Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Jon Krakauer, a journalist and resident of Colorado, published a book chronicling instances of alleged sexual misconduct on or near the Missoula campus of the University of Montana. This case involved Krakauer’s request for release of certain student records related to one instance of allegations of sexual assault. The Commissioner of Higher Education denied Krakauer’s request, and Krakauer filed a petition in the district court citing the right to know under the Montana Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment to Krakauer and ordered the Commissioner to make available for inspection the requested records. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA) and state statute provide an exception for release of information pursuant to a lawfully issued court order; and (2) the records at issue in this case appear to fall under the “personally identifiable information” protection granted by FERPA. Remanded for further proceedings. View "Krakauer v. Comm’n of Higher Educ." on Justia Law

The Water Use Act permits certain groundwater appropriations to be exempt from the permitting process. An exception to one exemption is when a “combined appropriation” from the same source by two or more wells or springs exceeds a certain amount per year. At issue in this case was the definition of the term “combined appropriation.” After an adverse ruling from the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) hearing examiner, a group of senior water users (the Coalition) challenged the validity of Admin. R. M. 36.12.101(13), which states that the term “combined appropriation” means “groundwater developments that are physically manifold into the same system.” The district court invalidated Admin. R. M. 36.12.101(13), reinstated Admin. R. M. 36.12.101(7), which provided that “[g]roundwater developments need not be physically connected nor have a common distribution system to be considered a ‘combined appropriation’” and directed the DNRC to formulate a new administrative rule consistent with the court’s order. The Supreme Court affirmed, with the exception of the requirement that the DNRC initiate rulemaking, holding (1) the district court did not err by invalidating the newer administrative rule and reinstating the older rule; and (2) it was the DNRC’s decision whether to initiate rulemaking to change the reinstated rule. View "Clark Fork Coalition v. Montana Well Drillers Ass’n" on Justia Law

When Chrysler Group, LLC filed with the Montana Department of Justice, Motor Vehicle Division a notice of intent to establish an additional Chrysler-Jeep dealership in Billings, Lithia Motors, Inc. filed an administrative protest. The Department sustained Lithia’s protest. Rimrock Chrysler, Inc. sought judicial review, but the district court dismissed the petition on the grounds of mootness and lack of a justiciable controversy. While Rimrock’s appeal was pending, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that section 747 of the United States Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010 preempted state regulation of new dealerships issued under certain dealership protest laws. The Montana Supreme Court dismissed Rimrock’s appeal. On remand, Rimrock moved to vacate the Department’s administrative decision and to dismiss the the judicial review proceeding on the ground that section 747 preempted Montana dealer protest laws and deprived the state of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the administrative claim. The district court denied Rimrock’s motion and dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s order denying Rimrock’s motion to vacate and to dismiss, holding that Rimrock waived its section 747 preemption defense when it entered into the settlement agreement; and (2) reversed the district court’s order dismissing Rimrock’s petition for judicial review, holding that Rimrock’s petition involved a justifiable controversy, and the court erred in concluding otherwise. View "Rimrock Chrysler, Inc. v. Lithia Motors, Inc." on Justia Law

Zabrocki began receiving Teachers Retirement System (TRS) retirement benefits in 2007. In 2012 TRS notified Zabrocki that he did not qualify for those benefits and was liable to reimburse TRS for the amounts it paid. Zabrocki requested administrative review. The TRS Board affirmed. Zabrocki requested a contested case hearing. TRS appointed a hearing examiner who issued a proposed order granting TRS's motion for summary judgment. Zabrocki filed exceptions. The Board heard argument on February 21, 2014; the chair stated that a final decision would be adopted at a subsequent meeting. On May 16, the Board issued its order, finding disputes as to material facts precluding summary judgment, and remanded to the hearing examiner. Zabrocki sought judicial review, contending that TRS violated MCA 2-4-623(1)(a), which requires that a final decision in a contested case be issued within “90 days after a contested case is considered to be submitted for a final decision.” The district court agreed that the May 16 order was not a final order, noted that a denial of summary judgment is not a final decision for purposes of appeal, and determined that on May 16 the Board decided “the issues raised on summary judgment” and not the entire dispute, so that “there is more to be done at the agency level.” The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, in favor of TRS. The Board did not violate the final agency decision requirement of MCA 2-4-623(1)(a). View "Zabrocki v. Teachers Ret. Sys." on Justia Law

