Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Gallatin Gateway County Water & Sewer District sought a permit for a proposed wastewater treatment system. The Montana Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) granted a wastewater discharge permit. Gateway Village, LLC, which owns land adjacent to and down-gradient from the proposed activities, requested judicial review of DEQ’s issuance of the permit and alleged that the discharge of wastewater into groundwater extending under its surface property would constitute a common law trespass. The district court determined that further environmental analysis was necessary and remanded the case to DEQ. The court also denied DEQ’s and the District’s motions for summary judgment or dismissal of Gateway Village’s trespass claim and denied Gateway Village’s request for attorneys’ fees. The Supreme Court (1) vacated the portion of the district court’s order addressing the trespass claim, holding that, having remanded the case, the district court should have declined to address the trespass claim; and (2) affirmed the district court’s decision to deny Gateway Village’s request for attorney’s fees. View "Gateway Village, LLC v. Mont. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality" on Justia Law

In 2013, Froid Elementary School District No. 65 petitioned the Roosevelt County Superintendent of Schools to transfer territory from the Poplar Elementary School District No. 9 to the Froid School District. Poplar opposed the transfer. The deputy superintendent appointed for the purpose of hearing and deciding the petition approved the territory transfer. Poplar appealed. The district court awarded summary judgment to Poplar and vacated the order transferring territory to Froid on the basis that the territory transfer statute required statements to be made under oath and that the deputy superintendent’s failure to administrator oaths was an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Poplar failed to preserve its statutory issue concerning the necessity of sworn testimony and it was error for the district court to reach the merits of the question. Remanded. View "In re Petition to Transfer Territory from Poplar Elementary Sch. to Froid Elementary Sch." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Lincoln County and several Lincoln County Commissioners, alleging certain errors committed in the resignations and appointments of the Commissioners. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the County. The County subsequently asked the court to award it attorney fees. The district court ultimately awarded the County a total of $11,281 in attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err by issuing an order prepared by the county’s counsel; (2) did not abuse its discretion by considering rates charged by practicing attorneys outside the Lincoln County legal market when deciding whether the County’s attorney fees were reasonable; but (3) did abuse its discretion when it awarded supplemental attorney fees to the County. View "Swapinski v. Lincoln County" on Justia Law

In 2014, the Montana Commissioner of Political Practices (COPP) issued a decision finding sufficient evidence that Terry Bannan had violated Montana’s campaign practices laws during the 2010 primary election and that civil adjudication of the violations was warranted. The COPP forwarded the sufficiency decision to the Lewis and Clark County Attorney for consideration. Bannan filed an action for declaratory relief in the Gallatin County District Court alleging that the COPP acted unlawfully by referring its sufficiency findings to the Lewis and Clark County Attorney rather than the Gallatin County Attorney. The Lewis and Clark County Attorney waived his right to participate in the action, citing Mont. Code Ann. 13-37-124(2). Thereafter, the COPP filed an enforcement action against Bannan in the Lewis and Clark County District Court. Bannan filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the COPP was obligated to assert its claims in the Gallatin County declaratory judgment action. The district court in Lewis and Clark County denied Bannan’s motion to dismiss. Bannan appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed Bannan’s appeal as premature, holding that Bannan’s appeal must be characterized as one seeking relief from the denial of a motion to dismiss, and orders denying motions to dismiss are not appealable. View "Motl v. Bannan" on Justia Law

While in the course and scope of his employment with Employer, Plaintiff suffered serious injuries. Plaintiff recovered workers’ compensation insurance benefits in the amount of $207,147. Plaintiff subsequently brought this action against Employer, alleging that Employer was an uninsured employer under the Workers’ Compensation Act at the time of the accident. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Employer, concluding that Employer was an insured employer under the Act and was therefore entitled to tort immunity pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 39-71-411. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in concluding that Employer was an insured employer under the Act and therefore was entitled to tort immunity. View "Stokes v. Golden Triangle, Inc." on Justia Law

