Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a Montana DOT (MDT) investigation, employee Richard Kershaw was demoted with a lower rate of pay. After resigning, Kershaw filed a complaint in district court, asserting wrongful discharge without good cause under the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act (WDEA), wrongful discharge under the WDEA, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The district court granted summary judgment to MDT all three claims, ruling that Kershaw was precluded from bringing a constructive discharge under the WDEA because the claim was subject to the Board of Personnel Appeals (BOPA) grievance procedure and that the IIED claim was precluded by Kershaw's failure to pursue a BOPA grievance procedure. Kershaw moved to amend his complaint to include additional tort claims, and the district court denied his motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err by concluding that the preclusion of Kershaw's claim from the WDEA did not violate his constitutional rights to equal protection and to a jury trial; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kershaw's motions for leave to amend the complaint.

Appellants Mike Touris and Chuck Sneed filed a petition for judicial review after the County Board of Commissioners denied Appellants' request for a zoning change. Appellants subsequently moved to dismiss the action (Touris I) with prejudice, and the district court granted the motion. Appellants then filed the current action (Touris II), setting forth a factual scenario identical to Touris I and asserting eleven counts. The County moved to dismiss Touris II, and the district court entered an order dismissing some but not all of the counts. The County then amended its answer in Touris II to include res judicata as an affirmative defense. The County moved for summary judgment on the remaining counts in Touris II, asserting the action was barred by res judicata. The district court entered an order dismissing Touris II. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly concluded that res judicata barred Appellants' claims, and (2) the County did not waive its right to assert res judicata.

Montana Trout Unlimited (MTU) appealed from an order of the water court dismissing its objections to water right claims by claimants Beaverhead Water Company, et al. Those claims were contained in the water court's temporary preliminary decree for the Big Hole River Basin. At issue in the appeal was whether the water court erred in holding (1) that only the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks may represent the public recreational and conservation interests in water adjudication proceedings, and (2) that only water right claimants may request a hearing on their objections in water adjudication proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) there is no statutory or regulatory restriction on who is entitled to file an objection to a claim of water right contained in a temporary preliminary decree, and (2) based on the state's ownership of the waters of Montana which it holds in public trust and the undisputed specific interests of the members of MTU in the Big Hole River basin, MTU has a sufficient ownership interest in water or its use to demonstrate good cause to require the water court to hold a hearing on its objections under Mont. Code Ann. 85-2-223.

The Montana Department of Revenue (Department) issued final ad valorem assessments of Puget Sound Energy (Puget) for several tax years, after which Puget petitioned the State Tax Appeal Board (STAB) for review of the Department's assessments. STAB determined the Department inaccurately assessed Puget's value and assessed Puget's value in excess of the Department's original assessment. Puget petitioned the district court for review, and the court concluded that STAB could not adopt an assessment value exceeding the Department's original assessment. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court incorrectly concluded that STAB may not assess Puget's market value in an amount that exceeds the Department's original assessment. The Court held that STAB has the constitutional and statutory duty to hear Puget's appeal and make an independent determination of Puget's market value even if STAB's assessment exceeds the Department's original assessment. Remanded.

The City of Great Falls, Benefis Health Care, and Electric City Power (ECP) filed a complaint with the Montana Public Service Commission (PSC) challenging the lawfulness of NorthWestern Energy's (NWE) refusal to allow ECP to provide electricity supply to meters owned by the City and Benefis. The PSC issued a final order concluding that ECP could not provide electricity supply service to the disputed meters, basing its decision upon its interpretation that "customer," as contained in Mont. Code Ann. 69-8-201(2), meant an individual meter or point of delivery, rather than an entity or person. The City, Benefis, and ECP appealed the final order. The district court reversed, finding error in the PSC's statutory interpretation, and remanded the matter to the PSC to allow all of the City's and Benefis' meters to receive electricity supply service from ECP. NWE and the PSC appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the district court correctly determined that under the statute, the term "customer" means an entity or person rather than an individual meter and, accordingly, correctly permitted the City and Benefis to receive electricity from ECP at the disputed meters.

