Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was a certain channel adjacent to the Yellowstone River. The disputed channel had been used for years to obtain river water to satisfy water rights held by Heart K Ranch. The City of Livingston owned land adjacent to the channel and argued that Heart K's maintenance activities in the channel harmed the City's property. The Park Conservation District (PCD) permitted Heart K's maintenance activities in the channel as provided in the Natural Steambed and Land Preservation Act. The City petitioned the PCD for a declaratory ruling that the channel was not subject to the permitting process in the Act because it was actually an irrigation ditch not subject to the Act. The PCD determined that the channel was part of the natural watercourse of the Yellowstone River, which was indisputably subject to the Act. The district court upheld the PCD. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the City failed to show that the PCD's decision was arbitrary or capricious, characterized by an abuse of discretion, or a clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. View "Livingston v. Park Conservation Dist." on Justia Law

The Lakeside Neighborhood Planning Board approved a revised neighborhood plan (Plan) created by the Lakeside Neighborhood Planning Committee (LNPC). The Flathead County Commissioners passed a resolution to adopt the Plan. Numerous property owners in Flathead County sought to have the Plan declared void, contending that the LNPC violated Montana's open meeting laws by holding unannounced meetings in private homes or via a private Yahoo Group website and that LNPC unlawfully destroyed public records by deleting files that had been posted to the Yahoo Group website. The district court entered judgment in favor of LNPC and Flathead County, concluding (1) LNPC initially failed to fully comply with the open meeting laws, but voiding the final Plan was not an appropriate remedy for the offense; and (2) the term "meetings" as defined by the relevant statute could not be held on Yahoo Group. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err (1) when it declined to void the Plan and determined that no relief was available on Plaintiffs' claims regarding the destruction of public records and violations of Montana's open meeting laws; and (2) in determining that an electronic meeting did not occur in this case. View "Allen v. Lakeside Neighborhood Planning Comm." on Justia Law

Mont. Code Ann. 15-7-211 requires the Department of Revenue (Department) to reappraise all residential property in the state every six years. The Department assessed the value of Plaintiff's property in 2008 and used the 2008 appraisal to establish Plaintiff's tax liability for the six-year tax cycle ending in 2014. Plaintiff argued that section 15-7-111, as applied, violated its right to equal protection. The State Tax Appeal Board rejected the claim. The district court, however, concluded that section 15-7-111 violated Plaintiff's right to equal protection because the six-year tax cycle caused some taxpayers to pay a disproportionate share of taxes due to their over-assessed property value and other taxpayers to pay less than their fair share of taxes due to their under-assessed property value. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that similarly situated taxpayers, for a short time, may pay divergent taxes, and such a divergence in taxes does not violate equal protection privileges. View "Covenant Invs., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

Employee contracted an occupational disease arising out of her employment with Employer. In 2006, Employee began seeking medical treatment. Employee received treatment periodically until 2011 when her doctor informed her that she had an occupational disease. Employee subsequently initiated a workers' compensation claim. Montana State Fund denied Employee's claim, asserting that the claim was not timely filed under the twelve-month statute of limitations. Employee appealed. The Workers' Compensation Court granted summary judgment for State Fund, concluding that the undisputed facts demonstrated that Employee knew or should have known that she was suffering from occupational disease as early as 2006. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a material question of fact existed as to when Employee should have known she was suffering from an occupational disease. Remanded for a trial to determine when Employee knew or should have known she was suffering from an occupational disease. View "Dvorak v. State Fund" on Justia Law

Respondent purchased a 240-acre parcel of land in Gallatin County in 1980 that he rented out for grain and hay production. Respondent subdivided a thirty-acre parcel of the property in 1995. The subdivision was known as Bridger Lake Meadows (BLM). Respondent adopted covenants for BLM at the time he subdivided the property reflecting his intent that the lots be used for private residential purposes. However, Respondent sold no lots in BLM, which remained in hay and grain production. In 2009, the Department his Revenue (DOR) reclassified BLM from agricultural land to residential land. Respondent requested an informal review with DOR on the grounds that nothing had changed on the land or its usage. DOR denied the request due to the restrictions imposed by the covenants. The State Tax Appeal Board (STAB) determined that Respondent's property satisfied the statutory test for agricultural classification. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Respondent's continued use of the land for agricultural purposes belied any claim that the covenants "effectively prohibit" agriculture as contemplated by the amendment to Mont. Code Ann. 15-7-202(5). View "State Dep't of Revenue v. Heidecker" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Granite County Commissioners (County) created a Georgetown Lake zoning district and adopted Georgetown Lake zoning regulations. Plaintiff filed this action to declare void the County's resolution to create the zoning district and to adopt the zoning regulations. The district court entered summary judgment that the County had properly enacted the Georgetown Lake zoning and determined Plaintiff to be a vexatious litigant. The Supreme Court affirmed except for the portion of the judgment requiring Plaintiff to pay the County's attorneys' fees, holding that the district court (1) correctly ruled that the County properly enacted the zoning; (2) did not err in determining that Plaintiff was a vexatious litigant; but (3) erred in its award of attorneys' fees to the County, as this case was not a case in which extraordinary circumstances justified the award of attorneys' fees. View "Motta v. Granite County Comm'rs" on Justia Law

