Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Missoula Chief of Police instituted this proceeding seeking forfeiture of a Hummer on the ground that it was involved in unlawful drug transactions. The Missoula Police determined that Marie Felton was the sham owner of the Hummer and that the police were not required to name her in the forfeiture proceeding or to serve her with the summons and a copy of the forfeiture of the petition. Felton moved to intervene in the forfeiture action. The district court denied the motion to intervene, concluding that Felton became a party when she requested release of the vehicle. The district court also dismissed Felton’s claim that she was not properly served with the forfeiture petition and summons. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the forfeiture proceeding was ineffective in terminating Felton’s interest in the vehicle because the district court erred in determining that Felton was a party to the forfeiture action and in relying on Felton’s presumed knowledge of the setting of the forfeiture hearing as adequate substitutes for timely service of summons and a copy of the forfeiture petition as required by Montana law. Remanded with instructions to vacate the order of forfeiture of the Hummer vehicle as to Felton. View "Muir v. Felton" on Justia Law

A licensed social worker informed the Department of Public Health and Human Services that Mother was psychologically abusing her two girls. After investigating the report, the Department removed the girls from Mother’s custody and placed them into foster care. The Department later returned the girls to Mother’s care. Mother sued the State, alleging that the Department failed adequately to investigate the social worker’s report before removing her children from her care, and as a result, she was wrongfully charged with and arrested for criminal contempt in Wisconsin, was denied custody and visitation with her children, and suffered emotional distress. The State moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was statutorily immune from suit. The district court denied the motion The district court later summary judgment for the State, concluding that the State qualified for statutory immunity. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s earlier decision and order and affirmed the district court’s later judgment in favor of the State, holding that the State was entitled as a matter of law to statutory immunity from Mother’s claims because Mother failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact to support her claim that the State employees involved in the investigation were grossly negligent or knowingly provided false information. View "Weber v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s position of employment with the Emergency Services Division of the State of Montana Department of Military Affairs was eliminated during implementation of the Division’s reduction-in-force policy. After her position was eliminated, Plaintiff filed a grievance with the Department of Labor and Industry Hearings Bureau alleging that the Division terminated her in retaliation for her complaint that sexual favoritism had occurred within the Division. The Bureau dismissed the complaint, and Plaintiff chose not to appeal. Instead, Plaintiff filed a discrimination complaint with the Montana Human Rights Bureau of the Department of Labor and Industry, restating her claims. The Department dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff later filed the present complaint in the district court. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that Plaintiff’s claims were time-barred under the Montana Human Rights Act (MHRA). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by holding that Plaintiff’s claims were subject to the procedures set forth in the MHRA, and as a result were time-barred. View "Lay v. Dep’t of Military Affairs" on Justia Law

Petitioner was stopped for crossing the center line of a road with his vehicle. When Petitioner refused to perform a breath alcohol test he was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Petitioner’s driver’s license was subsequently suspended. Thereafter, Petitioner petitioned the district court to reinstate his driver’s license. The district court denied the petition, concluding that Petitioner violated Mont. Code Ann. 61-8-328 when his vehicle “slightly crossed over the yellow center line.” The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by deciding that Petitioner violated section 6-18-328 when he directed his vehicle across the yellow center line. View "Mitchell v. State" on Justia Law

In 2009, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Baxter v. State, in which it held that a terminally ill patient’s consent to physician aid in dying constitutes a statutory defense to a charge of homicide against the aiding physician. In 2012, the Board of Medical Examiners (Board) posted a position statement on its website explaining the effect of the baxter decision on its discipline policy for physicians participating in “aid-in-dying.” Montanans Against Assisted Suicide (MAAS) filed a petition with the Board seeking a declaratory ruling that the position statement was invalid. The Board denied the petition. MAAS then filed a petition in the district court seeking an order requiring the Board to vacate the position statement. While the matter was pending before the district court, the Board removed the position statement from its website. The district court subsequently dismissed MAAS’ petition, concluding that once the Board rescinded the position statement the case was rendered moot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the matter before the district court was rendered moot when the Board rescinded the position statement. View "Montanans Against Assisted Suicide v. Bd. of Med. Examiners" on Justia Law

