for summary judgment, as, inter alia, the policy was unambiguous and UFC's insurance agreement did not create a reasonable expectation of stacked UM coverage. View "Parish v. Morris" on Justia Law

Casey Stuivnga and Britni Evans were injured in a single-vehicle accident. The vehicle was owned by Stuivenga. Both Stuivenga and Evans claimed the other person was driving and was liable to the other for their injuries. They both sought proceeds available under an automobile insurance policy issued to Stuivenga by Progressive Direct Insurance Company. Progressive determined that Evans' and Stuivenga's competing claims could not be settled in an amount equal to or less than the policy's per person liability limit of $25,000. Progressive commenced an interpleader action and deposited the $25,000 with the district court, asking the court to determine to whom the funds should be issued. Ultimately, a jury found that Evans was the driver at the time of the accident and released the $25,000 to Stuivenga. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) this appeal was not moot, as the issue presented at the outset of the action of who was driving had not ceased to exist, and Stuivenga's payment of the funds to third parties did not render the Court unable to grant effective relief; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Evans' motion for a new trial. View "Progressive Direct Ins. Co. v. Stuivenga" on Justia Law

Employee, a truck driver, resigned from his employment with Employer after he developed arthritis. Employee later filed an occupational disease claim, which the Montana State Fund (MSF) denied. The Workers' Compensation Court (WCC) concluded that Employee's job duties were the major contributing cause of his arthritic condition, and therefore, Employee was suffering from an occupational disease. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the WCC did not err in concluding that Grande was suffering from a compensable occupational disease arising out of and in the course and scope of his employment, as the WCC's findings of fact were supported by substantial, credible evidence, and its conclusions of law were correct. View "Mont. State Fund v. Grande" on Justia Law

Employee filed a workers' compensation claim against Employer. Employer's Insurer accepted liability for Employee's claim. Insurer contracted with third-party Adjuster to provide services for Employee's claim. Employee and Insurer disagreed over elements of the claim, and Attorney advised Insurer on various legal matters. The claim was eventually resolved. Employee then filed the present action for unfair claims settlement practices, naming Insurer and an employee of Adjuster as defendants. Employee served Employer with a subpoena requesting, inter alia, a letter Attorney wrote to Adjuster's employee concerning the underlying case. Employer and Insurer objected to the subpoena, citing attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine. The court denied the motions. Insurer then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of supervisory control. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the district court correctly applied the law of attorney-client privilege but incorrectly analyzed the work product doctrine. However, because the court reached the proper conclusion, supervisory control was unnecessary. View "Am. Zurich Ins. v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

James Whealon was employed by the Anaconda School District pursuant to a series of employment contracts. Upon retirement, Whealon filed a formal grievance, asserting that, under the terms of his contract, he was entitled to payment of his health insurance premiums by the District until he reached the age of sixty-five. The District denied his claim. The County Superintendent granted summary judgment to the District, holding that the language of the contract was unambiguous and that Whealon was not entitled to the claimed benefits beyond the date of his retirement. The State Superintendent of Public Instruction reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing, holding that the language of the contract was ambiguous. The district court reversed and reinstated the County Superintendent's ruling. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court, holding (1) the district court did not err in holding that a county superintendent has authority to grant summary judgment; and (2) the district court did not err in reinstating summary judgment in favor of the district where the language of the agreement was unambiguous and the District was entitled to judgment. View "Anaconda Public Schools v. Whealon" on Justia Law

Edna Banco filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits for an occupational disease (OD) in her right shoulder. Banco worked concurrently at 4B's Restaurant and the Child Development Center on Malmstrom Air Force Base (CDC). 4B's was insured by Liberty Northwest Insurance Corporation (Liberty). Liberty denied Banco's claim for workers' compensation benefits. The Workers' Compensation Court (WCC) found (1) Banco was last exposed to work of the same type and kind that gave rise to her shoulder condition while she was working at CDC; and (2) thus, since Banco was not last exposed at 4B's, Liberty was not liable under the "last injurious exposure" rule set forth in In re Mitchell. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the WCC had substantial credible evidence upon which to find Banco was last injuriously exposed at CDC to working conditions of the type and kind that led to her OD, and thus, Liberty was not liable for Banco's OD. View "Banco v. Liberty Nw. Ins." on Justia Law

Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Montana (BCBS) and New West Health Services (collectively TPAs) administered a self-funded employee healthcare benefit plan for the State's employees. Jeannette Diaz and Leah Hoffmann-Bernhardt (Plaintiffs), who were both injured in accidents, filed suit against the state, BCBS, and New West for allegedly violating their made-whole rights by failing to conduct a made-whole analysis before exercising subrogation rights. Plaintiffs moved for class certification seeking to include in the lawsuit individuals who had their benefits reduced under the State plan, as well as individuals who had their benefits reduced under policies independently issued and administered by the TPAs. The district court denied class certification and determined that Montana's made-whole laws did not apply to TPAs. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's finding that BCBS and New West, in their capacities as TPAs in the present case, were not subject to the made-whole laws under either the subrogation statutes or under a third-party beneficiary theory; and (2) reversed the district court denial of class certification, as Diaz and Hoffmann-Bernhardt demonstrated that the requirements of Mont. R. Civ. P. 23 were met. View "Diaz v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield" on Justia Law

In previous workers' compensation cases, the Montana Supreme Court had determined that its decisions apply retroactively to claims that are not "final" or "settled" at the time the decision was issued. Under statute, two types of claims fall under the definition of "settled," (1) claims where there has been a formal settlement agreement, and (2) claims that are "paid in full." In this case, the workers' compensation court (WCC) defined "paid in full" to mean that an injured worker received all the applicable benefits prior to a new judicial decision and had not received subsequent benefits on his or her pre-judicial decision claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the WCC properly applied retroactivity law in formulating its definition of "paid in full." View "Flynn v. Mont. State Fund" on Justia Law

After a fire damaged a building the Hinebauchs purchased from the McRaes, the Hinebauchs filed a complaint against the McRaes, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The district court granted the McRaes' motion for summary judgment, determining (1) because no evidence was presented showing that the McRaes agreed to obtain insurance for the building naming the Hinebauchs as an insured party, there was a lack of mutual consent and the agreement was unenforceable; and (2) the Hinebauchs did not establish any requisite misconduct or fault on the part of the McRaes, and the Hinebauchs had unclean hands in seeking equitable relief on the claim for unjust enrichment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statute of frauds precluded the Hinebauchs from enforcing any promises ostensibly made to them by the McRaes; and (2) the Hinebauchs wholly failed to show any misconduct or fault on the part of the McRaes, and therefore, the Hinebauchs' claim for unjust enrichment was without merit.

Terry Richerson died after being backed over by a truck owned by United Materials. Richerson's estate requested medical payments under the policy the Cincinnati Insurance Company issued to United Materials for the truck involved in the accident. Cincinnati denied the claim because the policy provided coverage for injuries suffered by a claimant while "occupying" a covered auto. The district court concluded that Richerson was not occupying the auto as defined in the policy and, accordingly, granted summary judgment in favor of Cincinnati. Richerson's estate appealed, arguing that because Richerson was caught in and transported by the truck, he was "upon" it, and therefore he was "occupying" the truck. the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Cincinnati, holding that Richerson's contact with the truck was insufficient to trigger coverage under the definition of "occupying" in the policy.