Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Carter Boehm, Trustee, sued Defendants Cokedale, L.L.C. and Allen Carter for property damages when, during construction of a road to reach Defendants' land, rocks of various sizes rolled downhill onto Plaintiff's property. Plaintiff subsequently added claims for assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that Boehm was not the trustee of any trust validly established under Montana law, and therefore Boehm was perpetuating the lawsuit on behalf of a non-existent trust. The district court also awarded Defendants attorneys' fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court properly granted summary judgment to Defendants pursuant to Mont. R. Civ. P. 17(a), which requires that every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest; and (2) the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees to Defendants. The award of fees was reversed.

After Homeowners' house burned down, Homeowners' insurer denied coverage, stating that payment was not timely delivered, the money order was not signed, and the damaged house was the secondary house and Insurer's underwriting policies required insurance on the primary house also to be purchased through Insurer in order to have coverage in place for the secondary residence. Homeowners filed suit, asserting that no reasonable basis in fact or law existed for denial of the claim and seeking damages and a declaratory judgment that the loss was covered. The district court granted Insurer's motion for summary judgment and denied Homeowners' motion for partial summary judgment with respect to their declaratory judgment action. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Insurer as genuine issues of material fact remained, and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Homeowners' motion for partial summary judgment.

Following an automobile crash for which United Tool Rental (UTR) and DeLyle Paulsen admitted negligence, UTR and Paulsen sought contribution from the state DOT and several construction entities (construction parties), alleging their negligent design, construction, and maintenance of the highway contributed to the crash. After a jury trial, the district court determined UTR and Paulsen were entirely at fault for the crash and rejected their contribution claim. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence the DOT erected a "no left turn" sign after the crash and a post-crash memorandum prepared by the highway patrol; (2) the district court did not deprive UTR and Paulsen a fair trial by allowing the construction parties' counsel to inquire what caused Paulsen to drive inattentively; and (3) the jury's verdict was not defective.

Stephen and Dawn Steadele contracted with Montana Component Housing Corporation (MCHC) to construct a home. MCHC did not complete the home by the deadline and eventually abandoned the project without completing the home. The Steadeles filed suit against MCHC. The district court entered a default judgment against MCHC when it failed to respond to the suit. The Steadeles then requested payment from Colony Insurance Company, MCHC's insurer. Colony denied coverage and refused to pay because MCHC never notified it of the Steadeles' claim. The Steadeles then filed this action, arguing that Colony's refusal to issue payment on the underlying judgment was a violation of Mont. Code Ann. 33-18-201, which prohibits unfair claim settlement practices. The district court granted summary judgment to Colony. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Colony because MCHC's failure to notify Colony of the Steadeles' claim was a material breach of MCHC's obligations under the policy.

Timothy Hop's automobile was damaged in an accident with a driver insured by Safeco Insurance Company. In addition to the costs of repair, Hop sought "residual diminished value" (RDV) for his vehicle. When Safeco failed to pay RDV, Hop filed a class action complaint for declaratory relief in the district court, seeking a declaration that Safeco was required to investigate and pay class members, people whose vehicles were damaged by a Safeco insured and who were not paid RDV by Safeco, for RDV of their vehicle. The district court granted Hop's motion for class certification. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion in certifying a class action before Hop had satisfied the statutory requirements to bring an individual third party action against Safeco. Remanded with instructions to dismiss Hop's class action without prejudice.

Joseph Graziano, an owner of property in the Stock Farm subdivision and a member of the Stock Farm Homeowners Association, filed a complaint against the Association and Stock Farm LLC (SFLLC), asserting several claims, including negligence, breach of fiduciary duties, defamation, and constructive fraud. The Association and SFLLC moved to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration pursuant to a provision of Stock Farm's Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CCRs). The district court granted the motion, finding the CCRs were an enforceable agreement to arbitrate all the claims in Graziano's complaint. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court did not err in finding the CCRs were not a contract of adhesion and were within Graziano's reasonable expectations, and thus were enforceable; (2) the district court erred in finding Graziano's claim of breach of fiduciary duty was not a personal injury claim exempt from arbitration under Mont. Code Ann. 27-5-114(2)(a); and (3) all of Graziano's remaining claims were subject to the valid and enforceable arbitration provision and must be arbitrated pursuant to the CCRs. Remanded.

