Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a Delaware LLC operating in Montana, purchased a cable television network infrastructure in Montana in 2003. In 2010, Plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action in response to certain actions taken by the State of Montana Department of Revenue. Specifically, Plaintiff sought (1) to prevent the Department from issuing revised assessments of Plaintiff for tax years 2007 through 2009 and to prevent the Department from issuing any other revised assessments, and (2) a declaration that the Department had illegally assessed all of Plaintiff's property as class thirteen property. The district court granted summary judgment for Plaintiff on the Department's ability to issue retroactive assessments and directed the Department to refund with interest the payments that Plaintiff had made under protest. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in concluding (1) Plaintiff owned exclusively class eight property because, under Montana law, Plaintiff was subject to assessment under class thirteen; and (2) the Department lacked authority to issue revised assessments for Plaintiff's property for tax years 2007 through 2009 where the Department's discovery and subsequent reclassification arose from the audit's revelation of inaccuracies in Plaintiff's self-classification. View "Bresnan Commc'ns, LLC v. Mont. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Lincoln County Commissioners created the Bull Lake Rural Fire District and appointed a Board of Trustees to govern the District. The District and County later disputed the permissible scope of the District's services and the circumstances under which the District could be dispatched. The district court granted summary judgment to the County, holding (1) the County delegated to the District only the authority to provide limited firefighting services, and only the County could authorize the District to expand the scope of its services; and (2) the District was only entitled to receive notice of emergencies in its geographical area, and Troy Dispatch had the discretion whether to dispatch the District to respond to any particular emergency. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the District's Trustees and the fire chief determined the scope of the District's services under Montana law, and the District was not required to seek prior approval of the County before providing any of those emergency services; and (2) the District was entitled to be notified of a request for service in its geographical area, and Troy Dispatch had the responsibility to determine how to provide the notification and which emergency service provider to dispatch in each instance. View "Bull Lake Fire Dist. v. Lincoln County" on Justia Law

Appellant, a vocational agricultural teacher at a high school, served as faculty advisor for the school's chapter of the National FFA Organization. Appellant obtained a loan on behalf of the school FFA and opened a checking account into which she deposited the loan proceeds. Because Appellant did not deposit the funds in an account maintained by the school district, Appellant violated the school district financial policy and was suspended. Appellant then made out a check to herself to purportedly reimburse herself for expenses incurred in setting up a hay cutting business. The Board of Trustees subsequently terminated Appellant's employment. The Montana Department of Labor and Industry determined that Appellant was eligible to receive benefits, but a hearing officer concluded that Appellant had been discharged for misconduct and was ineligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits. The Board of Labor Appeals affirmed the determination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's actions constituted misconduct, and she was therefore ineligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits. View "Roberts v. State Bd. of Labor Appeals" on Justia Law

In this water right adjudication, the Water Master concluded that the water right of Claimants, property owners, had been abandoned. Claimants filed an objection to the Water Master's report, arguing, among other things, that the Water Master's application of 79 Ranch v. Pitsch to their existing right was an impermissible retroactive application of the law. The Water Court ruled (1) 79 Ranch applied to Claimants' case; but (2) the Water Master erred in finding that Claimants had failed to produce sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of intent to abandon. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Water Court (1) correctly applied 79 Ranch analysis; and (2) correctly concluded that Claimants submitted sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of abandonment. View "Heavirland v. State" on Justia Law

After leaving her job as a bus driver, Plaintiff applied for unemployment benefits with the Montana Department of Labor and Industry. The Department determined that Plaintiff was not qualified to receive unemployment benefits. The Boar of Labor Appeals affirmed. Plaintiff subsequently filed a petition for review in the district court. The district court denied Plaintiff's petition for failure to comply with Rule 2 of the Montana Uniform District Court Rules because Plaintiff had not filed a supporting brief or stated issues of law for review. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred when it denied Plaintiff's petition for failure to include a supplemental brief because the provisions of Rule 2 do not apply to a petition for judicial review. View "Jacky v. Avitus Group" on Justia Law