Appellants (“the Silvertip Landowners”) were a group of private landowners in Carbon County who initiated a petition to establish a “Part 1” zoning district pursuant to 76-2-101, MCA, et seq. Appellees were the Board of County Commissioners of Carbon County (“the Commissioners”), and a group of private landowners in Carbon County who opposed the proposed zoning district (“the Neighbors”). At at hearing on the petition, the Commissioners reported that landowners holding 60.7% of the total acreage in the proposed district had submitted protests opposing the zoning district. The Commissioners rescinded their resolution of intent, and voted to deny creation of the zoning district as proposed, citing as the reason for doing so the formal protests lodged. The Silvertip Landowners filed suit at the district court, arguing: (1) reliance on an unconstitutional protest provision in 76-2-101(5), MCA; (2) arbitrary and capricious reversal of the Commissioners’ own finding of public interest; and (3) unconstitutional deprivation of the Silvertip Landowners’ right to a clean and healthful environment as guaranteed by the Montana Constitution. For relief, the Silvertip Landowners asked the District Court to: (1) declare 76-2-101(5), MCA, unconstitutional and therefore void; (2) declare the Commissioners’ decisions to withdraw the resolution of intent to create the zoning district and to deny the Silvertip Landowners’ petition as arbitrary and capricious; and therefore void; and (3) declare the Commissioners’ decisions to withdraw the resolution of intent and to deny the petition as violative of the Montana Constitutional environmental protections. The Commissioners and the Neighbors both moved to dismiss, and their motion was granted. Finding no reversible error, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal. View "Martinell v. Carbon Co. Comm." on Justia Law

S.H. appealed a court order committing her to the Montana State Hospital. In late 2014, S.H. sought help from the emergency department at the Billings Clinic. S.H. complained she was suffering from food poisoning, that there were snakes in her stomach, black bugs in the toilet, and the voices of God and Satan were arguing in her head. A psychiatrist at the Clinic examined S.H. and, upon his recommendation, the State filed a petition to involuntarily commit S.H. on November 12, 2014. The petition notified S.H. of her rights—including her “right to refuse any but lifesaving medication for up to 24 hours prior to any hearing held pursuant to [§ 53-21-115(11), MCA].” The District Court ordered S.H. detained at the Billings Clinic pending resolution of the petition. The District Court then appointed counsel to represent S.H., held an initial hearing, and ordered an evaluation. At the conclusion of the hearing, the District Court found that the State proved to a reasonable medical certainty that S.H. suffers from the mental disorder of bipolar disorder and that S.H. “is in a manic state, delusional, agitated and paranoid.” S.H. challenged the evidence presented against her as insufficient to support the order committing her to hospital care. The Supreme Court reviewed the District Court record, found sufficient evidence, and affirmed the District Court's decision. View "Matter of S.H." on Justia Law

