Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Ed Chamberlin filed for divorce from Trina Chamberlin. The district court entered a decree of dissolution that (1) awarded the couple's house and property to Ed without counting a loan from Ed's father as a liability against the house, (2) awarded Trina's car to her, (3) awarded primary custody of the couple's child to Trina, and (4) allocated parenting time to Ed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court equitably divided the marital estate, (2) the district court properly awarded Trina primary parenting of the parties' minor child, and (3) because Ed's appeal did not rise to the level of lacking good faith, Trina's request for attorney fees and costs was denied.

The district court terminated the parental rights of Mother and Father to their three Children after concluding that (1) Mother and Father had subjected two of the children to chronic and severe neglect under Mont. Code Ann. 41-3-423(2)(a), and (2) the Department of Public Health and Human Services was not required to make reasonable efforts to reunify the children with their parents. Mother and Father appealed the court's failure to require reunification efforts or to order a treatment plan prior to terminating their rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court was within its discretion in finding chronic, severe neglect and terminating the parental rights of Mother and Father without requiring reunification efforts.

Before their divorce, Scott Weiss borrowed $280,000 from Rayna Weiss for an ownership interest in a brokerage service. Upon dissolution of the marriage, the district court determined the loan from Rayna was interest-free. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the loan required the payment of interest at the rate of ten percent a year and remanded to the district court for calculation of interest from the time Rayna transferred the funds to Scott until the amount was paid in full. Upon remand, the district court concluded that Scott owed Rayna $49,954 in interest on the loan with postjudgment interest accruing at the rate of ten percent per annum until paid. Rayna appealed the district court's determination that the principal of the loan was paid back in full and the court's subsequent calculation of interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly determined that the loan was paid off in full by Scott, and (2) district court's subsequent calculation of simple interest on the loan was correct.

Mother consented to the adoption of her two biological children, after which the children were placed in the legal care of Guardians. Guardians later arranged for the adoption of the children by Adoptive Parents and relinquished the children. After six months of living with Adoptive Parents, Guardians moved to have their relinquishment and consent to adoption set aside, claiming their consent was fraudulently obtained by their reliance on a deficient pre-placement evaluation provided to them by Adoptive Parents. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Guardians failed to establish the existence of actual or constructive fraud by clear and convincing evidence, there was no statutory basis to set aside the relinquishments and consents given by Guardians.

Upon divorcing, Holly and Walter Wolf executed a dissolution agreement that was incorporated into a dissolution decree. Pursuant to the agreement, Walter agreed to pay Holly spousal maintenance. Holly later married Joseph Loftis, after which Walter stopped making payments to Holly. The district court subsequently declared the marriage between Holly Joseph to be invalid. Holly then filed a motion for partial summary judgment on her action contesting Walter's termination of maintenance payments, asserting that Walter's maintenance obligation was reinstated after Holly and Joseph stopped living together and arguing that Walter was in arrears. The district court ultimately granted summary judgment to Holly, concluding that the dissolution agreement unambiguously obligated Walter to continue paying Holly maintenance despite her remarriage. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in concluding that Mont. Code Ann. 40-4-208(4) was inapplicable in determining Walter's maintenance obligations under the dissolution agreement upon Holly's remarriage; and (2) under the plain language of the statute, Walter's maintenance obligation to Holly terminated by operation of law upon Holly's marriage to Joseph. Remanded.

After child R.M.T. had been in the custody of the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services for two years, the Department petitioned for termination of Father's and Mother's rights. After finding that Father's attempts to comply with his treatment plan failed to reach the level necessary to complete the plan, the court determined that the termination of Father's parental rights was in R.M.T.'s best interest. The court then terminated both Father's and Mother's parental rights. Father appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the lower court did not abuse its discretion when it terminated Father's rights; and (2) the lower court violated Father's due process rights when at the termination hearing the court declined Father's request to cross-examine the guardian ad litem, who submitted a factual report to the court, but because the report provided no new information to the court, the exclusion of the guardian ad litem's testimony did not cause substantial injustice to Father.

Montana resident Robin Jordan petitioned for a temporary protective order in a Montana county court against Ohio resident Mark Kalin. The court issued the temporary protective order, and Kalin appealed. In the district court, Kalin moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The district court did not rule on the motion but found it had jurisdiction in its findings issued after the substantive hearing. The district court then adopted a permanent order of protection prohibiting Kalin from having any contact with Jordan or her husband. Kalin appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in failing to grant Kalin's motion to dismiss as the allegations of the petition were sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the district court; (2) the evidence was sufficient for the district court to issue a permanent order of protection; and (3) the district court's order of protection did not punish Kalin for exercising his constitutional right to defend himself in court.

During the dissolution of the marriage of Karen and Rodney Stevens in 2008, the district court entered a temporary economic restraining order prohibiting any transfer by the parties of their assets during the pendency of the proceedings. The district court awarded Rodney all right and title in a truck titled in Karen's name and ordered Karen to transfer title to Rodney. Karen later transferred the title to her mother. In 2010 the district court issued a written order declining to hold Karen in contempt for her violation of the economic restraining order. Instead, the court ordered Karen to remove any liens on the truck and to secure a new certificate of title and ruled if Karen refused to do so, a judgment would be entered against her in the amount of $21,000. Later, Karen retook possession of the vehicle. Rodney appealed. The Supreme Court determined that the court acted within its discretion in refusing to issue a contempt order but did not have authority to modify the distribution of property under its prior decree without notice to both parties and an opportunity to be heard. However, because Rodney was not prejudiced by the district court's ruling, the judgment was affirmed.

Petitioner appealed an order of the district court declining transfer of jurisdiction over the parties' child custody proceeding in Kentucky where the couple were married in Montana, petitioner resided in Kentucky, and respondent resided in Montana. The principal issue was whether the district court correctly determined that Montana had continuing jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody and Jurisdiction Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA"), KRS 403.820 and MCA 40-7-140. The court held that the district court correctly concluded that Montana was the child's home state under the UCCJEA and the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the child had a significant connection to Montana or that Kentucky would not be a more convenient forum for conducting further child custody proceedings.

Appellant appealed from the district court's order declining to hold appellee in contempt and directing her to clear title to his vehicle or face entry of a judgment against her. At issue was whether the district court erred when it failed to hold appellee accountable for violating the economic restraining order and when it allowed her to repossess the vehicle. Also at issue was whether appellant's due process rights were violated because he did not receive notice of two hearings. The court held that the district court had broad discretion to determine whether or not to hold appellee in contempt for non-compliance with the decree. The court also held that, although the court acted within its discretion in refusing to issue a contempt order, the court did not have authority to modify the redistribution of property under its prior decree without notice to both parties and an opportunity to be heard, and erred in doing so. The court held, however, that appellant was not prejudiced by the district court's ruling, which was in his favor, and therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment.