Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This appeal arose from a dispute between two neighboring property owners regarding a workshop addition to the home of Appellants, Neil and Seth Milner (Milner). The addition violated the city's setback requirement, and Appellee Gary Olsen reached an agreement with Milner to sell strip of his property so the building would be in compliance. The parties disagreed, however, about the terms of the agreement. Milner filed suit, and the district court rescinded and set aside the agreement. Olsen was ordered to return Milner's money and costs, and Milner was required to deed the land back to Olsen. After Olsen discovered that Milner's addition encroached past the boundary line of his property, Olsen filed suit alleging trespass and nuisance. The district court found in favor of Olsen and ordered Milner to remove the addition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in determining (1) Olsen's claims were not barred by res judicata; (2) Olsen's claims were not barred by equitable estoppel or waiver; and (3) Milner was liable to Olsen for trespass. View "Olsen v. Milner" on Justia Law

After a dispute over the purchase of a motor coach, Plaintiff brought suit against Defendants, a used car salesman, a used car dealership, and a bank, asserting claims of, inter alia, breach of contract, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion to compel discovery, which the district court granted. Defendants did not meet their discovery deadlines, and Defendants' counsel failed to attend several status conferences. The district court then entered a default judgment for Plaintiff as a discovery sanction and later and awarded Plaintiff $74,154 in damages. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion when it entered a default judgment for Plaintiff as a discovery sanction under Mont. R. Civ. P. 37(b); (2) did not abuse its discretion when it refused to set aside the sanction orders; (3) did not err as a matter of law in calculating damages; but (4) failed to property calculate and award prejudgment interest. Remanded. View "Kraft v. High Country Motors Inc." on Justia Law

Casey Stuivnga and Britni Evans were injured in a single-vehicle accident. The vehicle was owned by Stuivenga. Both Stuivenga and Evans claimed the other person was driving and was liable to the other for their injuries. They both sought proceeds available under an automobile insurance policy issued to Stuivenga by Progressive Direct Insurance Company. Progressive determined that Evans' and Stuivenga's competing claims could not be settled in an amount equal to or less than the policy's per person liability limit of $25,000. Progressive commenced an interpleader action and deposited the $25,000 with the district court, asking the court to determine to whom the funds should be issued. Ultimately, a jury found that Evans was the driver at the time of the accident and released the $25,000 to Stuivenga. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) this appeal was not moot, as the issue presented at the outset of the action of who was driving had not ceased to exist, and Stuivenga's payment of the funds to third parties did not render the Court unable to grant effective relief; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Evans' motion for a new trial. View "Progressive Direct Ins. Co. v. Stuivenga" on Justia Law

Tina Blackmore filed a complaint against Marvin Dunster alleging damages arising from an assault and unlawful restraint. The district court entered a judgment against Dunster. Dunster subsequently filed an unrelated personal injury action in the district court. While that case was pending, the clerk of the district court issued a writ of execution directing a levying officer to satisfy the balance due to Blackmore out of Dunster's personal property. The writ specifically instructed the officer to seize and sell Dunster's personal injury cause of action. Blackmore purchased Dunster's cause of action for fifty dollars. The district court set aside the sale of Dunster's cause of action on the ground that a personal injury action was not subject to levy before judgment was entered. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Montana law does not allow the levy or sale of a personal injury cause of action before judgment is entered. View "Blackmore v. Dunster" on Justia Law

Kevin Kichnet was babysitting his young nieces when he met three-year-old Eternity after the Head Start bus dropped her off after school. Kichnet was allegedly holding her hand as they crossed the street when Eternity collapsed. Kitchnet called 9-1-1. After Eternity reached the hospital she was pronounced dead. Kichnet was subsequently arrested for deliberate homicide and jailed. More than six months later, charges against Kichnet were dropped when it was determined that the Head Start school bus had run over Eternity. Kichnet sued (1) Butte-Silver Bow County, claiming County law enforcement officers performed their investigation negligently, resulting in Kichnet's arrest and incarceration; and (2) the State, claiming that the State Medical Examiner performed his duties negligently when he reported Eternity's death as a homicide. The district court granted the County's and State's motions for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in its judgment, as (1) the State was immune under the cited statutes from Kichnet's negligence claim; and (2) the court did not err in determining that there was probable cause for the arrest and incarceration of Kichnet, and that the investigation by the County was not negligent. View "Kichnet v. Butte-Silver Bow County" on Justia Law

