Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2009, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Baxter v. State, in which it held that a terminally ill patient’s consent to physician aid in dying constitutes a statutory defense to a charge of homicide against the aiding physician. In 2012, the Board of Medical Examiners (Board) posted a position statement on its website explaining the effect of the baxter decision on its discipline policy for physicians participating in “aid-in-dying.” Montanans Against Assisted Suicide (MAAS) filed a petition with the Board seeking a declaratory ruling that the position statement was invalid. The Board denied the petition. MAAS then filed a petition in the district court seeking an order requiring the Board to vacate the position statement. While the matter was pending before the district court, the Board removed the position statement from its website. The district court subsequently dismissed MAAS’ petition, concluding that once the Board rescinded the position statement the case was rendered moot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the matter before the district court was rendered moot when the Board rescinded the position statement. View "Montanans Against Assisted Suicide v. Bd. of Med. Examiners" on Justia Law

In 2009, the Montana Department of Revenue (Department) began the process of reappraising Montana agricultural properties. In 2010, Petitioners filed a petition for declaratory judgment and writ of mandate seeking a declaration that the Department improperly assessed their agricultural property for tax uses. The district court granted the Department’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly interpreted the plain language of section 15-7-111 and complied with the rules of statutory construction; and (2) the Department followed the rule-making mandate of section 15-7-111(2), the Department’s application of section 15-7-111 was not unlawful, and the Department is capable of implementing the district court’s interpretations of section 15-7-111. View "Lucas Ranch, Inc. v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue" on Justia Law

After a hearing held on the second petition filed by the Department of Public Health and Human Services for termination of Mother’s parental rights, the district court terminated Mother’s parental rights to her three children on the grounds that Mother had not successfully completed her treatment plan and the condition rendering her unfit to parent was unlikely to change within a reasonable time. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) despite delays in holding the show cause, adjudicatory, and dispositional hearings, Mother’s due process rights were not violated by the efforts of the Department and court to provide her with services, a treatment plan, and time to work toward reunification with her children; and (2) the district court did not err when it found that Mother failed to complete her treatment plan and the condition rendering her unfit to parent was unlikely to change within a reasonable time. View "In re A.H." on Justia Law

Oliver Arlington, who worked for Miller’s Trucking for one year, claimed he was owed wages in accordance with a verbal employment agreement and was also owed unpaid overtime wages. On remand, a hearing officer with the Montana Department of Labor and Industry Hearings Bureau denied Arlington’s claims. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the hearing officer’s finding that Arlington and Miller’s Trucking did not have an oral employment agreement guaranteeing over $60,000 per year in wages; (2) the hearing officer’s conclusions of law were contrary to applicable wage and hour law; (3) the hearing officer’s factual findings were clearly erroneous; and (4) the hearing officer did not abuse his discretion when he refused to admit documents pertaining to regulatory violations by Miller’s Trucking. View "Arlington v. Miller’s Trucking, Inc." on Justia Law

In the process of hiring a new city manager, the City Commission of the City of Polson held a closed executive session with the description, “Personnel-meet with interview panels and deliberate on selection of city manager.” The Commission later unanimously voted to approve a city manager employment contract with Mark Shrives. Citizens for Open Government brought suit, contending that the executive session violated Citizens’ right to participate under the Montana Constitution and Montana statutory law. The district court ruled in favor of the City on the merits of Citizens’ claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission did not comply with the open meeting laws when it closed its executive session without first determining that the demands of individual privacy clearly exceeded the merits of public disclosure; but (2) because the Commission did not finalize its hiring decision until it held two additional open public meetings, the district court did not err in declining to void the Commission’s decision to present Shrives with an offer letter. View "Citizens for Open Gov’t., Inc. v. City of Polson" on Justia Law

