Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed an action against a district court judge, seeking damages for the judge's acts or omissions while presiding over a telephone pretrial conference in a civil action then pending before him. At all relevant times the judge was acting in his official capacity as a district court judge with regard to that case and the pretrial conference. The district court granted the judge's motion to dismiss on the grounds of judicial immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the acts of which Plaintiff complained occurred while the judge was conducting the pretrial conference and were clearly within the authority and responsibility of a district court judge, the judge was immune from suit, and the district court properly dismissed Plaintiff's complaint. View "Hartsoe v. McNeil" on Justia Law

Petitioner Caryn Lewis asked the Supreme Court to issue a writ of supervisory control over the Eighth Judicial District Court in Cascade County Cause No. ADV 10-895. The District Court action arose from a 2003 motor vehicle/pedestrian accident in which Lewis was the pedestrian. The vehicle that struck Lewis left the scene, and neither the vehicle nor the driver was ever located. Lewis’s complaint stated she suffered serious bodily injuries from the accident, and her medical reports showed that those injuries included a cause for a Rule 35 examination. The Court never ruled that a plaintiff's claim for general emotional distress damages is, in and of itself, a sufficient basis for ordering a Rule 35 mental examination. Lewis did not claim damages for any mental or psychological disorder or injury due to the accident, nor did she claim that a pre-existing mental condition was exacerbated by the accident or assert an independent tort claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Rather, she made only a general claim for "emotional pain, suffering and anxiety" associated with her physical injuries from the accident. Upon review, the Court concluded that the matter involved a legal issue as to which the District Court made a mistake of law. Because Lewis did not put her mental condition in controversy, the District Court erred in granting State Farm's (her insurer) motion for an independent psychological examination of her under M. R. Civ. P. 35. "And, because Lewis's loss of privacy in submitting to a Rule 35 psychological examination would be irretrievable, the normal appeal process would be inadequate to address the District Court's error." The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Lewis v. 8th Judicial District" on Justia Law

Michael Hicks appealed a district court's order awarding Anthony Varano damages of $616.33 in a dispute following a snowmobiling trip the two took together. Varano allowed Hicks to borrow his snowmobile. The parties disputed the events that took place on the trip, but the vehicle got damaged, and Varano sued Hicks for damages. Hicks challenged the district court's determination that there was sufficient evidence entered at trial to prove the existence of a contract between the parties. The Supreme Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence and affirmed the district court. View "Varano v. Hicks" on Justia Law

Candice Brilz filed an action in Montana state court purportedly asserting statutory and common law bad-faith claims against Metropolitan General Insurance Company (Metropolitan). Metropolitan removed the action to federal court and filed a motion for summary judgment, which the federal court granted. Thereafter, Brilz commenced this suit district court seeking a determination that she may pursue her common law bad-faith claim against Metropolitan. Because the statute of limitations on that claim had since expired, Brilz requested a ruling that she may pursue the claim pursuant to 27-2-407, MCA, or the Supreme Court's doctrine of equitable tolling. The District Court dismissed the action, and Brilz appealed. The Supreme Court concluded that principles of claim preclusion barred her from filing a second action against Metropolitan arising out of the same underlying facts. Accordingly the Court affirmed the District Court's judgment. View "Brilz v. Metropolitan General Ins." on Justia Law

Al Ballard and Ecosafe Gold Recovery, LLC (Ballard), appealed a district court's order entered following the Supreme Court’s remand in the first appeal of the case. The Supreme Court reversed the entry of judgment in favor of Ballard, and reversed the award of attorney fees to Ballard and remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Upon remittitur, Russell and Melissa Levens moved for an order on remand that would provide various forms of relief, including attorney fees. When Ballard did not initially respond, the District Court entered an order requiring Ballard to immediately restore a 30-foot buffer zone by appropriate filling, compacting, and buttressing. The court ordered Ballard to commence work immediately and to complete the restoration within 30 days, and imposed a $100 per day penalty for every day beyond the 30-day deadline that the restoration was incomplete. The court required Ballard to mark the boundary of the buffer zone and to pay Levens' attorney fees and costs, and scheduled a hearing to determine the proper amount of fees. The Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not err on remand of the case. "Ballard has no meritorious defense and the takings claim was raised for the first time on appeal." The District Court properly awarded attorney fees to Levens under the agreement. The Levens were likewise entitled to attorney fees on appeal. View "Ballard et al v. Levens" on Justia Law

