Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Labairs lost their newborn baby after an early delivery by C-section. The Labairs retained Steve Carey and Carey Law Firm (Carey) to pursue their medical malpractice claim against their obstetrician. More than two and a half years later, Carey filed a complaint against the obstetrician. However, Carey failed to file an application with the Montana Medical Legal Panel (MMLP) before filing a complaint with the district court as required by statute and further failed to file an MMLP application within the three-year statute of limitations applicable to medical malpractice claims. The district court later dismissed the Labairs' medical malpractice case with prejudice as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The Labairs subsequently filed a complaint for legal malpractice against Casey. The district court entered summary judgment for Carey, concluding that Carey's conduct of failing to file the application with the MMLP did not cause the Labairs injury or damages because the Labairs failed to show that the underlying medical malpractice claims would have succeeded but for the error. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the Labairs' loss of their medical malpractice case was an injury; and (2) the damages associated with that injury remained unproven. View "Labair v. Carey " on Justia Law

When Plaintiff brought her daughter to play in a city park, the child fell from a slide in the playground area and suffered a severe head injury. Plaintiff sued the City for negligently failing to maintain a safe depth of impact-absorbing material in the area under the slide. The district court granted summary judgment to the City, (1) determining that the "public duty doctrine" applied in this case, that the City owed no duty to Plaintiff's daughter, and therefore, the City could not be held liable for the accident; and (2) rejecting Plaintiff's argument that the recreational use statute applied to this case and imposed liability upon the City for willful or wanton misconduct. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) based upon an analysis of foreseeability, it was reasonable and proper to hold the City to a duty to exercise reasonable care in maintaining its public parks, and thus, the public duty doctrine did not apply here; and (2) the recreational use statute applied to this case, and the determination of whether the City's conduct rose to the level of willful or wanton misconduct should be decided at trial. View "Gatlin-Johnson v. Miles City" on Justia Law

Mike Alexander was one of two former employees of Bozeman Motors who filed suit against Bozeman Motors and its president and managers, alleging negligence, battery, and negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiffs claimed long-term physical and emotional injuries resulting from exposure to carbon monoxide and propane. Alexander died after filing suit. Bozeman Motors moved for summary judgment on the basis that the claims against it were barred by the exclusive remedy provision of Montana's Workers' Compensation Act. The district court granted Bozeman Motors' motion, holding that the conduct of Defendants did not rise to the level of deliberate intent to cause specific harm, and that Mont. Code Ann. 39-71-413, which provides an exception to the exclusive remedy provision of the Act, was constitutional. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with respect to Alexander's claims. On remand, the jury returned a verdict for Defendants on all claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 39-71-413(2) does not create an impermissible class of employees in violation of equal protection; (2) the district court did not err in instructing the jury; and (3) the court did not err in denying Plaintiffs' motion to exclude Alexander's cause of death. View "Alexander v. Bozeman Motors, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured in a car accident when the car in which he was a passenger and which Defendant was driving crashed after Defendant lost control of the vehicle. Plaintiff filed an action against Defendant seeking damages for injuries allegedly caused by Defendant's negligence. Following a jury trial, the jury found in favor of Plaintiff and awarded him $27,000. Plaintiff, having presented evidence of past medical expenses totaling $35,030, filed a motion for a new trial on the issue of damages. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the jury's conclusion that Plaintiff was not entitled to the full amount of damages he requested; and (2) thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Plaintiff's motion for a new trial. View "Murray v. Whitcraft" on Justia Law

In December 2004, Plaintiff, an on-duty law enforcement officer with the Federal Reserve Bank, was injured in an altercation on the bank premises with Defendant, who had trespassed onto the Federal Reserve property while intoxicated. In March 2009, Plaintiff sued for negligence. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the three-year statute of limitations expired by the time the complaint was filed. The district court granted Defendant's motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant, as the evidence of when the statute of limitations began to run on Plaintiff's claim against Defendant was conflicting. Remanded for trial. View "Siebken v. Voderberg" on Justia Law

