Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Marian Davis lost control of her vehicle and struck a vehicle driven by Amy Locke. At the time of the accident, Davis was insured by Safeco Insurance Company under a policy with a $100,000 per person coverage. Davis died from her injuries. Locke, who also sustained injuries, filed a claim for damages against Davis’s estate. Prior to trial, Safeco paid Locke $16,306 for her past medical expenses. After a trial, the jury awarded Locke $400,000 in compensation for her injuries. The Estate appealed, and Safeco intervened. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part, holding that the district court (1) abused its discretion in denying the Estate’s motion to alter or amend the judgment because Locke was precluded from recovering against the Estate more than the $100,000 insurance limitation; and (2) did not abuse its discretion when it made findings and conclusions that effectively bound Safeco to a judgment in a case in which Safeco was not a named party, was not represented by counsel, and did not appear. View "Locke v. Estate of Davis" on Justia Law

Casey Kent, an adult, died from a head injury he suffered after falling while skateboarding in a residential planned unit development in Columbia Falls, Montana known as Cedar Point Estates. Casey was skateboarding along a paved walking path within the subdivision, and at the bottom of a twenty-four percent decline in the path, Casey fell and suffered his fatal head injury. Sara Kent, Casey’s widow, filed suit against the City of Columbia Falls and other entities involved in designing, developing, and constructing the development, alleging that the steepness of the path grade caused Casey’s fall and injury. Sara ultimately settled with all defendants except the City. The district court granted the City’s motions for summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in barring Sara’s claims on the basis of the public duty doctrine. Remanded for a trial on the merits. View "Kent v. City of Columbia Falls" on Justia Law

Judy Meek died after a fall at a business premises. Sharon Meek, as personal representative of Judy’s Estate (Meek), sued the business where the fall happened seeking damages for survival and wrongful death. The issue in this case arose from the district court’s decision on a pre-trial motion filed by one of the defendants to limit medical expense evidence. The court then granted summary judgment against Meek on that issue. Meek subsequently filed a petition for writ of supervisory control on the issue. The Supreme Court granted the petition and exercised supervisory control, holding that the district court’s order admitting only evidence of amounts the insurers paid to Meek’s health care providers violated Mont. Code Ann. 27-1-308. View "Meek v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Kimberlee Johnson, who owned a home adjacent to a home owned by Travis and Misty Knapton, leased the downstairs portion of her home to Daniel and Cheryl Monk. At the time of the lease, Johnson knew that the Monks’ dogs of pit bull ancestry would be living with them. After the dogs bit the Knaptons’ daughter on the Knaptons’ property and later bit their other child in the Knaptons’ backyard, Travis Knapton brought this action against Johnson on behalf of E.K, alleging negligence and strict liability. Default judgment was entered against the Monks. The district court then granted summary judgment for Johnson on the ground that Johnson did not know the Monks’ dogs were vicious and that Knapton had not proved that mixed breed dogs with pit bull ancestry are inherently dangerous. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of Johnson on the negligence claim and on the strict liability claim. View "Knapton v. Monk" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Montana corporation, sells workers’ compensation insurance to employers without the use of insurance agencies. Defendant Montana State Fund sells workers’ compensation insurance through in-house and out-of-house agents. The remaining defendants also sell workers’ compensation insurance, including State Fund policies. In 2011, Plaintiff brought this of action against Defendants, alleging violations of the Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA) and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. The district court (1) dismissed Plaintiff’s UTPA claim on the grounds that the UTPA does not create a private right of action by one insurance company against another; and (2) granted Defendants’ motions for summary judgment with respect to interference with prospective economic advantage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff’s inability to establish damages was fatal to its intentional interference claim and would be fatal as well to any UTPA-related claim. View "Victory Ins. Co. v. Mont. State Fund" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendant for negligence after the parties were involved in a car crash. During discovery, Plaintiff asked Defendant to admit violating certain traffic laws on the day of the crash. Defendant denied the request. The district court eventually granted summary judgment on the issue of Defendant’s negligence but denied Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions for Defendant’s failure to admit violating traffic laws. After a jury trial on damages, the jury awarded Plaintiff some, but not all, of the damages she sought in her negligence action. Plaintiff appealed. Defendant moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that Plaintiff waived her right to appeal by accepting the benefits of the judgment. The Supreme Court dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal and affirmed the district court’s decision not to sanction Defendant’s discovery conduct, holding (1) Plaintiff waived her right to appeal the district court’s evidentiary rulings when she accepted the judgment entered on the jury’s verdict; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Defendant’s conduct did not warrant discovery sanctions. View "Tempel v. Benson" on Justia Law

