Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After Plaintiff’s vehicle was rear-ended by a vehicle owned by Defendant, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant, claiming negligence. Plaintiff alleged that the accident had caused a traumatic brain injury and prevented her from securing employment. Plaintiff sought $3,000,000 in damages. A jury awarded $65,000 to Plaintiff. Defendant filed a bill of costs within five business days of the verdict, but the district court rejected the bill, concluding that Mont. Code Ann. 25-10-501 required a bill of costs to be filed within five calendar days. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of Plaintiff’s prior trauma and depression; (2) did not err by failing to dismiss two jurors Plaintiff challenged for cause; and (3) did not err by denying Defendant’s bill of costs as untimely under section 25-10-501. View "Peterson-Tuell v. First Student Transp., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff fell at a Shopko store and was injured. Plaintiff filed suit, alleging that Shopko failed to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition. During the discovery process, Plaintiff requested recorded video footage taken on the day of her fall. Shopko’s attorney replied that the footage had been accidentally recorded over. Plaintiff filed a motion for sanctions based on Shopko’s spoliation of the video footage and included in her brief a list of facts she believed the video would have shown. In its response brief, Shopko pointed out that it agreed with most of Plaintiff’s contentions about what the video would have shown and then noted that it disagreed with Plaintiff’s other contentions about what the video showed. During trial, Plaintiff requested that the statements in Shopko’s response brief be read to the jury. The district court denied the request, concluding that the statements were not judicial admissions. Later in the trial, the district court allowed Shopko to present evidence contradicting the admissions. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the district court abused its discretion when it determined the circumstances did not warrant holding Shopko’s statements to be judicial admissions. View "Bilesky v. Shopko" on Justia Law

Calvin Stucky was injured in a motor vehicle accident. Calvin’s child, Sadee, was eighteen years old at the time of the accident. Sadee claimed damages for loss of parental services, society, or consortium, among other claims. Defendant-insurer moved for summary judgment with respect to Sadee’s loss of consortium claim, arguing that Montana law does not recognize a claim for loss of consortium by the adult child of an injured parent. The federal court, which had diversity jurisdiction, certified the matter to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court accepted the certified questions of law and answered (1) Montana law recognizes a claim for loss of consortium by the adult child of an injured parent; and (2) to assert such a claim, the plaintiff must show that a third party tortiously caused the parent to suffer a serious, permanent, and disabling injury compensable under Montana law, and that the parent’s ultimate condition of impairment is so overwhelming and severe that it has caused the parent-child relationship to be destroyed or nearly destroyed. View "N. Pac. Ins. Co. v. Stucky" on Justia Law

Beaverhead County selected Coleman Construction to complete a stream rehabilitation and bridge replacement project. Coleman was unable to finish the project on time or for the amount of money it had estimated. Coleman subsequently sued for damages, asserting ten claims for relief. The Montana Association of Counties Joint Powers Insurance Authority (MACo), which had issued an insurance policy to the County, denied coverage, finding that the claims against the County were excluded from coverage based upon two exclusions in the policy. The district court granted summary judgment for MACo, ruling that the two exclusions each provided sufficient independent bases for denying coverage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the claims against the County were not covered by its insurance policy with MACo. View "Beaverhead County v. Mont. Ass’n of Counties Joint Powers Ins. Auth." on Justia Law

Mines Management, Inc., Newhi, Inc., and Montanore Minerals Corp. (collectively, MMC) sued Defendants, challenging the validity of Defendants’ unpatented mining claims and asserting several tort claims. The district court ruled on several motions and granted injunctive relief for one defendant. MMC appealed. The Supreme Court remanded with instructions to vacate the injunction, concluding that the lower court had not made sufficient findings to support the granting of the injunction and permit appellate review. MMC then filed a motion for substitution of judge pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 3-1-804(12). The district court ruled that substitution was unavailable at this stage in the proceeding. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly denied the motion because, upon remand, section 3-1-804(12) did not provide MMC an opportunity to request a substitution of judge. View "Mines Mgmt., Inc. v. Fus" on Justia Law

