Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The State appealed an order that preliminarily enjoined parts of the Montana Marijuana Act. Montana Cannabis Industry Association, Mark Matthews, Shirley Hamp, Shelly Yeager, Jane Doe, John Doe #1, John Doe #2, Michael Geci-Black, John Stowers, Point Hatfield, and Charlie Hamp (collectively, Plaintiffs) cross-appealed. The 2004 Medical Marijuana Act left in place those provisions in the Montana criminal code that make it illegal to cultivate, possess, distribute or use marijuana, while simultaneously protecting authorized users of medical marijuana from being prosecuted. The Legislature enacted Senate Bill 423, which repealed the 2004 Medical Marijuana Act and replaced it with the Montana Marijuana Act (MMA), which dramatically changed the landscape for the cultivation, distribution, and use of marijuana for medical purposes. In 2011, the Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit seeking to both temporarily and permanently enjoin the implementation of the MMA in its entirety. Based on a motion filed with the complaint, the District Court immediately entered a temporary restraining order blocking implementation of the MMA which prohibited the advertising of "marijuana or marijuana-related products" and which was scheduled to take effect that day. By stipulation, the temporary restraining order remained in effect pending the preliminary injunction hearing. The court ultimately issued its Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction. The issues raised on appeal to the Supreme Court were: (1) whether the District Court erred when it applied a strict scrutiny, fundamental rights analysis to preliminarily enjoin the MMA; (2) whether the District Court erred in not enjoining section 50-46-308(2), MCA; (3) whether the District Court erred in not enjoining section 50-46-308(7), MCA; and, (4) whether the court erred in declining to enjoin the MMA in its entirety. The Supreme Court concluded after review: (1) the MMA did not implicate the fundamental right to employment, and reversed the District Court’s holding on this issue; and in pursuing health, an individual does not have a fundamental affirmative right of access to a particular drug. The Court reversed the District Court's holding with respect to this issue. Because the Court remanded the case on the scrutiny issue, it declined to address Issues Two, Three and Four. View "Montana Cannabis v. Montana" on Justia Law

The Montana Public Employees' Retirement Board (MPERB) denied death benefits to Petitioner Erene Briese (Erene) because her deceased husband, who had originally named her as his beneficiary under the Montana Sheriffs’ Retirement System (SRS), had later filed a new designation, dropping her as a beneficiary, while marital dissolution proceedings were pending. Erene appealed to the District Court, which affirmed the MPERB’s order. Erene then appealed the District Court’s order to the Supreme Court. "At a minimum," the Supreme Court agreed with those courts that have held that "a court has equitable power to order a return to the status quo when a party violating a temporary restraining order has died. Thus, in this case, the District Court should have invalidated the husband's 2006 change of beneficiaries because it was made in violation of the statutorily-mandated restraining order, and should have determined that his 2001 designation of Erene was "the most recent membership card filed with the board." View "Briese v. MPER Board" on Justia Law

Appellants Montana Department of Natural Resources and Montana Board of Land Commissioners (collectively, “the State”) appealed several portions of a district court's summary judgment order in the State’s quiet title action. The issues raised on appeal were: (1) whether the District Court erred by declaring that islands arising vertically from the bed of the Missouri River after statehood were not held by the State in trust for the financial benefit of the public schools; (2) whether the District Court erred by refusing to declare a surveyed boundary between the islands and adjacent private lands based on the State’s evidence; (3) whether the District Court erred in requiring the State to pay damages for taxes paid and improvements made on the land under the theory of unjust enrichment; and (4) whether the District Court erred by denying costs to the State. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the State was the owner of the disputed lands, and as the prevailing party, it was entitled to recover the costs of producing the survey of the boundary of the State-owned land at issue. "While the costs were substantial, the law affords the court no discretion." Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s denial of the State’s costs and remanded the case with instructions to determine and award the appropriate amount. View "Dept. of Nat. Resources v. ABBCO et al." on Justia Law

Birth mother N.S. (Mother) and birth father K.R. (Father) appealed a district court order that terminated their parental rights to their four-year-old twin daughters, T.R. 1 and T.R. 2. Mother also appealed the District Court’s order denying her a new trial. The issues on appeal were: (1) whether the District Court abused its discretion by terminating Mother and Father’s parental rights; (2) whether the District Court erred in finding it was in the children’s best interests to terminate those rights; (3) whether the District Court erred in finding the Department of Health and Human Services (the Department) made reasonable efforts to reunify the family; (4) whether the District Court adequately addressed the appropriateness of the treatment plans in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Furthermore, Mother asserted that the District Court abused its discretion by denying her a new trial based on new evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court found substantial evidence in the record to support the District Court’s findings that the conditions rendering Mother and Father unfit were unlikely to change within a reasonable time, and that it was in the best interests of the children to terminate the parental rights. "It [was] manifest on the face of the briefs and the record that there was not an abuse of discretion." View "Matter of T.R.1 and T.R.2" on Justia Law

Faith Malpeli brought an inverse condemnation action against the Montana Department of Transportation (MDT), seeking compensation for the alleged taking of her property as a result of the reconstruction of Montana Highway 191 near Big Sky during a highway safety improvement project. A jury found that MDT had not taken a property right belonging to Malpeli, and therefore did not reach the question of compensation. Malpeli appealed, arguing that the District Court erred by: (1) denying Malpeli's motions for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial; (2) excluding Malpeli's appraiser from testifying; and (3) allowing MDT to disclose to the jury an offer of compromise it had made to Malpeli before this action was filed. MDT cross-appealed, arguing that the District Court erred by denying its motion for partial summary judgment before trial. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court determined that the motion for summary judgment should have been granted, and therefore affirmed the judgment in favor of MDT. View "Malpeli v. Montana" on Justia Law

