Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, who operated a cattle ranch, owned a truck that had been modified with the attachment of a feedbox, hoist and tailgate. Plaintiff was cited for violating Mont. Code Ann. 15-70-330 after a Montana Department of Transportation (MDOT) officer discovered that the fuel in the tank of Plaintiff's vehicle was dyed and in excess of the legal concentration allowed to be in a fuel tank in a non-exempt vehicle being driven on a public highway. Plaintiff requested a review of his citation, arguing that the modifications made to his vehicle rendered its primary use off-road and off-highway, and therefore, he was entitled to a special exemption from the prohibition against dyed fuel on public roadways. After a hearing, MDOT determined Plaintiff was not entitled to any exemption. The State Tax Appeal Board (STAB) affirmed. The district court affirmed, determining that Plaintiff's vehicle's alterations simply enhanced its capability to transport property, whether on a public highway or on a ranch. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by affirming STAB's determination that Plaintiff violated section 15-70-330 and that his truck was not entitled to a special exemption under Mont. Admin. R. 18.10.110(1) and (2). View "Coleman v. State ex rel. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Bostwick Properties (Bostwick) sought a water use permit from the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC), which was denied. The district court (1) agreed with DNRC that Bostwick failed to prove no net depletion of surface water and lack of adverse effect, and therefore Bostwick was required to mitigate its water usage in order to receive a water use permit; (2) determined that Bostwick had submitted an adequate mitigation proposal, and therefore, ruled that DNRC improperly had denied Bostwick's permit application; and (3) determined that DNRC exhibited bias toward BNRC, but any bias did not prejudice Bostwick. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) DNRC and the district court properly required Bostwick to mitigate its water usage; (2) the district court properly determined Bostwick's mitigation proposal was adequate as a matter of law; and (3) DNRC bias did not substantially prejudice Bostwick. View "Bostwick Props., Inc. v. Dep't of Natural Res. & Conservation" on Justia Law

Petitioners filed a complaint with the Montana Public Service Commission (PSC), alleging that Northwestern Energy had been overcharging consumes for its street lighting services. The PSC dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed but remanded with instructions to remand the case to the PSC for a redetermination of whether to allow the filing of an amended complaint. On remand to the district court, Petitioners filed a motion seeking $1,137 in costs incurred while responding to objections before the PSC and courts. Petitioners also renewed a motion asking the district court to initiate an immediate rate reduction pending the PSC's final decision. The district court denied both of the Petitioners' requests and remanded to the PSC. The Supreme Court affirmed that order, holding that the district court did not err in (1) denying Petitioners their costs for the initial proceedings in district court and first appeal to the Supreme Court, and (2) denying Petitioners' request for a temporary rate decrease, pending the PSC's decision on remand. View "Williamson v. Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm'n" on Justia Law

An underground mine with surface facilities located in Musselshell County (Musselshell) extended underground into Yellowstone County (Yellowstone) and produced coal mined from both Musselshell and Yellowstone. Based upon a report of the counties from which the coal was mined, the Department of Revenue allocated approximately two-thirds of the mine's taxable coal gross proceeds to Musselshell, for a tax of $328,617, and the remainder to Yellowstone, for a tax of $126,909. Musselshell sued Yellowstone and the Department seeking a declaratory judgment that the Department wrongfully allocated a portion of the tax to Yellowstone. The district court upheld the Department's apportionment of the tax between the two counties, holding that Montana law contemplates taxation of the gross proceeds of coal in the county where the coal is mined and that the Department was not required to adopt administrative rules prior to apportioning the tax. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Department correctly apportioned the coal gross proceeds tax from the mine between Musselshell and Yellowstone and was not required by law to create an administrative rule before making that apportionment. View "Musselshell County v. Yellowstone County" on Justia Law

