Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2011, partners of the Interagency Bison Management Plan decided to expand the territory in the Gardiner basin in which bison were allowed to naturally migrate. That decision was challenged by various petitioners. Park County Stockgrowers Association filed a petition that raised a public nuisance claim, among other claims. That petition was consolidated with another petition, and several other petitioners intervened. Two of the intervenors filed a joint amended petition, which Park County did not join, adding a claim based on changes to Mont. Code Ann. 87-1-216. After a hearing, the district court rejected all of the claims and dismissed all of the petitions. Park County appealed, contending that the district court erred in its interpretation of section 87-1-216. Because Park County neither raised a claim based on section 87-1-216 in the proceedings before the district court, nor adopted the arguments of the other petitioners, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that consolidation did not permit Park County to appeal an issue raised in a separate case by another party. View "Park County Stockgrowers Ass'n v. State" on Justia Law

After Petitioner was involved in an accident from allegedly hitting a building with his truck, Petitioner was cited for DUI, third offense. Petitioner’s driver’s license was seized based on his refusal to submit to a blood or breath test. Defendant subsequently filed a petition to reinstate his driver’s license. The hearing on Petitioner’s petition was continued several times. Meanwhile, a jury found Defendant not guilty of the underlying DUI charge. Based on this acquittal and “res judicata and/or collateral estoppel” principles, Petitioner filed a petition asking the district court to enter judgment against the State on his petition and to permanently reinstate his license. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in denying Petitioner’s petition for reinstatement of his driver’s license, as the acquittal in municipal court did not establish res judicata or collateral estoppel in Petitioner’s reinstatement proceeding. View "Ditton v. Dep't of Justice Motor Vehicle Div." on Justia Law

After K.L. was removed from her parents’ custody, K.L. was adjudicated a youth in need of care, and the Department of Public Health and Human Services (Department) petitioned to terminate the parental rights of both parents. After a hearing, the district court terminated the parents’ rights to K.L. Both parents appealed the order of termination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in (1) granting the Department’s motion for an extension of temporary legal custody over K.L; (2) terminating Father’s parental rights after finding that the condition rendering Father unfit to parent was unlikely to change within a reasonable time; and (3) terminating Mother’s parental rights. View "In re K.L." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought this action to challenge a decision by county commissioners (the Commissioners) to permit elected county officials to receive cash payments in lieu of county contributions on their behalf to a group health insurance program. Plaintiff claimed the Commissioners violated Montana’s open meetings statute and his constitutional right of participation, requested a declaration that the “cash in lieu” policy was unlawful, and filed a writ for mandamus that the county attorney commence an action to recover any illegal payments. The district court (1) dismissed Plaintiff’s right to know and right of participation claims as time barred; (2) dismissed Plaintiff’s declaratory claim for lack of standing; and (3) dismissed the mandamus claim, determining that mandamus did not apply. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiff had standing to pursue his right to know and right of participation claims; and (2) Plaintiff’s right to know and right of participation claims were time barred, but Plaintiff’s allegations qualified for application of equitable tolling principles. Remanded. View "Schoof v. Nesbit" on Justia Law

The Boulder Monitor, which regularly attended meetings of the full Jefferson County High School Board, sued Jefferson High School District No. 1, claiming that a meeting of the Board’s budget subcommittee violated statutory open meeting and public participation requirements because there was a quorum of the Board present at the subcommittee meeting, the meeting discussed personnel matters in addition to the 2012-2013 budget, that all Board members present participated in the discussion, and that the public notice of the subcommittee meeting was inadequate. The district court granted summary judgment to the Monitor, concluding that the Board violated Montana law in the manner in which the budget subcommittee meeting was conducted. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that summary judgment in this case was improper because contested issues of fact existed that may not be resolved on summary judgment. Remanded. View "Boulder Monitor v. Jefferson High Sch. Dist. No. 1" on Justia Law

