Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a self-represented litigant, filed a complaint against Defendant for defamation. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, and Plaintiff did not file a brief in response. The district court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment due to Plaintiff’s failure to respond. Plaintiff sought relief under Mont. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) for excusable neglect because she “simply forgot to file the brief.” The court denied Plaintiff’s motion, concluding that all litigants should adhere to procedural rules and that Plaintiff was familiar with the rules of the court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting Defendant summary judgment, and therefore, the Court need not reach the second issue raised by Plaintiff of whether the district court abused its discretion in denying her Rule 60(b) motion. View "Chapman v. Maxwell" on Justia Law

Rober Spoja represented Duste White regarding White’s probation revocation. The sentencing court sentenced White but did not mention whether the sentence was to be served concurrently with other sentences. White petitioned to correct his sentence. The court entered an amended re-sentencing order allowing him to serve his term concurrently with other sentences, resulting in an earlier discharge date. Believing he was incarcerated for fourteen months longer than his actual sentence, White retained Bryan Tipp to represent him in a civil action against Spoja and Spoja’s law firm. After Tipp discovered the sentencing court had not ordered concurrent sentences, Tipp moved successfully to dismiss the case without informing Spoja. Spoja subsequently filed a civil action against White, Tipp, and Tipp’s law firm. The district court dismissed Spoja’s claims. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the entry of summary judgment against Spoja’s attorney deceit claim, and the award of costs, as a trier of fact could find Tipp acted deceitfully and intended to do so; and (2) affirmed the dismissal of Spoja’s malicious prosecution claim and the award of summary judgment against his abuse of process claim. View "Spoja v. White" on Justia Law

Before he resigned, Plaintiff worked as the education director for Defendant, a farm organization. Plaintiff filed this action, claiming (1) Defendant failed to pay him for overtime, for vacation, and for his work handling the duties formerly assigned to the executive director; (2) Defendant's president (President) interfered with his employment relationship with Defendant; and (3) Defendant constructively discharged him because he refused to violate the law regarding payment of wages and overtime. The jury returned a special verdict form in all respects favorable to Plaintiff and awarded $232,439 in compensatory damages and $300,000 in punitive damages. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the district court erred in denying summary judgment on Plaintiff's wage claims; (2) the district court erred in denying judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff's claim against President individually; (3) Defendant was not entitled to a new trial on Plaintiff's constructive discharge claim; and (4) the punitive damages claim properly went to the jury, but the trial court should have limited the award to three percent of Defendant's net worth as required by Mont. Code Ann. 27-1-220(3). View "Harrell v. Farmers Educ. Coop. Union of Am., Mont. Div." on Justia Law

NorthWestern Energy (NWE) disconnected electric service to Plaintiff's residence based on an outstanding balance on Plaintiff's utility bill. Plaintiff filed an action alleging property damage due to NWE's negligence and negligence per se, claiming that the termination of his electric service caused his furnace to fail, which led to water pipes freezing and bursting. NWE filed a motion to dismiss based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction for Plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies before the Public Service Commission (PSC). The district court granted NWE's motion and dismissed the action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the PSC had no authority to adjudicate Plaintiff's damage claim, and a negligence action seeking damages could be maintained against the power company in district court. View "Schuster v. NorthWestern Energy Co." on Justia Law

Appellant was involved in a car accident with Kent Blough. Appellant's insurer, USAA Casualty Insurance Company, concluded that Appellant was the majority at fault for the accident and refused to honor Appellant's $300,000 UM/UIM coverage. Appellant filed suit against Blough, and in an apparent attempt to prevent Appellant from prevailing, USAA unsuccessfully tried to intervene in the lawsuit. Blough's insurer paid Appellant the limit of Blough's insurance policy. USAA's expert eventually determined that Blough, whom USAA had already paid under Appellant's policy, had been the majority at fault. USAA then tendered to Appellant its $300,000 UM/UIM policy limit. Appellant filed a complaint against USAA for, among other claims, violations of the Montana Unfair Trade Practices Act and emotional distress as a result of the mishandling of her claim. The district court entered summary judgment for USAA. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court (1) erred in determining that Appellant may not pursue a claim based upon USAA's alleged failure to reasonably investigate her claim as required under Mont. Code Ann. 33-13-201(4); and (2) erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of USAA regarding Appellant's claim for damages arising from emotional distress. View " McVey v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Burcalow Family, LLC purchased property that sat adjacent to The Corral Bar, Inc. property. Burcalow and The Corral signed a license agreement whereby The Corral agreed to pay Burcalow for the use of Burcalow's property for its drain field and well. After the license agreement expired, Burcalow filed suit against The Corral, alleging claims for trespass and a declaratory judgment. The Corral counterclaimed for, inter alia, prescriptive easement, detrimental reliance, and mistake. The district court (1) determined that The Corral possessed a prescriptive easement over and across Burcalow's property, and (2) rescinded the license agreement, ordering Burcalow to refund the fees The Corral had paid under the license agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) The Corral failed to demonstrate the elements required to establish a prescriptive easement; and (2) Burcalow's counsel did not make fraudulent representations entitling The Corral to rescind the parties' license agreement, and therefore, Burcalow did not have to return The Corral's payments made pursuant to the agreement. Remanded. View "Burcalow Family, LLC v. The Corral Bar, Inc." on Justia Law

