Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In previous workers' compensation cases, the Montana Supreme Court had determined that its decisions apply retroactively to claims that are not "final" or "settled" at the time the decision was issued. Under statute, two types of claims fall under the definition of "settled," (1) claims where there has been a formal settlement agreement, and (2) claims that are "paid in full." In this case, the workers' compensation court (WCC) defined "paid in full" to mean that an injured worker received all the applicable benefits prior to a new judicial decision and had not received subsequent benefits on his or her pre-judicial decision claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the WCC properly applied retroactivity law in formulating its definition of "paid in full." View "Flynn v. Mont. State Fund" on Justia Law

The City Police Department conducted an internal investigation of an administrative coordinator, who was placed on administrative leave after she allegedly misused public funds. The Department created a sixteen-page due process letter detailing the evidence against the coordinator, who subsequently resigned. The Billings Gazette requested the letter, but the City declined to release it. The Gazette sued the City. The district court ordered that the document be provided to the Gazette. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) where two constitutional rights are implicated, including the public's right to know about the actions of public agencies and employees and the employees' right to privacy, the district court must balance the two rights to determine whether the employees' right to privacy outweighs the public's right to know; (2) in this case, the coordinator did not have a reasonable expectation of individual privacy to the document because she held a position of trust with the Department and she was accused of breaching that trust; and (3) the mere prospect of a criminal case will not deprive the public of its right to access a public document once that right has been balanced against the right to privacy. View "Gazette v. City of Billings" on Justia Law

The Slacks sued the County for damages due to the County's alleged failure to comply with its statutory obligation to notify the Slacks that the home they purchased was once the site of a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory. After a trial, the jury found the County was negligent and awarded the Slacks $563,592 in damages. The Supreme Court affirmed on all issues, holding (1) the County waived all the issues it raised on appeal; and (2) the district court properly denied the Slacks' motion for attorneys' fees because simply including attorneys' fees in a bill of costs does not entitle a party to recover attorneys' fees, and the County's defense was not frivolous or pursued in bad faith. View "Slack v. Landmark Co." on Justia Law

NorthWestern Energy proposed constructing an electric transmission line from Montana to Idaho and submitted its application for a certificate from the Montana Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ). While preparing a draft of the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), Jefferson County informed DEQ that it expected DEQ to consult with the County in determining the route. Jefferson County subsequently filed a petition for writ of mandamus and injunction relief against DEQ, (1) seeking an order requiring DEQ to comply with the Montana Environmental Policy Act and other environmental legislation, and (2) requesting DEQ be enjoined from releasing a draft EIS. NorthWestern subsequently intervened. The district court ruled in favor of Jefferson County after determining that DEQ had not satisfied its duty to consult with Jefferson County under Mont. Code Ann. 75-1-201(1)(c) and enjoined DEP from releasing the Draft EIS until it had done so. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) at this stage in the process, DEQ had not violated a clear legal duty to consult with the County prior to issuing its draft EIS; and (2) because the County had adequate legal remedies once DEQ rendered a final agency action, the County was not entitled to mandamus or injunctive relief.

Appellees Dana Headapohl and Lawrence Martin placed two buildings in the floodplain without a permit and installed an un-permitted incinerating toilet. The health department issued a notice of violation (NOV) to Appellees, informing them that the two structures constituted "increased use" of the septic system in violation of the health code and requiring Appellees to remove the buildings and incinerating toilet. The health board affirmed the Department's NOV following a hearing. The district court concluded that Appellees had not violated the health code by adding the two buildings, that the contested provisions of the health code suffered unconstitutional vagueness as applied to Appellees, and that the incinerating toilet did not qualify as a wastewater treatment and disposal system under the health code. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court relied on an incomplete interpretation of "increased use" to determine whether the addition of the two buildings constituted increased use of the septic system that violated the health code, and (2) Appellees' incinerating toilet required a permit under the health code as a wastewater treatment and disposal system. Remanded to determine whether Appellees' changes of use could result in increased effluent flow to the septic system.

