Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant, a vocational agricultural teacher at a high school, served as faculty advisor for the school's chapter of the National FFA Organization. Appellant obtained a loan on behalf of the school FFA and opened a checking account into which she deposited the loan proceeds. Because Appellant did not deposit the funds in an account maintained by the school district, Appellant violated the school district financial policy and was suspended. Appellant then made out a check to herself to purportedly reimburse herself for expenses incurred in setting up a hay cutting business. The Board of Trustees subsequently terminated Appellant's employment. The Montana Department of Labor and Industry determined that Appellant was eligible to receive benefits, but a hearing officer concluded that Appellant had been discharged for misconduct and was ineligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits. The Board of Labor Appeals affirmed the determination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's actions constituted misconduct, and she was therefore ineligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits. View "Roberts v. State Bd. of Labor Appeals" on Justia Law

In this water right adjudication, the Water Master concluded that the water right of Claimants, property owners, had been abandoned. Claimants filed an objection to the Water Master's report, arguing, among other things, that the Water Master's application of 79 Ranch v. Pitsch to their existing right was an impermissible retroactive application of the law. The Water Court ruled (1) 79 Ranch applied to Claimants' case; but (2) the Water Master erred in finding that Claimants had failed to produce sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of intent to abandon. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Water Court (1) correctly applied 79 Ranch analysis; and (2) correctly concluded that Claimants submitted sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of abandonment. View "Heavirland v. State" on Justia Law

After leaving her job as a bus driver, Plaintiff applied for unemployment benefits with the Montana Department of Labor and Industry. The Department determined that Plaintiff was not qualified to receive unemployment benefits. The Boar of Labor Appeals affirmed. Plaintiff subsequently filed a petition for review in the district court. The district court denied Plaintiff's petition for failure to comply with Rule 2 of the Montana Uniform District Court Rules because Plaintiff had not filed a supporting brief or stated issues of law for review. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred when it denied Plaintiff's petition for failure to include a supplemental brief because the provisions of Rule 2 do not apply to a petition for judicial review. View "Jacky v. Avitus Group" on Justia Law

Mont. Code Ann. 15-6-218 grants tax exemption to intangible personal property and defines intangible personal property. The statute lists "goodwill" as the one non-exhaustive example of intangible property that lacks physical existence. The Department of Revenue implements the statute with Mont. Admin. R. 42.22.110. In 2010, the Department amended its definitions of intangible personal property and goodwill. The district court found that the new definitions of intangibles and goodwill imposed additional and contradictory requirements on state law and that the valuation manuals adopted by the Department were invalid to the extent they supported the Department's new rules. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded (1) the Department's regulation defining goodwill was invalid because it conflicted with section 15-6-218(2)(b); (2) the Department's regulation defining intangible personal property was invalid because it conflicted with section 15-6-218(2)(a); and (3) the valuation manuals adopted by the Department were invalid to the extent they supported its new rules. View "Gold Creek Cellular of Mont. Ltd. P'ship v. Dep't of Revenue " on Justia Law

Appellant Tammy Zunski appealed a district court's grant of summary judgment to the Frenchtown Rural Fire Department Board of Trustees (Board) against her right to know and right to participate claims. The issues before the Supreme Court were: (1) whether the District Court correctly determined that the Board's actions at an August 8, 2011, meeting rescinded the actions taken at an improper July 20, 2011, meeting thereby defeating Zunksi's open meeting and public participation claims; and (2) whether the District Court correctly determined that the Board had responded to Zunski's document request in a reasonably timely manner. Zunski admitted that the Board had provided all documents responsive to her right to know request. Because of Zunski's admission, the Supreme Court concluded the district court properly found that no further controversy existed regarding Zunski's right to know claims: "[w]e are left with no reasonable expectation that the Board would fail to comply with any future right to know requests made by Zunski. The District Court correctly resolved Zunski's right to know claims." View "Zunski v. Frenchtown Rural Fire Dep" on Justia Law