In 2009, the Montana Department of Revenue (Department) began the process of reappraising Montana agricultural properties. In 2010, Petitioners filed a petition for declaratory judgment and writ of mandate seeking a declaration that the Department improperly assessed their agricultural property for tax uses. The district court granted the Department’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly interpreted the plain language of section 15-7-111 and complied with the rules of statutory construction; and (2) the Department followed the rule-making mandate of section 15-7-111(2), the Department’s application of section 15-7-111 was not unlawful, and the Department is capable of implementing the district court’s interpretations of section 15-7-111. View "Lucas Ranch, Inc. v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue" on Justia Law

After a hearing held on the second petition filed by the Department of Public Health and Human Services for termination of Mother’s parental rights, the district court terminated Mother’s parental rights to her three children on the grounds that Mother had not successfully completed her treatment plan and the condition rendering her unfit to parent was unlikely to change within a reasonable time. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) despite delays in holding the show cause, adjudicatory, and dispositional hearings, Mother’s due process rights were not violated by the efforts of the Department and court to provide her with services, a treatment plan, and time to work toward reunification with her children; and (2) the district court did not err when it found that Mother failed to complete her treatment plan and the condition rendering her unfit to parent was unlikely to change within a reasonable time. View "In re A.H." on Justia Law

Oliver Arlington, who worked for Miller’s Trucking for one year, claimed he was owed wages in accordance with a verbal employment agreement and was also owed unpaid overtime wages. On remand, a hearing officer with the Montana Department of Labor and Industry Hearings Bureau denied Arlington’s claims. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the hearing officer’s finding that Arlington and Miller’s Trucking did not have an oral employment agreement guaranteeing over $60,000 per year in wages; (2) the hearing officer’s conclusions of law were contrary to applicable wage and hour law; (3) the hearing officer’s factual findings were clearly erroneous; and (4) the hearing officer did not abuse his discretion when he refused to admit documents pertaining to regulatory violations by Miller’s Trucking. View "Arlington v. Miller’s Trucking, Inc." on Justia Law

In the process of hiring a new city manager, the City Commission of the City of Polson held a closed executive session with the description, “Personnel-meet with interview panels and deliberate on selection of city manager.” The Commission later unanimously voted to approve a city manager employment contract with Mark Shrives. Citizens for Open Government brought suit, contending that the executive session violated Citizens’ right to participate under the Montana Constitution and Montana statutory law. The district court ruled in favor of the City on the merits of Citizens’ claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission did not comply with the open meeting laws when it closed its executive session without first determining that the demands of individual privacy clearly exceeded the merits of public disclosure; but (2) because the Commission did not finalize its hiring decision until it held two additional open public meetings, the district court did not err in declining to void the Commission’s decision to present Shrives with an offer letter. View "Citizens for Open Gov’t., Inc. v. City of Polson" on Justia Law

At issue in this case were smoking structures built by the owners and operators of two casinos in Great Falls (“Casino Owners”). After the Cascade City-County Board of Health (Board) commenced enforcement steps against the Casino Owners under the Montana Clean Indoor Air Act (MCIAA), the Casino Owners initiated an action against the Board seeking a declaration that their smoking structures were in compliance with the MCIAA. The district court granted summary judgment to the Casino Owners and awarded attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of the Board, holding (1) the MCIAA clearly delineates casinos on the statute’s list of public places wherein smoking is prohibited, and therefore, the district court erred in concluding that the smoking structures at issue were not subject to the smoking prohibition of the MCIAA; (2) the Casino Owners failed to establish that the Board was equitably estopped from enforcing the MCIAA; and (3) the district court improperly awarded the Casino Owners attorney fees. View "MC, Inc. v. Cascade City-County Bd. of Health" on Justia Law