Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Injury Law
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Plaintiff injured his shoulder while working for his employer, who was insured by the Montana State Fund. The State Fund paid for Plaintiff's two shoulder injuries and paid temporary total disability (TTD) benefits after informing Plaintiff that if he returned to gainful employment without the State Fund's knowledge and continued to receive benefits, he would be subject to legal action or criminal prosecution. After the State Fund discovered that Plaintiff had built and sold furniture and worked at a vacuum cleaner store while receiving TTD benefits, the assistant attorney general charged Plaintiff with theft, a felony. The State Fund subsequently terminated Plaintiff's TTD benefits. Plaintiff filed suit against the State fund and its private investigators, alleging that Defendants violated Montana's Insurance Code regarding unfair claim settlement practices and pleaded a variety of common law causes of action. The district court ruled in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's entry of judgment in favor of the State Fund, holding that the district court did not err in (1) granting the State Fund's motion to dismiss Defendant's claims under the Insurance Code; and (2) granting the State Fund's motion for summary judgment regarding Plaintiff's common law claims. View "White v. State ex rel. Mont. State Fund" on Justia Law

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The Leonards entered into contracts with Centennial for the sale of a log home kit and construction of a custom log home. The Leonards later released Centennial from any claims for damages for defective construction or warranty arising out of the home's construction. Greg and Elvira Johnston held a thirty-six percent interest in the property at the time the release was signed. Eventually, all interest in the property was transferred to the Elvira Johnston Trust. A few years later, because of a number of construction defects affecting the structural integrity of the house, the Johnstons decided to demolish the house. The Johnstons sued Centennnial for negligent construction, breach of statutory and implied warranties, and other causes of action. The district court granted summary judgment for Centennial, finding that the Johnstons' claims were time-barred and were waived by the Leonards' release. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the court's ruling that the Johnstons' claims were time-barred and directed that the decision on remand apply only to the interest owned by the Johnstons at the time the release was executed; and (2) affirmed the district court's conclusion that the release was binding on the Leonards' sixty-four percent interest, later transferred to the Trust. View "Johnston v. Centennial Log Homes & Furnishings, Inc." on Justia Law

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In 2012, Plaintiff sought and obtained a temporary order of protection against Defendant in a civil action. Subsequently, Plaintiff obtained a no contact order against Defendant in a criminal action. Defendant moved to have the civil action dismissed with prejudice as a discovery sanction. Plaintiff moved to have the civil action dismissed without prejudice in the event she needed a future civil order of protection. The district court granted Plaintiff's motion and dismissed the civil action without prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the circumstances, it made sense to dismiss the action without prejudice so that, if necessary, Plaintiff could resurrect her action quickly; and (2) Defendant failed to establish that Plaintiff should be sanctioned with a dismissal of her proceeding with prejudice for her failure to appear for a deposition. View "Lear v. Jamrogowicz" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs leased an apartment from Defendant for thirteen months. Before the lease term expired, a dispute arose between the parties. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a complaint against Defendant, alleging breach of the terms of the lease, negligence, and negligence per se. The justice court found in favor of Plaintiffs. Defendant appealed, seeing a trial de novo. After a bench trial, the district court ruled in Plaintiffs' favor on their breach of lease claim and awarded them damages, costs, and attorney's fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed Plaintiffs to amend their complaint to add a claim that had not been pled during the justice court proceedings; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant's motion in limine to prohibit any reference to the testimony and evidence presented during the justice court proceedings; and (3) because the district court's references to the prior proceedings did not suggest that the district court was unduly influenced by the justice court proceedings, Defendant was not denied her right to a trial de novo. View "McDunn v. Arnold" on Justia Law

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Margaret Howard was driving south and John Bradford was driving north on a two-lane highway when the two vehicles collided. Neither Margaret nor John survived. The Howards, the co-personal representatives of Margaret's estate, filed a wrongful death and survivorship action against the Bradfords, the co-personal representatives of John's estate, alleging negligence. A jury found that John was not liable in negligence for the death of Margaret. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err ruling that a defense expert's testimony was supported by an adequate factual foundation and by determining that the scientific method used by the expert to reconstruct the accident was reliable and admissible; (2) the Bradfords did not violate the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure by failing to supplement the disclosure of the defense expert; and (3) the district court did not err by denying the Howards' motion for a new trial View "Wheaton v. Bradford" on Justia Law