In 2008, Allen Ginn was injured while delivering a truck load of logs to a mill owned by Smurfit Stone Container Enterprises, Inc. In 2009, Smurfit filed voluntary petitions for bankruptcy relief under Chapter 11. In 2011, Ginn and his wife (the Ginns) and Smurfit stipulated an agreement in which Smurfit agreed not to enforce the claim bar date set by the bankruptcy court. The Ginns subsequently served Smurfit with a complaint, summons, and related document. When the Ginns received no reply or acknowledgement of service, they requested entry of default from the district court. The district court entered default against Smurfit. Smurfit filed a motion to vacate the entry of default. The court concluded that the default would stand with regard to Smurfit’s liability but that a jury would be allowed to consider the issues of causation and damages. Thereafter, a jury awarded Allen Ginn $3,470,899 in damages plus an additional $500,000 to his wife. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion, even slightly, in denying Smurfit’s motion to vacate the entry of default, as good cause did not exist to vacate the entry of default. View "Ginn v. Smurfit Stone Container Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

This case concerned a wall that Defendants constructed near a border shared by property owned by Plaintiffs, owners of lots in a subdivision. Plaintiffs sued Defendants claiming that the wall was constructed in violation of the subdivision’s “Declaration of Restrictions” and constituted a nuisance and a spite fence. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants and awarded Defendants attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether the wall constituted a spite fence or violated the Restrictions; (2) the district court's reasoning on the issue of whether the wall constituted a nuisance was based on an erroneous interpretation of the law; and (3) the district court, therefore, erred in awarding attorney fees to Defendants. View "Bennett v. Hill" on Justia Law

Twelve days after Justin Schiller was involuntarily committed to the Montana State Hospital (MSH), Schiller was released. A few months later, Schiller killed his former girlfriend, Catherine Woods, and then himself. Catherine’s parents filed a complaint alleging that MSH had a statutory duty to warn Catherine of the risk of violent behavior by Schiller. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the State and MSH, concluding that MSH had no duty to warn Catherine or take precautions for her protection because Schiller never communicated any specific threat of violence against Catherine during his commitment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because no actual, specific threat was communicated in this case, the duty to warn was not triggered. View "Woods v. Mont. State Hosp." on Justia Law

Centennial Contracting and Development, LLC (Centennial) and Leonard Investments, LLC (Leonard) obtained a judgment against Don and Susan Salminen. Morrison & Frampton law firm (Frampton) represented Centennial and Leonard in the litigation. The district court subsequently issued a writ of execution and garnishment. Frampton subsequently seized virtually everything in the Salminens house. Thereafter, the district court held that all of the property seized from the Salminens’ home was exempt from execution and must be returned. The Salminens commenced this action against Frampton, Centennial, and Leonard, asserting claims for violation of rights secured by Article II of the Montana Constitution, abuse of legal process, conversion, and wrongful levy. The district court granted Frampton’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and then granted judgment on the pleadings to Centennial and Leonard on the remaining claims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court erred in determining that the Salminens failed to state a claim for conversion as a matter of law, abuse of process and wrongful levy at this stage in the process. Remanded. View "Salminen v. Morrison & Frampton, PLLP" on Justia Law