This appeal pertained to the location of a partially-constructed horse barn in a planned unit development (PUD). Plaintiffs were the owner of the barn, the owner's contractor, and FPR Properties. After it was notified that the barn did not comply with the regulations and covenants and must be removed, FPR submitted an application to modify the conditional use permit of the PUD development to bring the location of the barn into compliance. The planning and zoning commission affirmed the code compliance specialist's determination that the barn violated zoning regulations and applicable covenants. The commission also denied FPR's request to modify the conditional use permit for the PUD. On appeal, the district affirmed the commission's rulings and dismissed FDR's takings claim without conducting a trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) affirming the commission's determination that the partially-constructed barn violated applicable zoning regulations and covenants and must be removed; (2) affirming the commission's denial of FPR's application to modify the PUD's conditional use permit; and (3) dismissing FPR's constitutional takings claim. View "Botz v. Bridger Canyon Planning & Zoning Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, in anticipation of Revett Silver Company and RC Resources, Inc. (collectively, "Revett") seeking approval for mine-related construction under a general permit, filed this action against the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) seeking a declaratory judgment that use of general permits to approve stormwater runoff from the Rock Creek Mine would violate Mont. Admin. R. 17.30.1341(4)(e) because Rock Creek is an area of "unique ecological significance" based on considerations of impacts on fishery resource and local conditions at proposed discharge. The district court granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs and declared the general permit void. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that DEQ's approval of the use of the general permit to allow storm water discharges was arbitrary and capricious because DEQ failed to consider the relevant factors set forth in the law prior to its decision, and as a result, committed a clear error of judgment. View "Clark Fork Coalition v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality" on Justia Law

Plaintiff submitted an application for a 119-lot subdivision, which the Board of Missoula County Commissioners denied. Plaintiff petitioned for judicial review of the Board's action and alternatively claimed that the Board's actions constituted a regulatory taking that entitled him to just compensation. The district court granted summary judgment to the County on all of Richard's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by not allowing Plaintiff to conduct further discovery before ruling on the summary judgment motion; (2) the district court properly granted summary judgment to the County on the Board's decision to deny the subdivision; and (3) the County was entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's regulatory taking claim. View "Richards v. County of Missoula" on Justia Law

After the Department of Public Health and Human Services was given temporary legal custody of D.B., a youth in need of care, the Department developed a treatment plan for Father. Following twenty months of poor cooperation from Father, the Department determined it would seek termination of his parental rights. The district court terminated Father's parental rights to D.B. Father appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the Department proposed an appropriate treatment plan; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Father's behavior would be unlikely to change within a reasonable amount of time; and (3) Father lacked any basis for the Court to determine that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. View "In re D.B." on Justia Law

Employer terminated Employee's employment after receiving complaints regarding poor service and use of inappropriate language by Employee. The Department of Labor & Industry concluded Employee was not qualified for unemployment insurance benefits because she had been discharged for misconduct. A hearing officer awarded unemployment benefits to Employee, concluding that Employee had not been deliberately rude and thus had not engaged in misconduct. The Board of Labor Appeals affirmed. Employer petitioned for judicial review. The Department and Board filed a notice of non-participation indicating they would not participate in the proceeding but reserved the right to intervene if issues arose pertaining to them. The district court reversed, holding that Employee's conduct as established by the hearing officer's findings of fact constituted misconduct as a matter of law under the carelessness standard of Admin. R. M 24.11.460(1)(d). The Department appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Department did not preserve its evidentiary arguments for appeal; and (2) the district court did not err by determining that the evidence found by the Department constituted misconduct as a matter of law under the carelessness standard. View "Gary & Leo's Fresh Foods v. Dep't of Labor & Indus." on Justia Law

After Employee made allegations about a fellow employee that Employer concluded were patently false, Employee was discharged. Employee applied to the Department of Labor and Industry Unemployment Insurance Division (UID) for unemployment benefits, and the UID determined Employee had not been discharged for misconduct. Employer appealed. The Department of Labor and Industry Hearings Bureau reversed. The Board of Labor Appeals (BOLA) reversed, concluding that Employee's conduct was a good faith error in judgment and that Employer had presented insufficient evidence that Employee acted in willful or wanton or deliberate disregard for the interests of Employer. The District Court found substantial evidence to support BOLA's determination that Employer had not shown misconduct. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because BOLA's factual findings were supported by substantial evidence, it's legal conclusion that misconduct had not been shown was correct. View "Somont Oil Co. v. King" on Justia Law