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This matter arose from the suicide of a sixteen-year-old girl, who was residing at the Spring Creek Lodge Academy at the time of her death. Following the girl's death, her mother, Plaintiff, brought an action against the owner of the school, its on-site directors, including Teen Help, and various related entities. Claims against Teen Help were settled before trial, and the settlement was later reduced to a judgment. While Newman I proceeded to trial, Newman filed this declaratory judgment and breach of contract action against Teen Help's two insurers to collect on the settlement and judgment, arguing that the insurers breached their obligation to defend and indemnify Teen Help in Newman I. The district court determined the insurers were severally liable for the underlying judgment and awarded attorney's fees and interest on the underlying judgment. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's judgment as it pertained to the insurers, its award of interest on the underlying judgment, and its application of Montana law; and (2) reversed the court's ruling on attorney's fees. Remanded for recalculation of reasonable attorney's fees. View "Newman v. Scottsdale Ins. Co." on Justia Law

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In 2006, Plaintiffs sustained serious injuries in an automobile accident and incurred medical expenses in excess of $1,000,000. Plaintiffs subsequently learned that they had only $5,000 in medical payments coverage and did not have any underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage after a transfer of their Oregon State Farm policy to Montana by the Mark Olson State Farm Agency. The driver who caused the accident carried the statutory minimum automobile liability insurance limits. Plaintiffs sued State Farm and Mark Olson, requesting declaratory relief and a reformation of the contract and alleging negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and conduct sufficient to support an award of punitive damages. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in entered summary judgment in favor of State Farm and Olson on Plaintiffs' negligence claims. Remanded for trial. View "Bailey v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

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To help finance her purchase of a condominium (condo) for $395,000, Mary McCulley sought a residential loan from Heritage Bank (Bank) for $300,000. American Land Title Company (ALTC) provided a commitment for title insurance. McCulley signed a promissory note and signed a deed of trust as collateral. Subsequently, ALTC changed the designated use of the condo in the deed from residential to commercial. After closing, McCulley discovered the Bank had issued her an eighteen-month, $300,000 commercial property loan rather than the thirty-year residential property loan for which she applied. When she was unable to obtain long-term refinancing on the property, McCulley signed a warranty deed transferring ownership of the condo to the Central Asia Institute and used the proceeds to pay off the loan. McCulley then sued ALTC and the Bank (collectively, Defendants) for, inter alia, negligence, breach of contract, slander of title, and fraud. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the district court's order of summary judgment in favor of the Bank on the issue of fraud, as genuine issues of material fact existed relative to McCulley's claim of fraud on the part of the Bank; and (2) otherwise affirmed. View "McCulley v. Am. Land Title Co." on Justia Law

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This dispute stemmed from the actions of a former Bank employee, Diane Becker, who pleaded guilty to federal fraud and money laundering charges. Becker had previously assisted Marilyn Feller with her banking and finances. Feller filed a complaint against the Bank, alleging, inter alia, negligent supervision, wrongful conversion, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, claiming that her financial standing and credit reputation were damaged by Becker and the Bank. The district court entered summary judgment for the Bank, determining (1) Feller's state law causes of action were preempted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act, (2) Feller failed to provide sufficient evidence to support her emotional distress claims, and (3) Feller failed to establish the element of unauthorized control on her conversion claim. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in entering summary judgment in favor of the Bank on all of Feller's claims. View "Feller v. First Interstate Banksystem, Inc." on Justia Law

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Mother and Child were seriously injured in an automobile accident. Mother and her husband (Husband) hired Viscomi & Gersh (Viscomi) to represent Mother and Child in their claims for damages resulting from the accident. Matthew O'Neill was subsequently appointed to act as guardian ad litem (GAL) and conservator for Child. After Mother's case settled, Mother and Husband agreed with Morales Law Office (Morales) that Morales would represent Child. Morales then filed a motion to disqualify counsel. The district court denied the motion because it did not contain the consent of Viscomi and O'Neill. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when Mother and Husband consented to the appointment of a GAL and conservator to act in Child's best interests in the legal claims she had arising from the accident, they divested themselves of the right to determine who should represent Child in her personal injury claim; (2) Mont. Code Ann. 37-61-403 and Mont. Code Ann. 72-5-427 are not unconstitutional as applied in this case; and (3) section 37-61-403 does not conflict with the Montana Rules of Professional Conduct. View "In re Estate of C.K.O." on Justia Law