The Denturist Association of Montana (Association), on behalf of denturist Carl Brisendine, filed suit against the Board of Dentistry, challenging the validity of A.R.M. 24.138.2302(1)(j) (Rule J), the latest in a long line of legal disputes between the two. "Wiser v. Montana," (129 P.3d 133 (Wiser I)) and "Wiser v. Board of Dentistry," (Wiser II)) either implicitly or explicitly claimed that the Board's promulgation of Rule J was invalid because it conflicted with statute. The Wiser I plaintiffs (comprised of every denturist in Montana) made their claims "on behalf of the profession of denturitry." Wiser I plaintiffs lost their challenge to the Board's authority. The Wiser II plaintiffs, comprised of a smaller group of denturists, attempted to distinguish themselves from the Wiser I plaintiffs, but the Court saw no distinction in their capacity to challenge the Board’s promulgation of Rule J as individuals rather than as representatives of a group. The Court barred the Wiser II plaintiffs’ claims on res judicata grounds. In this case, Brisendine’s complaint contains three counts: Count 1 Rule J was discriminatory and restrained trade, and that the Board violated Montana law by discriminatorily applying its disciplinary rules: being unduly harsh on denturists while giving leniency to dentists. Counts II and III alleged Rule J was invalid because it conflicted with various statutes. Brisendine moved for summary judgment on Count II, and the Board filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on all counts. The District Court, citing Wiser I and II, held Brisendine’s claims were barred by res judicata as a matter of law. Brisendine appealed. The Supreme Court concluded that privity existed between the litigants in the Wiser cases and Brisendine. Because privity exists and the other elements of claim preclusion were not contested with respect to Counts II and III, the Court affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to the Board on those claims on res judicata grounds. Brisendine's claim in Count I was an entirely different claim than those made in the Wiser cases, and the District Court erred when it granted summary judgment to the Board on this claim. View "Denturist Assoc. v Montana DOL" on Justia Law

Property owners (Petitioners) appealed the Department of Revenue’s valuation of their residential lot for the tax year 2012. The Flathead County Tax Appeal Board (County Board) reduced the value of the land and the value of the improvements. Petitioners appealed, arguing that the appraised value was still too high. The State Tax Appeal Board (STAB) upheld the County Board’s determination of the value of the property. The district court reversed, concluding that the County Board property value upheld by STAB was clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court reversed the district court and reinstated the STAB decision, holding that the district court erred in reversing STAB’s order concerning the valuation of the property. View "Peretti v. State, Dep’t of Revenue" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs worked within the Child Support Enforcement Division of the Department of Public Health and Human Services and constituted the majority of Compliance Specialists, Pay Band 6, employed by the State. Plaintiffs, who belonged to a Union, filed a grievance with the Board of Personnel Appeals (BOPA) alleging that their pay was not “internally equitable” in comparison with Pay Band 6 Compliance Specialists in other state agencies. A Hearing Officer issued a recommended order holding that Plaintiffs were aggrieved and awarded damages. BOPA, however, rejected the recommended order and dismissed the grievance, concluding that Plaintiffs had no independent right to internally equitable pay with other Pay Band 6 Compliance Specialists, but, instead, internal equity was a factor to be considered during the collective bargaining process. The district court vacated and reversed BOPA’s final order, agreeing with the Hearing Officer that Plaintiffs had a right to pay that was internally equitable with other Pay Band 6 Compliance Specialists. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s order and reinstated BOPA’s final order, holding that the statutory factor of “internal equity” is not a stand-alone right that may be pursued independently and in preemption of the work of the collective bargaining process. View "Mashek v. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

Fellows filed the underlying complaint challenging the Water Commissioner’s administration of water under the Perry v. Beattie decree. The district court dismissed Fellows’s complaint for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding that Fellows’s allegations were sufficient to state a claim. Fellows then requested the district court to certify a question to the Water Court. The district court granted the request. The Water Court entered a final order that tabulated the water rights necessary to address Fellows’s underlying complaint. By the time of its certification order, the water claims had been adjudicated in a temporary preliminary decree, and therefore, the Water Court ordered that the matter be closed and returned to the district court. The Perry Defendants filed a motion to alter or amend the Water Court’s judgment. The Water Court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Water Court correctly followed the law of the case; (2) Fellows’s petition for certification was proper; and (3) the Water Court did not err in defining the scope of the controversy, in determining the purpose of the tabulation, and in tabulating the applicable rights involved in the controversy. Remanded. View "Fellows v. Saylor" on Justia Law