Employee, a truck driver, resigned from his employment with Employer after he developed arthritis. Employee later filed an occupational disease claim, which the Montana State Fund (MSF) denied. The Workers' Compensation Court (WCC) concluded that Employee's job duties were the major contributing cause of his arthritic condition, and therefore, Employee was suffering from an occupational disease. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the WCC did not err in concluding that Grande was suffering from a compensable occupational disease arising out of and in the course and scope of his employment, as the WCC's findings of fact were supported by substantial, credible evidence, and its conclusions of law were correct. View "Mont. State Fund v. Grande" on Justia Law

Judith LaPlante filed an action in tribal court against Town Pump, Inc. and Major Brands Distributing Imports, Inc. (collectively, Defendants). The case was eventually dismissed by the Ninth Circuit, which ruled that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over LaPlante's claims. LaPlante then filed a new action in state district court. District court judge Laurie McKinnon assumed jurisdiction. LaPlante attempted to commence the action in district court by transferring the tribal court action rather than filing a new complaint. The district court dismissed LaPlante's attempted transfer of the action from tribal court and provided LaPlante with twenty days to serve a complaint on Defendants. LaPlante filed a complaint as a new cause of action rather than as an amended pleading in the original transfer action. Judge McKinnon also assumed jurisdiction of the new action and consolidated the two cases. LaPlante filed a motion to substitute Judge McKinnon in the new action, which Judge McKinnon denied as untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Judge McKinnon properly deemed LaPlante's substitution motion as untimely as the time limit elapsed well before LaPlante filed her substitution motion. View "LaPlante v. Town Pump, Inc." on Justia Law

Employee filed a workers' compensation claim against Employer. Employer's Insurer accepted liability for Employee's claim. Insurer contracted with third-party Adjuster to provide services for Employee's claim. Employee and Insurer disagreed over elements of the claim, and Attorney advised Insurer on various legal matters. The claim was eventually resolved. Employee then filed the present action for unfair claims settlement practices, naming Insurer and an employee of Adjuster as defendants. Employee served Employer with a subpoena requesting, inter alia, a letter Attorney wrote to Adjuster's employee concerning the underlying case. Employer and Insurer objected to the subpoena, citing attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine. The court denied the motions. Insurer then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of supervisory control. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the district court correctly applied the law of attorney-client privilege but incorrectly analyzed the work product doctrine. However, because the court reached the proper conclusion, supervisory control was unnecessary. View "Am. Zurich Ins. v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

In 2007, Scottie and Dawn Pederson (the Pedersons) and Rocky Mountain Bank (the Bank) entered into a construction loan agreement pursuant to which the Bank agreed to lend the Pedersons several thousand dollars. In 2008, the Pedersons and the Bank agreed to finance the construction loan through three short term loans. In 2009, the Pedersons tried to refinance their loans but were unable to do so. Due to alleged failures on the part of the Bank, the Pedersons brought suit against the Bank in 2011, asserting claims for, inter alia, negligence, constructive fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. After it was served with the complaint, the Bank filed a Mont. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, asserting the statutes of limitations had run on all of the Pedersons' claims. The district court granted the Bank's motion and dismissed the Pedersons' claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the applicable statutes of limitations began to run in 2008 because the Pedersons' claims had accrued and they had discovered the facts constituting the claims; and (2) by filing their complaint more than three years later, the Pedersons failed to commence their action within any of the applicable statutes of limitations. View "Pederson v. Rocky Mountain Bank" on Justia Law

Judith Newman (Newman), mother and personal representative of the estate of Karlye Newman (Karlye), appealed from certain pretrial and trial rulings made in the district court concerning the suicidal death of Karlye while at a boarding school for troubled teenagers. Newman named as Defendants Robert Lichfield and the World Wide Association of Specialty Programs and Schools. A jury found Defendants were not negligent, did not commit deceit or negligent misrepresentation, and were not liable for the possible wrongful acts of other defendants regarding Karlye's death. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court abused its discretion in limiting the scope of evidence regarding foreseeability, as the exclusion of the evidence was highly prejudicial to Newman and largely prevented her from being able to argue foreseeability, duty, and negligence on the part of Defendants. Remanded for a new trial. View "Newman v. Lichfield" on Justia Law