All but one of the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in Florida. Plaintiff sued Defendants, alleging that Defendants had procured a wire transfer from Plaintiff to a public adjusting company under false pretenses and with the intent to defraud him. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants, concluding that general personal jurisdiction did not exist because Defendants’ contacts with Montana were neither continuous nor systematic and that specific personal jurisdiction did not exist because all of the substantial activity underlying Plaintiff’s claims occurred in Florida. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded that it lacked personal jurisdiction because Defendants formed no “jurisdictionally relevant contacts” with Montana, and Plaintiff’s single act of authorizing his local bank in Montana to wire funds to the public adjusting company was insufficient to establish that his action accrued in Montana for purposes of Mont. R. Civ. P. 4(b)(1)(B). View "Tackett v. Duncan" on Justia Law

Based on advice from a licensed securities salesperson registered with Royal Alliance Associates, Inc., two ranching organizations and a family farmer (collectively, Appellants) invested in certain properties that eventually stopped paying or paid at a greatly reduced rate. Appellants filed separate complaints against Royal Alliance, alleging negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty, among other claims. Royal Alliance moved for summary judgment, arguing that the claims were subject to the three-year tort statute of limitations, and it had not been named in any of the complaints until three and a half years after the injuries became known. Summary judgment was granted in favor of Royal Alliance. On appeal, Appellants claimed that the facts constituting their claims against Royal Alliance were concealed or self-concealing such that they could not have been discovered in the exercise of due diligence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the facts constituting Appellants’ claims against Royal Alliance could have been discovered in the exercise of due diligence, and therefore, the three-year statute of limitations was not tolled. View "Thieltges v. Royal Alliance Assocs., Inc." on Justia Law

Bilt Rite Construction and Landscaping, LLC (Bilt Rite) opened a credit account with Larson Lumber Company (Larson) in 2003. Bilt Rite did not make the required payments, and as of 2006, when Bilt Rite had ceased operations, it owed approximately $14,000. That same year, Bilt Rite transferred real property it had purchased to Anita Bartz, who had loaned Rankin or Bilt Rite $45,000. In 2007, Casey Rankin, a partner in Bilt Rite, signed a contract agreeing to pay Larson Bilt Rite’s debt. In 2009 and 2010, Larson Lumber Company (Larson) filed suit against Bilt Rite, Rankin, and Bartz, among others. The district court entered judgment in favor of Larson, holding (1) Rankin and Bilt Rite breached a written contract with Larson; and (2) the transfer of the real property from Bilt Rite to Bartz was fraudulent. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err by denying summary judgment to Defendants; (2) did not err by holding that Rankin and Bilt Rite were jointly and severally liable to Larson; (3) erred by holding that the Bartz loan was made to Rankin personally; and (4) erred by holding that the transfer of the real property to Bartz was a fraudulent transfer. View "Larson Lumber Co. v. Bilt Rite Constr. & Landscaping LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident caused by another driver. As a result of the accident, Plaintiff sustained both bodily injury and property damage. Plaintiff carried an automobile insurance policy through United Services Automobile Association General Indemnity Company (USAA). USAA paid vehicle repair and car rental costs, after which it sought subrogation for the property damage expenses from the tortfeasor’s automobile liability insurer. Plaintiff subsequently filed an action on behalf of himself and a putative class of plaintiffs, alleging that USAA violated Montana law by seeking subrogation for property damage loss before its insured had been made whole with respect to related personal injuries. The U.S. district court certified a question to the Montana Supreme Court, which answered by holding that Montana law does not prohibit an insurer from exercising its right of subrogation under the limited, specific circumstances presented in the certified question. View "Orden v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n" on Justia Law

Mid-Continent Casualty Company provided comprehensive general liability insurance to Scentry Biologicals, the manufacturer of NoMate, a pest control product designed to protect agricultural crops from destructive insects. Applewood Orchards purchased NoMate from Wilbur-Ellis (W-E), a distributor of NoMate, and used the product on its apple crop to protect against moths. After Applewood discovered significant moth damage, it filed a tort action against Scentry and W-E. Scentry and W-E requested that Mid-Continent defend them under Scentry’s policy. Mid-Continent agreed to defend Scentry, reserving its right to determine its coverage obligations later, but refused to defend W-E. Applewood settled with W-E, and a court ruled against Scentry and in favor of Applewood. Meanwhile, Scentry filed a declaratory judgment against against Mid-Continent seeking declaratory relief on coverage issues. W-E and Applewood intervened. The district court granted summary judgment for and awarded damages to Scentry, Applewood, and W-E. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting the summary judgment motions filed by Scentry, Applewood, and W-E. View "Scentry Biologicals, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co." on Justia Law