Mont. Code Ann. 15-6-218 grants tax exemption to intangible personal property and defines intangible personal property. The statute lists "goodwill" as the one non-exhaustive example of intangible property that lacks physical existence. The Department of Revenue implements the statute with Mont. Admin. R. 42.22.110. In 2010, the Department amended its definitions of intangible personal property and goodwill. The district court found that the new definitions of intangibles and goodwill imposed additional and contradictory requirements on state law and that the valuation manuals adopted by the Department were invalid to the extent they supported the Department's new rules. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded (1) the Department's regulation defining goodwill was invalid because it conflicted with section 15-6-218(2)(b); (2) the Department's regulation defining intangible personal property was invalid because it conflicted with section 15-6-218(2)(a); and (3) the valuation manuals adopted by the Department were invalid to the extent they supported its new rules. View "Gold Creek Cellular of Mont. Ltd. P'ship v. Dep't of Revenue " on Justia Law

Appellant Tammy Zunski appealed a district court's grant of summary judgment to the Frenchtown Rural Fire Department Board of Trustees (Board) against her right to know and right to participate claims. The issues before the Supreme Court were: (1) whether the District Court correctly determined that the Board's actions at an August 8, 2011, meeting rescinded the actions taken at an improper July 20, 2011, meeting thereby defeating Zunksi's open meeting and public participation claims; and (2) whether the District Court correctly determined that the Board had responded to Zunski's document request in a reasonably timely manner. Zunski admitted that the Board had provided all documents responsive to her right to know request. Because of Zunski's admission, the Supreme Court concluded the district court properly found that no further controversy existed regarding Zunski's right to know claims: "[w]e are left with no reasonable expectation that the Board would fail to comply with any future right to know requests made by Zunski. The District Court correctly resolved Zunski's right to know claims." View "Zunski v. Frenchtown Rural Fire Dep" on Justia Law

Respondent-appellant N.A. was committed to Montana State Hospital for 90 days by a District Court order. N.A. appealed that order. Respondent was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. After some treatment at the Phoenix House, professionals there became concerned that he was a danger to himself and others. The State instituted an involuntary civil commitment proceeding. At his initial appearance, N.A. was informed of his right to a jury trial and the subsequent hearing that would occur, which would include a prehearing mental health evaluation. N.A. did not want evaluation by professionals who had evaluated him in the past because he believed them to be guilty of perjury. N.A. informed the court that he needed more time to find and choose an evaluator. The court gave N.A. a one-day continuance to obtain his chosen professional, but he failed to provide a name to his attorney in time for her to contact the evaluator. When the commitment proceeding resumed, the District Court found that N.A. had been given a reasonable choice of evaluator, and denied the continuance. After the State had finished presenting its case, N.A. moved for a jury trial, which the court rejected as untimely. Upon careful consideration of the District Court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the District Court properly denied N.A.'s motions for continuance and for a jury trial, and his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were not supported by sufficient evidence that he was prejudiced by his attorney's actions. View "Matter of N.A." on Justia Law

The State appealed a jury verdict that awarded damages to L. Fred Weaver, Joan Weaver and Vicki Weaver. The Weavers had sued the State over negligent fire containment procedures on their real property. The State argued on appeal to the Supreme Court: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss the Weavers' negligence claim; (2) whether the trial court did not allow the State to assert a "public duty doctrine" defense; (3) whether the trial court erred by allowing the jury to find the state negligent without expert testimony to establish the standard of care; and (4) whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the State's motion to change venue. Finding no errors or abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Weaver v. DNRC" on Justia Law

Landowners protested pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 76-2-205(6) to block the Board of County Commissioners of Missoula County from establishing a special zoning district north of Lolo, Montana. Landowners effectively blocked the zoning proposal pursuant to section 76-2-205(6). L. Reed Williams filed a complaint against Commissioners, challenging the constitutionality of the statute. Landowners intervened in the action. The district court denied Landowners' motion to dismiss and granted summary judgment to Williams and Commissioners, concluding that section 76-2-205(6) was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power and an unconstitutional violation of the right to equal protection and the right to suffrage. The Supreme Court upheld the Commissioners' adoption of the special zoning district and affirmed the district court, holding that the district court did not err in (1) denying Landowners' motion to dismiss Williams' complaint for failure to join them as necessary parties; (2) determining that section 76-2-205(6) was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power; and (3) ruling that section 76-2-205(6) was severable from the remainder of the statute. View "Williams v. Bd. of County Commr's" on Justia Law