Missoula Police took into custody Bobby Bilderback, who was wanted in connection with a homicide case, and seized his Hummer vehicle. Missoula officers searched the Hummer pursuant to a warrant and found over $36,000 in cash and methamphetamine. The Missoula Chief of Police instituted this proceeding seeking forfeiture of the Hummer, the cash, and other items found during the search. Bilderback failed to appear at the forfeiture hearing, and the district court ordered forfeiture of the Hummer and the cash. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) properly denied Bilderback’s motion to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant executed on his Hummer vehicle; (2) properly denied Bilderback’s motion to dismiss the forfeiture proceeding for lack of personal service of the notice of the forfeiture hearing; and (3) properly denied Bilderback’s motion for summary judgment. View "Muir v. Bilderback" on Justia Law

The Missoula Chief of Police instituted this proceeding seeking forfeiture of a Hummer on the ground that it was involved in unlawful drug transactions. The Missoula Police determined that Marie Felton was the sham owner of the Hummer and that the police were not required to name her in the forfeiture proceeding or to serve her with the summons and a copy of the forfeiture of the petition. Felton moved to intervene in the forfeiture action. The district court denied the motion to intervene, concluding that Felton became a party when she requested release of the vehicle. The district court also dismissed Felton’s claim that she was not properly served with the forfeiture petition and summons. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the forfeiture proceeding was ineffective in terminating Felton’s interest in the vehicle because the district court erred in determining that Felton was a party to the forfeiture action and in relying on Felton’s presumed knowledge of the setting of the forfeiture hearing as adequate substitutes for timely service of summons and a copy of the forfeiture petition as required by Montana law. Remanded with instructions to vacate the order of forfeiture of the Hummer vehicle as to Felton. View "Muir v. Felton" on Justia Law

A licensed social worker informed the Department of Public Health and Human Services that Mother was psychologically abusing her two girls. After investigating the report, the Department removed the girls from Mother’s custody and placed them into foster care. The Department later returned the girls to Mother’s care. Mother sued the State, alleging that the Department failed adequately to investigate the social worker’s report before removing her children from her care, and as a result, she was wrongfully charged with and arrested for criminal contempt in Wisconsin, was denied custody and visitation with her children, and suffered emotional distress. The State moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was statutorily immune from suit. The district court denied the motion The district court later summary judgment for the State, concluding that the State qualified for statutory immunity. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s earlier decision and order and affirmed the district court’s later judgment in favor of the State, holding that the State was entitled as a matter of law to statutory immunity from Mother’s claims because Mother failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact to support her claim that the State employees involved in the investigation were grossly negligent or knowingly provided false information. View "Weber v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s position of employment with the Emergency Services Division of the State of Montana Department of Military Affairs was eliminated during implementation of the Division’s reduction-in-force policy. After her position was eliminated, Plaintiff filed a grievance with the Department of Labor and Industry Hearings Bureau alleging that the Division terminated her in retaliation for her complaint that sexual favoritism had occurred within the Division. The Bureau dismissed the complaint, and Plaintiff chose not to appeal. Instead, Plaintiff filed a discrimination complaint with the Montana Human Rights Bureau of the Department of Labor and Industry, restating her claims. The Department dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff later filed the present complaint in the district court. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that Plaintiff’s claims were time-barred under the Montana Human Rights Act (MHRA). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by holding that Plaintiff’s claims were subject to the procedures set forth in the MHRA, and as a result were time-barred. View "Lay v. Dep’t of Military Affairs" on Justia Law

Petitioner was stopped for crossing the center line of a road with his vehicle. When Petitioner refused to perform a breath alcohol test he was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Petitioner’s driver’s license was subsequently suspended. Thereafter, Petitioner petitioned the district court to reinstate his driver’s license. The district court denied the petition, concluding that Petitioner violated Mont. Code Ann. 61-8-328 when his vehicle “slightly crossed over the yellow center line.” The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by deciding that Petitioner violated section 6-18-328 when he directed his vehicle across the yellow center line. View "Mitchell v. State" on Justia Law