Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant was a fifty-five-year-old male with a history of schizoaffective disorder. The State filed a petition to involuntarily commit Appellant, alleging that Appellant was unable to care for his basic needs and appeared to pose a danger to himself and others. After a hearing, the district court granted the State's petition and involuntarily committed Appellant to the Montana State Hospital (MSH), authorizing MSH to administer appropriate medication involuntarily. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not violate Appellant's statutory and due process rights when it failed to obtain a personal waiver of rights under Mont. Code Ann. 53-21-119(1), as Appellant effectively waived his rights by allowing his counsel to inform the judge of his desire to do so; and (2) the district court complied with the statutory requirements in ordering Appellant to take medications as prescribed by his doctors, and this directive was sufficient to authorize involuntary medication. View "In re R.W.K." on Justia Law

Edythe Rice, who was in her late eighties, owned a cattle ranch. Edythe's son, Clark Rice, assisted Edythe in performing ranch duties. In 2006, Clark was driving a tractor in "advanced twilight" without illuminated lights. Juanita Stands struck the tractor's left rear tire. The impact caused Juanita's vehicle to spin into the neighboring lane, where it collided with Vianna Stewart's vehicle. Juanita and Vianna sustained injuries from the accident. The tractor and automobiles were total losses. After five years in litigation, the district court (1) concluded that Clark was negligent per se for violating three traffic statutes; (2) determined Edythe was vicariously liable for the injuries; and (3) concluded that Clark and Edythe were jointly and severally liable for eighty percent of Juanita's claimed damages and one hundred percent of Vianna's claimed damages. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the district court's judgment against Edythe, holding that the district court erred by proceeding to trial without addressing Edythe's competency or ensuring the parties met statutory notice requirements; and (2) otherwise affirmed. Remanded the case for an evaluation of Edythe's need for a conservator and new trial as to Edythe's vicarious liability only. View "Stewart v. Rice" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Yellowstone County Attorney's Office filed a petition for involuntary commitment of Appellant. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court determined that Appellant met the statutory criteria for involuntary commitment and involuntarily committed Appellant to the Montana State Hospital. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence presented for the district court to determine that Appellant required commitment because he was unable to care for his basic needs and presented an imminent threat of injury to himself or others; and (2) Appellant failed to make a substantial showing that his trial counsel was ineffective. View "In re R.F." on Justia Law

After Respondent voluntarily admitted herself to the behavioral health unit of a hospital, Respondent requested to be discharged. However, the county attorney's office filed a petition requesting that Respondent be committed for further evaluation and treatment. The district court appointed a public defender to represent Respondent, and following a hearing on the petition for commitment, the court committed Respondent to the Montana State Hospital with a treatment order that included the involuntary administration of medication. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) plaint error review of this issue was not warranted; and (2) Respondent was not denied the effective assistance of counsel during the hearing. View "In re J.S.W." on Justia Law

The Labairs lost their newborn baby after an early delivery by C-section. The Labairs retained Steve Carey and Carey Law Firm (Carey) to pursue their medical malpractice claim against their obstetrician. More than two and a half years later, Carey filed a complaint against the obstetrician. However, Carey failed to file an application with the Montana Medical Legal Panel (MMLP) before filing a complaint with the district court as required by statute and further failed to file an MMLP application within the three-year statute of limitations applicable to medical malpractice claims. The district court later dismissed the Labairs' medical malpractice case with prejudice as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The Labairs subsequently filed a complaint for legal malpractice against Casey. The district court entered summary judgment for Carey, concluding that Carey's conduct of failing to file the application with the MMLP did not cause the Labairs injury or damages because the Labairs failed to show that the underlying medical malpractice claims would have succeeded but for the error. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the Labairs' loss of their medical malpractice case was an injury; and (2) the damages associated with that injury remained unproven. View "Labair v. Carey " on Justia Law