After Peter Carter was killed in a car accident, Plaintiff filed a wrongful death and survival action against the vehicle manufacturer, the auto rental company, and the other driver in the accident. Plaintiff asserted claims against the auto companies for negligence and strict liability, arguing that the seatbelt system in Carter's vehicle was defective. The district court ruled that Mont. Code Ann. 61-13-106 prohibited evidence of seatbelt use or nonuse in products liability claims but not in negligence claims. The court concluded it would be too confusing for the jury to admit the evidence on the products liability claims but exclude it on the negligence claims and informed Stokes if he planned on using evidence of seatbelt use or nonuse he must drop his negligence claims. The Supreme Court granted Stokes's petition for supervisory control, holding (1) when the plaintiff's injuries are alleged to result from a defect in the vehicle's occupant restraint system, whether the claim sounds in negligence or strict liability, the statute does not preclude evidence of seatbelt use or nonuse; and (2) where the plaintiff's claim is combined with a claim against the driver of another vehicle involved in the crash, a limiting instruction must be given.

After Madeleine Willson died of metastatic breast cancer and acute aspiration pneumonia, Robert Willson filed a complaint against Benefis Hospitals, Peace Hospice, and Dr. T. Brice Addison for medical malpractice. Robert alleged that the administration of medication expedited Madeleine's death and that Madeleine did not give informed consent to administration of the medications. Benefis filed two motions for summary judgment, the first of which argued that Robert had failed to establish causation through qualified expert testimony. Robert filed a motion for summary judgment seeking default judgment as a sanction for Benefis' alleged spoliation of evidence. The district court granted summary judgment on the issue of causation in favor of Benefis and Dr. Addison. The court denied Robert's motion, finding Robert failed to prove spoliation. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Benefis and Dr. Addison, and (2) although the district court denied Robert's motion for summary judgment for the wrong reason, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion where sanctions were not appropriate.

While pitching in a baseball game, Brandon Patch was struck in the head by a batted ball that was hit using a Hillerich & Bradsby Company (H&B) aluminum bat. Brandon died from his injuries. Brandon's parents sued H&B in strict products liability for survivorship and wrongful death damages, asserting manufacturing and design defect and failure to warn claims. The district court granted H&B's motion for summary judgment on Patches' manufacturing defect claim but denied summary judgment on their design defect and failure to warn claim. The court granted Patches' motion in limine, excluding H&B's assumption of the risk defense. The jury concluded that the bat was in a defective condition due to failure to warn of the enhanced risks associated with its use and awarded Patches an $850,000 verdict on their failure to warn claim. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding the district court properly (1) denied H&B summary judgment, (2) denied H&B's motion for judgment as a matter of law, (3) granted Patches' motion in limine regarding H&B's assumption of the risk defense, and (4) instructed the jury on failure to warn.

After a Montana DOT (MDT) investigation, employee Richard Kershaw was demoted with a lower rate of pay. After resigning, Kershaw filed a complaint in district court, asserting wrongful discharge without good cause under the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act (WDEA), wrongful discharge under the WDEA, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The district court granted summary judgment to MDT all three claims, ruling that Kershaw was precluded from bringing a constructive discharge under the WDEA because the claim was subject to the Board of Personnel Appeals (BOPA) grievance procedure and that the IIED claim was precluded by Kershaw's failure to pursue a BOPA grievance procedure. Kershaw moved to amend his complaint to include additional tort claims, and the district court denied his motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err by concluding that the preclusion of Kershaw's claim from the WDEA did not violate his constitutional rights to equal protection and to a jury trial; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kershaw's motions for leave to amend the complaint.