When Father and Mother divorced, the district court ordered Father to pay child support. After Father failed to make child support payments, the Child Support Enforcement Division (CSED) of the Department of Public Health and Human Services (Department) placed a support lien on all of his property. After Father and Mother's divorce, Mother married Plaintiff. Plaintiff and Mother subsequently divorced pursuant to a final decree of dissolution in which Mother assigned to Plaintiff her interest in the child support lien. Thereafter, Plaintiff commenced a proceeding against Father seeking to foreclose on the CSED support lien. The district court granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, ordering that Plaintiff could foreclose on the child support lien. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff was precluded from obtaining an enforceable interest in the support lien, as, under Montana law, the Department alone held the rights to and was authorized to foreclose on the child support lien. Remanded. View "LeCount v. Davis" on Justia Law

Paula Ehrmantraut-Kiosee sought tax deductions for educational expenses incurred in pursuit of a doctoral degree in psychology. The Montana Department of Revenue disallowed the deductions sought by Paula individually in 2007, and jointly with Randy Myrup in 2008 and 2009. The Office of Dispute Resolution affirmed the disallowance, and the State Tax Appeal Board (STAB) upheld the disallowance. The district court denied Taxpayers' petition for judicial review. After noting that educational expenses will be deemed nondeductible as qualification for a new trade or business if the education is a step towards obtaining a certification that, once obtained, would qualify the taxpayer to perform tasks significantly different from those the taxpayer performed before receiving the education, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the findings of STAB and the district court that Paula pursued her education in an effort to become a clinical psychologist, rather than simply to improve her skills as a counselor, were supported by substantial evidence; and (2) therefore, Taxpayers failed to demonstrate that the educational expenses were deductible under either 26 C.F.R. 1.162-5(a)(1) or (2). View "Myrup v. State, Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

Plaintiff asked the district court for a declaratory judgment that the Montana Department of Revenue (DOR) used improper or illegal methods of assessing Plaintiff's Montana properties for property tax purposes in 2009 and 2010. The court granted summary judgment in favor of DOR on Plaintiff's claims, ruling that Plaintiff's substantive arguments could not be brought directly in a Montana district court without first appealing to the administrative tax appeals boards. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff's challenges to the methods and procedures of assessment used by DOR to assess Plaintiff's property must be raised through the administrative tax appeal process; (2) Plaintiff's claim that DOR failed to equalize its valuation of Plaintiff's property is the type of challenge that must be pursued administratively; and (3) the district court did not err when it granted DOR summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim that the 2009 assessment of its property was illegal or improper because the assessment was made too late. View "CHS, Inc. v. State Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who operated a cattle ranch, owned a truck that had been modified with the attachment of a feedbox, hoist and tailgate. Plaintiff was cited for violating Mont. Code Ann. 15-70-330 after a Montana Department of Transportation (MDOT) officer discovered that the fuel in the tank of Plaintiff's vehicle was dyed and in excess of the legal concentration allowed to be in a fuel tank in a non-exempt vehicle being driven on a public highway. Plaintiff requested a review of his citation, arguing that the modifications made to his vehicle rendered its primary use off-road and off-highway, and therefore, he was entitled to a special exemption from the prohibition against dyed fuel on public roadways. After a hearing, MDOT determined Plaintiff was not entitled to any exemption. The State Tax Appeal Board (STAB) affirmed. The district court affirmed, determining that Plaintiff's vehicle's alterations simply enhanced its capability to transport property, whether on a public highway or on a ranch. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by affirming STAB's determination that Plaintiff violated section 15-70-330 and that his truck was not entitled to a special exemption under Mont. Admin. R. 18.10.110(1) and (2). View "Coleman v. State ex rel. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law