Plaintiff gave birth to Child at Hospital. Complications arose prior to and after Child's delivery, leading to problems with Child's brain development. Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of Child, later sued the doctor who delivered Child and Hospital. Plaintiff subsequently settled her claims with the doctor. The district court granted summary judgment to Hospital on all of Plaintiff's claims. This appeal arose out of pre-trial rulings made by the district court in Plaintiff's litigation with Hospital. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) extending discovery deadlines; (2) granting summary judgment to Hospital on Plaintiff's agency claims; (3) granting summary judgment to Hospital on Plaintiff's Consumer Protection Act Claim; (4) granting summary judgment to Hospital on Plaintiff's joint venture claim; and (5) granting summary judgment to Hospital on Plaintiff's negligent credentialing claim. View "Brookins v. Mote" on Justia Law

The district court involuntarily committed and authorized the involuntary medication of thirty-year-old C.R. after it determined that he suffered from a mental disorder and that his condition met the statutory criteria for involuntary commitment to the Montana State Hospital. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly disregarded C.R.'s hearing testimony, as substantial evidence supported the court's findings that the testimony was unreliable; (2) the district court's failure to offer C.R. a court-appointed friend did not violate C.R.'s statutory or constitutional rights, as the appointment of a friend was not statutorily mandated; and (3) C.R. received effective assistance of counsel. View "In re C.R." on Justia Law

Katherine Beehler-Goodson was the mother of minor children E.G. and R.G., the wife of Plaintiff Robert Goodson, and the sister of Plaintiff Tony Beehler. While Katherine was undergoing a myelogram, bacteria were introduced into her cerebrospinal fluid, resulting in a meningitis infection, which caused her death. Plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice claim against Eastern Radiological Associates; Dr. Anne Giuliano, the radiologist who performed the myelogram; and St. Vincent Healthcare, alleging that Dr. Giuliano negligently failed to wear a mask during the myelogram, which resulted in bacteria traveling from Dr. Giuliano's uncovered mouth into Katherine's spinal column. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, finding (1) Plaintiff's proposed expert witness, Dr. Patrick Joseph, was not qualified to offer expert testimony on the applicable standards of care, breach, or causation; and (2) without Dr. Joseph's expert testimony, Plaintiffs lacked the necessary expert witness to establish the elements of medical negligence. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the court abused its discretion by excluding Dr. Joseph's testimony on the applicable standards of care and causation. View "Beehler v. E. Radiological Assocs., P.C." on Justia Law

Appellants, three licensed clinic psychologists, were former partners of Great Falls Clinic, LLP, a general limited liability partnership comprised of medical professionals. The Clinic partners, including Appellants, signed a partnership agreement stating that a partner who separates from the partnership in compliance with the agreement's terms will receive a partnership interest subject to reduction for competing after withdrawal or retirement. Appellants subsequently separated from the Clinic and filed a declaratory judgment action when the Clinic refused to pay them their full partnership interest payments. At issue was whether the agreement's restriction, which applied to those engaged in the "practice of medicine," included partners who practiced psychology after separating from the Clinic. The district court granted summary judgment for the Clinic. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by (1) holding that the Appellants engage in the "practice of medicine" as used in the partnership agreement; and (2) concluding that the parties' intention regarding the term "practice of medicine" in the language of the agreement was to include the psychologists. View "Krajacich v. Great Falls Clinic, LLP" on Justia Law

After giving birth to a newborn who suffered severe developmental issues resulting from a lack of glucose, Joe and Kathryn Norris (Norris) filed a medical malpractice action against, among others, Dr. Blayne Fritz, a physician who cared for the newborn. The morning before trial, Fritz moved to limit the scope of the testimony of Dr. Tom Strizich, the treating pediatrician, arguing that Norris failed to provide sufficient notice as to Strizich's opinions regarding a newborn's blood glucose level. The district court granted Fritz's motion, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Fritz. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to the district court to vacate its judgment and order a new trial, holding that the district court abused its discretion when it excluded Strizich's testimony regarding the appropriate standard of care where (1) Strizich was a hybrid witness for purposes of standard of care testimony; and (2) Fritz could not reasonably claim surprise or prejudice from Strizich's proposed testimony. View "Norris v. Fritz" on Justia Law