In 2004, Petitioner was hired as a production supervisor for Holcim Inc.’s cement manufacturing plant. In 2008, Petitioner was diagnosed with angina. After Petitioner left Holcim, Petitioner filed a claim under the Montana Human Rights Acts for discrimination. The Montana Department of Labor and Industry dismissed Petitioner’s complaint, concluding that Holcim did not discriminate against Petitioner on the basis of disability. The Montana Human Rights Commission upheld the dismissal, and the district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in affirming the hearing officer’s determination that Petitioner did not prove that he belonged to a protected class, as Petitioner failed to establish that he was disabled within the meaning of the Human Rights Act. View "Estate of Welch v. Holcim, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff agreed to an increase in his monthly support obligation. The increase was applied retroactively to the date the child’s mother requested the increase, which created an arrearage in Plaintiff’s account. Although Plaintiff arranged to pay off the arrearage, the State of Montana, Child Support Enforcement Division (CSED) reported the arrearage to national consumer credit reporting agencies. Prospective employers subsequently rejected Plaintiff as an otherwise qualified candidate for being delinquent in his child support payments. Plaintiff filed suit against CSED for its erroneous report to the credit agencies. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court erred in concluding that Plaintiff’s arrearage constituted a delinquency or overdue child support, but the dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint must be upheld because Plaintiff did not avail himself of the statutory and administrative processes for challenging this action by CSED; and (2) the resulting injustice in this case required remand with directions that the credit reporting agencies that reported Plaintiff’s arrearage remove from their data base any reference to Plaintiff having been in arrears or delinquent in the payment of his child support obligations. View "Kenck v. State, Child Support Enforcement Div." on Justia Law

NorthWestern Energy (NWE) disconnected electric service to Plaintiff's residence based on an outstanding balance on Plaintiff's utility bill. Plaintiff filed an action alleging property damage due to NWE's negligence and negligence per se, claiming that the termination of his electric service caused his furnace to fail, which led to water pipes freezing and bursting. NWE filed a motion to dismiss based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction for Plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies before the Public Service Commission (PSC). The district court granted NWE's motion and dismissed the action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the PSC had no authority to adjudicate Plaintiff's damage claim, and a negligence action seeking damages could be maintained against the power company in district court. View "Schuster v. NorthWestern Energy Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Delaware LLC operating in Montana, purchased a cable television network infrastructure in Montana in 2003. In 2010, Plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action in response to certain actions taken by the State of Montana Department of Revenue. Specifically, Plaintiff sought (1) to prevent the Department from issuing revised assessments of Plaintiff for tax years 2007 through 2009 and to prevent the Department from issuing any other revised assessments, and (2) a declaration that the Department had illegally assessed all of Plaintiff's property as class thirteen property. The district court granted summary judgment for Plaintiff on the Department's ability to issue retroactive assessments and directed the Department to refund with interest the payments that Plaintiff had made under protest. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in concluding (1) Plaintiff owned exclusively class eight property because, under Montana law, Plaintiff was subject to assessment under class thirteen; and (2) the Department lacked authority to issue revised assessments for Plaintiff's property for tax years 2007 through 2009 where the Department's discovery and subsequent reclassification arose from the audit's revelation of inaccuracies in Plaintiff's self-classification. View "Bresnan Commc'ns, LLC v. Mont. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Lincoln County Commissioners created the Bull Lake Rural Fire District and appointed a Board of Trustees to govern the District. The District and County later disputed the permissible scope of the District's services and the circumstances under which the District could be dispatched. The district court granted summary judgment to the County, holding (1) the County delegated to the District only the authority to provide limited firefighting services, and only the County could authorize the District to expand the scope of its services; and (2) the District was only entitled to receive notice of emergencies in its geographical area, and Troy Dispatch had the discretion whether to dispatch the District to respond to any particular emergency. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the District's Trustees and the fire chief determined the scope of the District's services under Montana law, and the District was not required to seek prior approval of the County before providing any of those emergency services; and (2) the District was entitled to be notified of a request for service in its geographical area, and Troy Dispatch had the responsibility to determine how to provide the notification and which emergency service provider to dispatch in each instance. View "Bull Lake Fire Dist. v. Lincoln County" on Justia Law