Grant Creek Heights, Inc. and Kenneth R. Knie appealed a district court order that granted Missoula County’s third motion for summary judgment. Missoula County, Missoula County Commissioners, J. Fern Hart and Michael Kennedy cross-appealed the district court’s denial of their second motion for summary judgment. The issues on appeal were related to whether the district court erred in denying the second and granting the third motions. Upon review of the district court order, the Supreme Court found no error and affirmed both decisions. View "Grant Creek Heights, Inc. v. Missoula Co." on Justia Law

This was a dispute over rights to use water from the Teton River in Montana. Giese, Kelly and Reichelt use water from the downstream portion of the Teton near Fort Benton, Montana. They claimed generally that they are damaged by diversion practices on the upstream portion of the Teton near Choteau, Montana, and that their "calls" on upstream appropriators to release water for their downstream use have been ignored. They first filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in the District Court in February, 2011, and ultimately filed second and third amended petitions seeking to halt certain water diversions from the Teton. The issue underlying this case arose in part from the decision in "Perry v. Beattie." "Perry" decreed the priority date and flow rate of about 40 water right claims in the upper Teton River west of Choteau. The District Court appointed a Water Commissioner pursuant to 85-5-101, MCA, to administer the water rights decreed in "Perry." The majority of water users on the Teton (and their successors in interest, including downstream users Giese, Kelly and Reichelt) were not parties to the Perry case. Giese, Kelly and Reichelt claimed water rights from the Teton with priority dates that are senior to or contemporary with the upstream rights decreed in Perry. Water right claimants on the Teton were participating in the Water Court’s on-going adjudication of water rights under Title 85, Chapter 2 of the Montana Code. While that process was nearing its final stages, it was not yet complete and the Water Court did not issue a final decree. Giese, Kelly and Reichelt challenged the Water Commissioner’s practice of diverting the flow of the Teton down the Bateman Ditch. They contended that their water rights pre-date the rights of many upstream Perry decree rights and pre-date the Water Commissioner’s diversion of the Teton through the Bateman Ditch. They contended that since the Bateman Ditch was not used to divert the entire river at the time of the Perry decree, the Water Commissioner lacked the authority to make the diversion. The Supreme Court restated the issue on appeal as whether the District Court erred in dismissing Appellants’ request for certification to the Chief Water Judge pursuant to 85-2-406(2)(b), MCA. Upon review, the Court reversed and remanded the case to the District Court with instructions to certify all appropriate issues to the Chief Water Judge as provided in 85-2-406(2)(b), MCA, and to grant such injunctive or other relief that, in the District Court’s discretion, it determined to be necessary and appropriate. View "Giese v. Blixrud" on Justia Law

Petitioners brought an original proceeding to the Supreme Court to challenge the validity of Initiative 166. They requested the Court rule that the Attorney General and Secretary of State did not comply with their responsibilities under law when they failed to bar I-166 from appearing on the general election ballot. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Attorney General and Secretary of State acted in compliance with their duties under law, and that the initiative met all statutory requirements. Accordingly, the Court denied the petition. View "Montanans Opposed to I-166 v. Bullock" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Charles Fellows appealed a district court's order that dismissed his complaint. Plaintiff owned a water right in Spring Creek. He claimed that the flow of the creek was for many years recharged by water seeping from the natural channel of the Teton River. He claimed that the practice of diverting water from the natural channel of the Teton implemented by the district court's water commissioner on the Teton adversely affected the water available to satisfy his water right in Spring Creek. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court held that Plaintiff lacked standing to bring an action as a dissatisfied water user unless he could prove a hydrological connection between Spring Creek and the Teton River. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Plaintiff's factual allegations and his request for a declaratory ruling were sufficient to invoke the district court's power to issue a ruling on the issue of connectivity. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Fellows v. Water Commissioner et al" on Justia Law

Sherman Anderson and other concerned residents of the City of Deer Lodge (Anderson) appealed a district court order that denied their petition for a writ of mandamus. The issue in this case arose from the revocation of Zoo Mountain Natural Care, Inc.'s business license. Zoo Mountain contacted the City in 2010 regarding a business license. Zoo Mountain had purchased property in the City limits for the purpose of lawfully growing and selling medical marijuana. The City was not issuing business licenses at that time, however, due to a change from a calendar-year licensing system to a fiscal year licensing system. The City previously had determined that it would waive the business license requirement for new applicants during this transition period. The City accordingly allowed Zoo Mountain to operate lawfully without a business license until July 2010. The City Council convened shortly after Zoo Mountain’s move to Deer Lodge. Anderson expressed concern over Zoo Mountain’s location at this meeting. He specifically disliked the fact that Zoo Mountain was located in a residential neighborhood, and that Zoo Mountain was located near the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. Anderson believed that the City’s decision to issue the business license violated Ordinances 130 and 136. Anderson further believed that the City violated the 2009 version of the Medical Marijuana Act when it issued the business license to a corporation, rather than to an individual. Anderson sought a writ of mandamus from the District Court to require the City to revoke Zoo Mountain’s business license. The court declined to issue the writ. It concluded that the MMA provided no clear legal duty for the City to revoke the business license. It similarly concluded that the City Code, particularly Ordinances 130 and 136, contained no clear legal duty to revoke the business license. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: Anderson has failed to establish any clear legal duty that requires the City to revoke Zoo Mountain’s business license. The District Court acted accordingly in denying the writ. View "Deer Lodge v. Chilcott et al." on Justia Law