Richard Ford suffered a work-related injury to his neck. He was diagnosed with a cervical strain, and Sentry Casualty Company accepted liability and paid benefits for this injury. During Ford’s treatment, he underwent an MRI which revealed a more serious cervical disc condition. Ford claimed that the workplace accident caused or aggravated this condition and that Sentry was liable for surgery to address it. Ford also claimed that Sentry was liable for ongoing temporary total disability benefits and that Sentry had unreasonably adjusted his claim. Sentry denied liability for Ford’s cervical disc condition based on the opinions of several doctors that the condition was not related to the industrial accident. Sentry also maintained that Ford reached maximum medical improvement, that he has been released to return to work without restrictions, and that it reasonably adjusted his claim. The dispute ultimately reached the Workers’ Compensation Court (WCC). Trial was held in early 2011. Ford and his wife testified, and numerous medical records were admitted into evidence. The WCC ruled in favor of Sentry as to each of the foregoing issues, and Ford appealed. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the WCC correctly determined that he failed to carry his burden of establishing causation with regard to his disc condition and affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Ford v. Sentry Casualty Co." on Justia Law

In July 2009, Charles Albert’s Billings, Montana home caught fire. Despite response by the City of Billings Fire Department, the house burned to the ground. Albert sued the City for negligence of the Billings Fire Department, discrimination based upon age and disability, slander, and violation of his constitutional and statutory right to know and obtain documents held by the City. The District Court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment on all issues. Albert appealed. Finding no error in the district court's consideration of Albert's case, the Supreme Court affirmed that court's decision. View "Albert v. City of Billings" on Justia Law

Cassadie and Chris Parish were injured in a motor vehicle accident when their vehicle was struck by an uninsured driver. United Financial Casualty Insurance Company (UFC) provided insurance coverage to the Parishes, including uninsured motorist (UM) coverage. The Parishes, who had two vehicles insured on their UFC policy at the time of the accident, argued they should be permitted to stack the UM benefits provided in their policy. UFC refused, stating that the Parishes' policy did not allow stacking. The Parishes sued seeking declaratory judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of UFC. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting UFC's motion for summary judgment, as, inter alia, the policy was unambiguous and UFC's insurance agreement did not create a reasonable expectation of stacked UM coverage. View "Parish v. Morris" on Justia Law

Appellant Marla Ward filed suit seeking damages for personal injuries she sustained as she was sorting horses on Appellee Paul Johnson's property. Johnson resided in Pondera County. Johnson filed a motion to change venue, arguing that Pondera County was the appropriate place for trial because it was the only county where a defendant resided. Ward opposed the motion, asserting that case law permitted Ward to file her claim in Yellowstone County, her place of residence. The district court ruled in favor of Johnson. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Ward's decision to file her complaint in Yellowstone County was legally correct under Mont. Code Ann. 25-2-122(2)(b); and (2) the statute permitting Ward to file her action in the county of her residence did not deprive Johnson of the equal protection of the laws. View "Ward v. Johnson" on Justia Law

On August 9, 2007, Philip Boude filed a Federal Employers' Liability Act claim against his employer, Union Pacific Railroad Company, asserting that he experienced a work-related injury on July 29, 2006 due to the Railroad's negligence. The jury ruled in favor of Union Pacific. Boude appealed, contending that the district court committed multiple errors during the trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of Boude's termination of employment and the Public Law Board's decision affirming his termination, as the evidence was inadmissible on three separate stand-alone grounds; and (2) the admission of the evidence was prejudicial, and reversal was appropriate. View "Boude v. Union Pac. R.R. Co." on Justia Law