Plaintiff gave birth to Child at Hospital. Complications arose prior to and after Child's delivery, leading to problems with Child's brain development. Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of Child, later sued the doctor who delivered Child and Hospital. Plaintiff subsequently settled her claims with the doctor. The district court granted summary judgment to Hospital on all of Plaintiff's claims. This appeal arose out of pre-trial rulings made by the district court in Plaintiff's litigation with Hospital. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) extending discovery deadlines; (2) granting summary judgment to Hospital on Plaintiff's agency claims; (3) granting summary judgment to Hospital on Plaintiff's Consumer Protection Act Claim; (4) granting summary judgment to Hospital on Plaintiff's joint venture claim; and (5) granting summary judgment to Hospital on Plaintiff's negligent credentialing claim. View "Brookins v. Mote" on Justia Law

Katherine Beehler-Goodson was the mother of minor children E.G. and R.G., the wife of Plaintiff Robert Goodson, and the sister of Plaintiff Tony Beehler. While Katherine was undergoing a myelogram, bacteria were introduced into her cerebrospinal fluid, resulting in a meningitis infection, which caused her death. Plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice claim against Eastern Radiological Associates; Dr. Anne Giuliano, the radiologist who performed the myelogram; and St. Vincent Healthcare, alleging that Dr. Giuliano negligently failed to wear a mask during the myelogram, which resulted in bacteria traveling from Dr. Giuliano's uncovered mouth into Katherine's spinal column. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, finding (1) Plaintiff's proposed expert witness, Dr. Patrick Joseph, was not qualified to offer expert testimony on the applicable standards of care, breach, or causation; and (2) without Dr. Joseph's expert testimony, Plaintiffs lacked the necessary expert witness to establish the elements of medical negligence. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the court abused its discretion by excluding Dr. Joseph's testimony on the applicable standards of care and causation. View "Beehler v. E. Radiological Assocs., P.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants asserting that a tree on Defendants' property was a nuisance and trespass because it blocked Plaintiff's view. The district court dismissed the complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) the district court properly granted Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's nuisance claim, as the naturally growing tree that obstructed Plaintiff's view did not constitute, as a matter of law, conduct that was "intentional, negligent, reckless, or ultrahazardous," "an inherently injurious act," or a condition which "obviously exposes another to probable injury;" but (2) the complaint adequately stated a legal claim for trespass because it alleged that the roots of Defendants' tree entered, remained on, and damaged Plaintiff's property. View "Martin v. Artis " on Justia Law

After a five-day trial, a jury decided that Appellee Bull River Country Store Properties, LLC was not negligent in connection with Appellants' claim that it sold water-contaminated diesel fuel. Appellants appealed the district court's order denying their motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the circumstances, Plaintiff could not demonstrate prejudice from Bull River's reliance on the settled-party defense authorized by 27-1-703 MCA, and therefore, the Court did not need to address the constitutionality of the statute; (2) Appellant waived his right to argue on appeal that the district court erred when it allowed Bull River to question Appellant about his unrelated insurance claims; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant's motion for a new trial based on Bull River's insurance-related arguments; and (4) Appellant was not entitled to a new trial on the ground of juror misconduct. View "Horn v. Bull River Country Store Props., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff owned and operated a ranch with an 18,000 square-foot lodge. Defendant was a custom manufacturer of high-end wood flooring from whom Plaintiff brought wood flooring while building the lodge. After it was installed, the wood flooring began buckling and had to be replaced. Plaintiff sued Defendant for negligent misrepresentation, breach of an implied warranty of suitability for a particular purpose, and violation of the Montana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (MCPA). The jury returned a verdict in Defendant's favor on all of Plaintiff's claims. The district court then granted Defendant attorney fees as the prevailing party under the MCPA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion when it found good cause to amend the scheduling order to allow Defendant's late disclosure of an expert witness; and (2) did not err when it awarded Defendant attorney fees under the MCPA. View "B Bar J Ranch, LLC v. Carlisle Wide Plank Floors, Inc." on Justia Law