Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Donald Puhto and his sister, Janet Barrett, commenced an action against Defendant Smith Funeral Chapels, alleging negligence and misrepresentation in the handling of their deceased uncle's remains. Counsel for Puhto and Barrett withdrew from the representation. Defendant's counsel then sent Puhto and Barrett a notice of removal of attorney for plaintiffs informing them of the need to appoint a new attorney or appear in person at a show cause hearing. After Puhto and Barrett failed to respond to the notice of removal and failed to appear at the hearing, the district court dismissed the case with prejudice. The court subsequently set aside the dismissal as to Barrett. The court then denied Puhto's motion to set aside the dismissal and request for an evidentiary hearing, finding that Puhto did not raise sufficient indications of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect under Mont. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Puhto had not shown the district court abused its discretion in determining he had not proven excusable neglect.

Terry Richerson died after being backed over by a truck owned by United Materials. Richerson's estate requested medical payments under the policy the Cincinnati Insurance Company issued to United Materials for the truck involved in the accident. Cincinnati denied the claim because the policy provided coverage for injuries suffered by a claimant while "occupying" a covered auto. The district court concluded that Richerson was not occupying the auto as defined in the policy and, accordingly, granted summary judgment in favor of Cincinnati. Richerson's estate appealed, arguing that because Richerson was caught in and transported by the truck, he was "upon" it, and therefore he was "occupying" the truck. the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Cincinnati, holding that Richerson's contact with the truck was insufficient to trigger coverage under the definition of "occupying" in the policy.

Daughter was injured in an automobile accident caused by an uninsured motorist. Father and Daughter were insured by two Farmers Insurance Exchange automobile insurance policies, each providing uninsured motorist protection of $25,000. After the accident, in exchange for a full release signed by Daughter, Farmers paid $25,000 in uninsured motorist coverage under Father's policy insuring the vehicle involved in the accident. Later, Daughter and Father (Plaintiffs) sued Farmers, seeking uninsured motorist benefits under Father's second policy. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Farmers. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) dismissing Plaintiffs' claim for stacking of uninsured motorist coverage; (2) ruling that neither Plaintiff had standing to bring a claim for medical pay coverage; and (3) declining to certify a putative class for claims of unjust enrichment and disgorgement of premiums.

Plaintiff Walter Fasch was injured in a single-vehicle ATV accident that occurred within a construction area on a U.S. highway. Fasch filed a negligence action against the Montana Department of Transportation, the construction contractor, and the subcontractor (collectively, Defendants). The district court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that Defendants owed no duty to Fasch because Fasch was an unforeseeable plaintiff who was not in the zone of risk. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that reasonable minds could differ as to the resolution of certain factual issues, that the factual issues should be resolved by trial, and that resolution of the factual issues would also affect the determination of the legal issue of duty.

Meril Curtis's houseguest took his credit card and made over $7,000 in unauthorized charges. After acknowledging that the charges were unauthorized and that Curtis was not personally liable for the charges, Citibank referred the account to a collection agency called Professional Recovery Services (PRS). Curtis filed suit against Citibank, alleging libel and credit libel and violation of the Montana Consumer Protection Act (MCPA). The district court granted summary judgment to Citibank, finding that Curtis's claims were preempted by the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in finding that Curtis' state law claims were preempted by the FCRA because the FCRA does not regulate collection agencies such as PRS. Remanded.

Sellers entered an alleged contract with Buyer for the sale of property. After the parties failed to complete the sale, Buyer sued Sellers, seeking specific performance of the alleged contract. Buyer filed an amended complaint that added as a defendant Attorney, who had served as counsel for Sellers in the failed transaction, alleging fraud and other tortious conduct. Attorney filed a motion to substitute the district court judge, which the district court denied after finding Attorney's motion was untimely. At issue on appeal was whether Attorney qualified as a third-party defendant who possessed an independent right of substitution as opposed to a subsequently joined defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Attorney and Buyer qualified as adverse parties, and therefore, Attorney was a third-party defendant; and (2) Attorney timely filed his motion of substitution. Remanded.

John Miller pled guilty to two counts of deliberate homicide. Miller later filed suit against James Goetz, the attorney that defended him, and arranged for Patrick Begley's limited representation in his claims against Goetz. Begley later withdrew from representing Miller. Miller then filed suit against Begley, alleging breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and fraudulent deceit. The district court granted summary judgment to Begley, finding that Begley had reasonably assisted Miller with his claims against Goetz and the dismissal of the Goetz claim was based on legal deficiencies unrelated to Begley's legal services. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Begley as Miller failed to demonstrate genuine issues of material fact existed regarding his claims.

Dane Shattuck died from injuries after being hit by an automobile. Dane received medical care at Hospital for his injuries. Dane was enrolled in a children's health insurance program (CHIP), administered by the department of public health and human services (DPHHS). Hospital submitted the bill for Dane's care to Blue Cross and Blue Shield (BCBS), which served as third-party administrator of the CHIP program for DPHHS. Hospital then asserted a lien for the full bill amount against recoveries Gail Shattuck, as personal representative of Dane's estate, may obtain against third parties. Shattuck sued Hospital, BCBS, DPHHS, and the State, asserting that Defendants unlawfully acted to avoid application of "made whole" rules and that Hospital could not foreclose the lien because Shattuck had not been made whole. The district court granted partial summary judgment to Shattuck. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the district court erred by determining that CHIP constitutes insurance and was governed by the made whole doctrine, and (2) the district court did not err by determining that BCBS was not an insurer in its role here and, therefore, was not subject to the made whole statute. Remanded.

Rohnn Lampi's neighbor admitted liability for negligently dumping ashes that caused a wildfire that burned the trees and vegetation on Lampi's property. After the parties failed to agree on a settlement amount, Lampi brought an action in district court against his neighbor and sought a jury trial to determine damages. The jury awarded Lampi $250,000. On appeal, Lampi contended that the district court wrongly denied his motions to establish restoration damages as the appropriate measure of damages in his case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred by not concluding that restoration damages constituted the appropriate measure of damages in this case. Remanded for a new trial to allow the jury to determine what reasonable amount of damages would restore Lampi's property to its pre-fire condition.

Heather Weber filed suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) to recover for personal injuries allegedly received during the course and scope of her employment with BNSF Railway Company, alleging BNSF breached its duty under FELA, violated the Locomotive Inspection Act (LIA), and violated the Safety Appliance Act (SAA), federal regulations, and other standards. The district court found BNSF not negligent. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the district court erred in granting BNSF's motion for judgment as a matter of law on Weber's LIA claim because Weber presented sufficient evidence that presented a factual issue whether the LIA had been violated and whether that violation played a part in causing Weber's injuries; and (2) the district court did not err in granting BNSF's motion to exclude testimony from Weber's treating physician about the results of a positron emission tomography (PET) scan performed on Weber. Remanded.