At issue in this case were smoking structures built by the owners and operators of two casinos in Great Falls (“Casino Owners”). After the Cascade City-County Board of Health (Board) commenced enforcement steps against the Casino Owners under the Montana Clean Indoor Air Act (MCIAA), the Casino Owners initiated an action against the Board seeking a declaration that their smoking structures were in compliance with the MCIAA. The district court granted summary judgment to the Casino Owners and awarded attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of the Board, holding (1) the MCIAA clearly delineates casinos on the statute’s list of public places wherein smoking is prohibited, and therefore, the district court erred in concluding that the smoking structures at issue were not subject to the smoking prohibition of the MCIAA; (2) the Casino Owners failed to establish that the Board was equitably estopped from enforcing the MCIAA; and (3) the district court improperly awarded the Casino Owners attorney fees. View "MC, Inc. v. Cascade City-County Bd. of Health" on Justia Law

The Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services filed a petition for emergency protective services for seven-year-old H.T., alleging drug use by Mother and domestic violence between Mother and her boyfriend. The petition stated that H.T. “may be an Indian Child for the purposes of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).” The district court granted the motion for emergency protective services. The district court subsequently held a hearing that adjudicated H.T. a youth in need of care. The Department then filed a petition for permanent legal custody and termination of parental rights. The district court held a termination hearing and adopted and approved the termination petition. Mother appealed, asserting that the district court failed to comply with state and federal statutory requirements for terminating parental rights to an Indian child. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) Mother received fundamentally fair procedures prior to the termination of her parental rights; but (2) because the district court applied the wrong statutory standards in its final order, its judgment is vacated. Remanded for entry of a new order on the issue of whether Mother’s parental rights should be terminated. View "In re H.T." on Justia Law

Lisa Bailey, a fifty-one-year old who was considered morbidly obese, requested, through her physician, Medicaid authorization for gastric bypass surgery. The Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services (Department) denied the request because gastric bypass surgery is a non-covered service under Department administrative rules. A hearing officer upheld the Department’s determination, and the Board of Public Assistance adopted the decision of the hearing officer. The district court affirmed. Bailey appealed, asking that the Department be required to conduct a determination of medical necessity for the procedure. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Department’s rule excluding coverage for all invasive procedures undertaken for the purpose of weight reduction, including gastric bypass surgery, is not unreasonable or contrary to federal law. View "Bailey v. Mont. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

In 2012, after auditing Cloud Peak Energy Resources, LLC’s Montana Coal Tax payments for years 2005-2007, the Department levied a deficiency assessment for additional taxes owing from sales involving non-arm’s length (NAL) agreements. Cloud Peak filed a complaint alleging that the Department’s methodology for determining market value was illegal and that it had also illegally assessed taxes on coal additives for the years 2005-2007. The district court (1) held in Cloud Peak’s favor on the first issue, concluding that the market value of coal sold under NAL agreements is determined by comparing its price with that of coal sold under arm’s length contracts negotiated in a similar timeframe; and (2) ruled in the Department’s favor on the issue regarding additives. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) correctly found that market value is properly based upon similarly negotiated contracts, but the additional language included in the order was inappropriate; and (2) did not err in holding that coal additives used from 2005-2007 are subject to Montana Coal Taxes. View "Cloud Peak Energy Res., Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue" on Justia Law

After Senate Bill 140 was enacted in 2011, Billings Yellow Cab, LLC applied to the Public Service Commission (PSC) for issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity (PCN certificate) as a grandfathered entity. The PSC denied the application. Yellow Cab subsequently filed a second application for a PCN certificate as a Class B carrier. After a hearing, the PSC issued a final order denying the application, concluding that Yellow Cab failed to demonstrate that public convenience and necessity required authorization of the proposed service. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by (1) concluding that Yellow Cab’s claims that the PSC’s denial of a PCN certificate constituted an unconstitutional taking and violated equal protection were procedurally barred; (2) affirming the PSC’s denial of Yellow Cab’s application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity; and (3) affirming the PSC’s exclusion of Yellow Cab’s Exhibit 2. View "Billings Yellow Cab, LLC v. State ex rel. Pub. Serv. Comm’n" on Justia Law