Norma Jean King worked for the Hays/Lodge Pole School District for more than thirty-five years, holding positions of elementary school teacher, elementary school principal, and high school principal. After serving as the high school principal for three years, the school district board of trustees reassigned her to an elementary school teaching position. On appeal, the county superintendent and, subsequently, the state superintendent affirmed the board's reassignment decision. The district court reversed the state superintendent's ruling, holding that the state superintendent erred in ruling that a principal position was comparable to a teaching position. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court, holding that the district court erred in concluding that the positions of teacher and principal were not comparable positions of employment under the applicable statutes. Remanded.

In 2003, Joshua Micone applied for Medicaid benefits for himself and his family. In his applications, Joshua did not report his wife Jennifer's interest in a family limited partnership. The Department of Public Health and Human Services approved Joshua's application, and the Micone family received Medicaid benefits from 2003 to 2006. Subsequently, the Department notified Joshua that his household was ineligible for benefits paid over the past three years because of Jennifer's interest in the partnership and demanded repayment. Joshua contested the demand of benefits paid. The State Board of Public Assistance upheld a hearing officer's findings that Jennifer's interest in the partnership was a countable and available resource. The district court affirmed. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly concluded that that the hearing officer did not violate Mont. Code Ann. 2-4-623 when he did not issue a decision within ninety days after the case was deemed submitted; and (2) the district court correctly determined that substantial credible evidence supported the Department's finding that Jennifer's interest in the partnership was an available resource.

After a Montana DOT (MDT) investigation, employee Richard Kershaw was demoted with a lower rate of pay. After resigning, Kershaw filed a complaint in district court, asserting wrongful discharge without good cause under the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act (WDEA), wrongful discharge under the WDEA, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The district court granted summary judgment to MDT all three claims, ruling that Kershaw was precluded from bringing a constructive discharge under the WDEA because the claim was subject to the Board of Personnel Appeals (BOPA) grievance procedure and that the IIED claim was precluded by Kershaw's failure to pursue a BOPA grievance procedure. Kershaw moved to amend his complaint to include additional tort claims, and the district court denied his motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err by concluding that the preclusion of Kershaw's claim from the WDEA did not violate his constitutional rights to equal protection and to a jury trial; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kershaw's motions for leave to amend the complaint.

Appellants Mike Touris and Chuck Sneed filed a petition for judicial review after the County Board of Commissioners denied Appellants' request for a zoning change. Appellants subsequently moved to dismiss the action (Touris I) with prejudice, and the district court granted the motion. Appellants then filed the current action (Touris II), setting forth a factual scenario identical to Touris I and asserting eleven counts. The County moved to dismiss Touris II, and the district court entered an order dismissing some but not all of the counts. The County then amended its answer in Touris II to include res judicata as an affirmative defense. The County moved for summary judgment on the remaining counts in Touris II, asserting the action was barred by res judicata. The district court entered an order dismissing Touris II. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly concluded that res judicata barred Appellants' claims, and (2) the County did not waive its right to assert res judicata.

Montana Trout Unlimited (MTU) appealed from an order of the water court dismissing its objections to water right claims by claimants Beaverhead Water Company, et al. Those claims were contained in the water court's temporary preliminary decree for the Big Hole River Basin. At issue in the appeal was whether the water court erred in holding (1) that only the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks may represent the public recreational and conservation interests in water adjudication proceedings, and (2) that only water right claimants may request a hearing on their objections in water adjudication proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) there is no statutory or regulatory restriction on who is entitled to file an objection to a claim of water right contained in a temporary preliminary decree, and (2) based on the state's ownership of the waters of Montana which it holds in public trust and the undisputed specific interests of the members of MTU in the Big Hole River basin, MTU has a sufficient ownership interest in water or its use to demonstrate good cause to require the water court to hold a hearing on its objections under Mont. Code Ann. 85-2-223.