Plaintiff, on behalf of a class of similarly situated plaintiffs who received Medicaid assistance and were subject to a Medicaid lien pursuant to 53-2-612, MCA, sued defendant alleging that defendant had collected a greater amount than it was entitled from plaintiffs' recoveries from other sources. The parties raised several issues on appeal. The court held that Ark. Dept. of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn applied retroactively to all class members' claims and that defendant must raise affirmative defenses with respect to individual class members to avoid Ahlborn's effect. The court held that the applicable statute of limitations to be 27-2-231, MCA, which provided for a five-year limitations period. The court declined to disturb the district court's order requiring defendant to compile data on individual class members' claims. The court reversed the district court's determination as to interest assessed against defendant, and concluded that no interest could be assessed until two years after any judgment had been entered, under 2-9-317, MCA. The court concluded that the term "third party" in the Medicaid reimbursement statutes included all other sources of medical assistance available to Medicaid recipients, including private health or automobile insurance obtained by the Medicaid recipient. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the class on its proffered distinction between "first party" and "third party" sources. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that plaintiffs' "made whole" claim was immaterial in light of Ahlborn.

The Montana Department of Revenue ("Department") appealed a judgment reversing the State Tax Appeal Board's ("STAB") conclusion that the Department had applied a "commonly accepted" method to assess the value of PacificCorp's Montana properties. At issue was whether substantial evidence demonstrated common acceptance of the Department's direct capitalization method that derived earnings-to-price ratios from an industry-wide analysis. Also at issue was whether substantial evidence supported STAB's conclusion that additional obsolescence did not exist to warrant consideration of further adjustments to PacifiCorp's taxable value. The court held that substantial evidence supported the Department's use of earnings-to-price ratios in its direct capitalization approach; that additional depreciation deductions were not warranted; and that the Department did not overvalue PacifiCorp's property. The court also held that MCA 15-8-111(2)(b) did not require the Department to conduct a separate, additional obsolescence study when no evidence suggested that obsolescence existed that has not been accounted for in the taxpayer's Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") Form 1 filing. The court further held that STAB correctly determined that the actual $9.4 billion sales price of PacifiCorp verified that the Department's $7.1 billion assessment had not overvalued PacifiCorp's properties.

The Missoula City Counsel, the City of Missoula, and the Mayor, (collectively "City") and Muth-Hilberry, LLC ("developer") appealed a district court determination that found that the City was arbitrary and capricious in approving a zoning and preliminary plat for a subdivision known as Sonata Park located in Rattlesnake Valley, Montana. At issue was whether neighbors, several parties opposed to the subdivision, and the North Duncan Drive Neighborhood Association, Inc. ("Association") had standing. Also at issue was whether the district court erred in striking affidavits filed by the developer and the City in connection with their motions for summary judgment. Further at issue was whether the 1989 Sunshine Agreement between the City and the developer's predecessor in interest superseded the City's growth policy. Finally at issue was whether the City's decision in Sonata Park was arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful. The court held that the neighbors had standing to sue in their own right and that the Association had associational standing to proceed on behalf of its members. The court also held that any error made by the district court in granting the neighbor's motion to strike the developer's affidavit was harmless. The court further held that the Sunlight Agreement did not supersede the City's growth policy where the Sunlight Agreement could be void ab initio and did not appear to guarantee certain density. The court finally held that substantial compliance was still valid and that a government body must substantially comply with its growth policy in making zoning decisions and that the City's decision to approve Sonata Park was arbitrary, capricious, and unlawful.

Appellants, 30 Civil Engineering Technician IV employees, sought reclassification of their positions as Civil Engineering Specialist III from the State Department of Transportation ("DOT"). The State Human Resources Division ("SHRD") determined that Technician IV's were correctly classified as pay band five and DOT changed the classification of Civil Engineering Specialist III from band six to band five, although it did not lower the rate of pay. At issue was whether the district court's findings were supported by substantial evidence when it concluded that the Technician IV and Specialist III positions were not required to receive equal pay. The court held that the district court's findings were supported by substantial evidence where the positions' non-predominant duties were different, education requirements were different, minimum professional experience for the positions was different, and there were also differing market demands for each position, as well as collective-bargaining effects for Technician IV positions.