Teresa and Dee Carestia sued Jeffrey Robey, claiming damages resulting from a car accident. The jury found Jeffrey's negligence was the cause of the accident and that Dee was contributorily negligent. The jury awarded Teresa $872 in medical expenses but awarded nothing for her past and future pain and suffering or loss of capacity to pursue her established course of life. Both parties subsequently filed a bill of costs. The district court allowed the Carestias to recover costs from Jeffrey and Jeffrey to recover costs from the Carestias. Teresa appealed. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) a portion of the jury's damage award was not supported by substantial credible evidence, as Teresa was entitled to some award of damages for her past pain and suffering proven in this case; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the Carestias' objection to Jeffrey's bill of costs. Remanded. View "Carestia v. Robey" on Justia Law

Thomas Warner filed a complaint against Robert and Rebecca Hanke for conversion and negligence after Robert Hanke asserted ownership over some personal property Warner was storing on the Hanke's property. At the time the action was filed, Robert and Rebecca Hankes maintained home insurance coverage from a subsidiary of Horace Mann Insurance Company. The Hankes filed a claim with Horace Mann to request a defense against Warner's suit. Horace Mann filed a declaratory judgment action requesting a determination whether the insurance policy required Horace Mann to defend the Hankes. The district court concluded that Horace Mann did not owe coverage to the Hankes for the Warner dispute. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding that the district court (1) properly determined that the Hankes' insurance policy failed to cover the Warner dispute; (2) correctly determined that Horace Mann's decisions to provide a defense and to pay the settlement of Warner's claims nevertheless allowed Horace Mann to pursue reimbursement for the Hankes' share of the settlement; and (3) abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to Horace Mann. View "Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Hanke" on Justia Law

Defendants, an attorney and a law firm, structured a tax-deferred exchange for Plaintiffs, a husband and wife and the cattle ranch they owned. It was later determined that the exchange did not qualify for deferred tax treatment under 26 U.S.C. 1031, resulting in significant tax liability for Plaintiffs. Defendants filed an action against Defendants for professional negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and misrepresentation. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants on all claims on grounds that Plaintiffs' claims were time barred. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiffs' tort claims were timely filed, and the issue of whether Plaintiffs' timely filed their misrepresentation claim was a question of material fact to be resolved by a jury; (2) Plaintiffs properly stated a claim for breach of contract and the claim was not time barred; and (3) the district court erred in granting Defendants a protection order to prevent discovery of alleged work product and attorney-client communications, as further analysis and fact finding were necessary to determine which documents were discoverable and which qualified for work product or attorney-client protection. Remanded. View "Draggin' Y Cattle Co., Inc. v. Addink" on Justia Law

C.R. Weaver formed Mikart Transport, LLC in January 2011. At that time, the articles of organization named Weaver and Michael Smith as members or managers. In March 2011, Smith submitted a credit application with Tri-County Implement, Inc. After Smith failed to pay Tri-County for work it performed on two vehicles, including a Volvo semi-truck titled in Weaver's name, Tri-County refused to release the Volvo from its possession pursuant to its asserted agisters' lien on the vehicle. Weaver subsequently filed a complaint against Tri-County. In response, Tri-County filed a counterclaim against Weaver and a third-party complaint against Mikart. The district court entered judgment against Mikart, ordering it to pay for the work it performed, and awarded Tri-County attorney fees and costs. The court also held Mikart, Smith, and Weaver jointly and severally liable for these amounts. The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the district court's imposition of personal liability on Weaver for the work performed on the two vehicles, as there was no basis to hold Weaver individually liable for the obligations of Mikart to Tri-County. Remanded. View "Tri-County Implement, Inc. v. Weaver" on Justia Law