Respondent-appellant N.A. was committed to Montana State Hospital for 90 days by a District Court order. N.A. appealed that order. Respondent was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. After some treatment at the Phoenix House, professionals there became concerned that he was a danger to himself and others. The State instituted an involuntary civil commitment proceeding. At his initial appearance, N.A. was informed of his right to a jury trial and the subsequent hearing that would occur, which would include a prehearing mental health evaluation. N.A. did not want evaluation by professionals who had evaluated him in the past because he believed them to be guilty of perjury. N.A. informed the court that he needed more time to find and choose an evaluator. The court gave N.A. a one-day continuance to obtain his chosen professional, but he failed to provide a name to his attorney in time for her to contact the evaluator. When the commitment proceeding resumed, the District Court found that N.A. had been given a reasonable choice of evaluator, and denied the continuance. After the State had finished presenting its case, N.A. moved for a jury trial, which the court rejected as untimely. Upon careful consideration of the District Court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the District Court properly denied N.A.'s motions for continuance and for a jury trial, and his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were not supported by sufficient evidence that he was prejudiced by his attorney's actions. View "Matter of N.A." on Justia Law

The State appealed a jury verdict that awarded damages to L. Fred Weaver, Joan Weaver and Vicki Weaver. The Weavers had sued the State over negligent fire containment procedures on their real property. The State argued on appeal to the Supreme Court: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss the Weavers' negligence claim; (2) whether the trial court did not allow the State to assert a "public duty doctrine" defense; (3) whether the trial court erred by allowing the jury to find the state negligent without expert testimony to establish the standard of care; and (4) whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the State's motion to change venue. Finding no errors or abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Weaver v. DNRC" on Justia Law

Landowners protested pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 76-2-205(6) to block the Board of County Commissioners of Missoula County from establishing a special zoning district north of Lolo, Montana. Landowners effectively blocked the zoning proposal pursuant to section 76-2-205(6). L. Reed Williams filed a complaint against Commissioners, challenging the constitutionality of the statute. Landowners intervened in the action. The district court denied Landowners' motion to dismiss and granted summary judgment to Williams and Commissioners, concluding that section 76-2-205(6) was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power and an unconstitutional violation of the right to equal protection and the right to suffrage. The Supreme Court upheld the Commissioners' adoption of the special zoning district and affirmed the district court, holding that the district court did not err in (1) denying Landowners' motion to dismiss Williams' complaint for failure to join them as necessary parties; (2) determining that section 76-2-205(6) was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power; and (3) ruling that section 76-2-205(6) was severable from the remainder of the statute. View "Williams v. Bd. of County Commr's" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a certain channel adjacent to the Yellowstone River. The disputed channel had been used for years to obtain river water to satisfy water rights held by Heart K Ranch. The City of Livingston owned land adjacent to the channel and argued that Heart K's maintenance activities in the channel harmed the City's property. The Park Conservation District (PCD) permitted Heart K's maintenance activities in the channel as provided in the Natural Steambed and Land Preservation Act. The City petitioned the PCD for a declaratory ruling that the channel was not subject to the permitting process in the Act because it was actually an irrigation ditch not subject to the Act. The PCD determined that the channel was part of the natural watercourse of the Yellowstone River, which was indisputably subject to the Act. The district court upheld the PCD. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the City failed to show that the PCD's decision was arbitrary or capricious, characterized by an abuse of discretion, or a clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. View "Livingston v. Park Conservation Dist." on Justia Law

The Lakeside Neighborhood Planning Board approved a revised neighborhood plan (Plan) created by the Lakeside Neighborhood Planning Committee (LNPC). The Flathead County Commissioners passed a resolution to adopt the Plan. Numerous property owners in Flathead County sought to have the Plan declared void, contending that the LNPC violated Montana's open meeting laws by holding unannounced meetings in private homes or via a private Yahoo Group website and that LNPC unlawfully destroyed public records by deleting files that had been posted to the Yahoo Group website. The district court entered judgment in favor of LNPC and Flathead County, concluding (1) LNPC initially failed to fully comply with the open meeting laws, but voiding the final Plan was not an appropriate remedy for the offense; and (2) the term "meetings" as defined by the relevant statute could not be held on Yahoo Group. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err (1) when it declined to void the Plan and determined that no relief was available on Plaintiffs' claims regarding the destruction of public records and violations of Montana's open meeting laws; and (2) in determining that an electronic meeting did not occur in this case. View "Allen v. Lakeside Neighborhood Planning Comm." on Justia Law