Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

During the dissolution of the marriage of Karen and Rodney Stevens in 2008, the district court entered a temporary economic restraining order prohibiting any transfer by the parties of their assets during the pendency of the proceedings. The district court awarded Rodney all right and title in a truck titled in Karen's name and ordered Karen to transfer title to Rodney. Karen later transferred the title to her mother. In 2010 the district court issued a written order declining to hold Karen in contempt for her violation of the economic restraining order. Instead, the court ordered Karen to remove any liens on the truck and to secure a new certificate of title and ruled if Karen refused to do so, a judgment would be entered against her in the amount of $21,000. Later, Karen retook possession of the vehicle. Rodney appealed. The Supreme Court determined that the court acted within its discretion in refusing to issue a contempt order but did not have authority to modify the distribution of property under its prior decree without notice to both parties and an opportunity to be heard. However, because Rodney was not prejudiced by the district court's ruling, the judgment was affirmed.

Petitioner appealed an order of the district court declining transfer of jurisdiction over the parties' child custody proceeding in Kentucky where the couple were married in Montana, petitioner resided in Kentucky, and respondent resided in Montana. The principal issue was whether the district court correctly determined that Montana had continuing jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody and Jurisdiction Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA"), KRS 403.820 and MCA 40-7-140. The court held that the district court correctly concluded that Montana was the child's home state under the UCCJEA and the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the child had a significant connection to Montana or that Kentucky would not be a more convenient forum for conducting further child custody proceedings.

Appellant appealed from the district court's order declining to hold appellee in contempt and directing her to clear title to his vehicle or face entry of a judgment against her. At issue was whether the district court erred when it failed to hold appellee accountable for violating the economic restraining order and when it allowed her to repossess the vehicle. Also at issue was whether appellant's due process rights were violated because he did not receive notice of two hearings. The court held that the district court had broad discretion to determine whether or not to hold appellee in contempt for non-compliance with the decree. The court also held that, although the court acted within its discretion in refusing to issue a contempt order, the court did not have authority to modify the redistribution of property under its prior decree without notice to both parties and an opportunity to be heard, and erred in doing so. The court held, however, that appellant was not prejudiced by the district court's ruling, which was in his favor, and therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment.

Petitioner filed a petition for dissolution in district court and the only contested issue between the parties was the valuation and division of the marital home and surrounding acreage, which was purchased for $45,000 in the mid-1990's. Petitioner had obtained a letter from a realtor stating that the marital home could be worth approximately $250,000-275,000 if the home was in good condition. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied petitioner's M.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6) motion, which was filed after the district court found the marital home was valued at $22,423, where petitioner alleged that her attorney grossly neglected her case when she failed to identify the realtor as an expert, or any other qualified real estate expert, and failed to prepare any evidence for trial to reflect petitioner's estimated value of the marital home. The court held that under the unique circumstances, where the district court had a statutory obligation to equitably apportion the marital estate and petitioner's counsel totally failed to present evidence on the issue, the district court abused its discretion in denying her Rule 60(b)(6) motion and should have granted the motion, thereby allowing her to present evidence regarding the value of the marital home so that the district court could make an equitable distribution. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Petitioner ("husband") and respondent ("wife") divorced in May 1993 and entered into a Marital and Property Settlement Agreement ("settlement agreement") where, pursuant to the settlement agreement, husband and wife's two children would live primarily with wife and husband would pay wife child support payments each month plus half the cost of the children's uninsured medical expenses. At issue was whether the district court erred when it concluded that wife's statements filed with the court indicating that husband was current on his child support obligations as of September 2001 constituted judicial admissions and thus precluded an award of back child support; when it determined that wife had filed inconsistent pleadings and imposed sanctions against her; and when it held that husband did not owe wife for back child support. Also at issue was whether the district court erred by failing to award husband his attorney fees pursuant to a "prevailing party" contractual provision when the sanctions imposed on wife covered only a portion of husband's attorney fees. The court held that the district court did not err when it assumed that wife's written statements were true and concluded that the statements were judicial admissions where both documents that contained wife's statements were signed by her attorney at the time and neither were superseded or withdrawn at any point. The court also held that, without knowing the legal basis for sanctions, it was impossible to ascertain whether the award constituted an abuse of discretion and concluded that it was unnecessary to remand in light of the court's disposition of the last issue. The court further held that the district court did not err in concluding that husband did not owe wife back child support where the record established that wife was overpaid child support. The court finally held that the district court erred when it granted husband only a portion of his attorney fees and costs as sanctions against wife where, by the terms of the settlement, husband should have been awarded all of his costs and attorney fees expended in defense of wife's claims because husband was the prevailing party.

Petitioner and respondent had one child together, never married, and split up shortly after respondent became pregnant with the child in 2000. At issue was whether the district court wrongly named petitioner as the primary residential parent, properly calculated respondent's child support obligation, and afforded respondent a fair trial. The court held that the district court properly held that it was in the best interest of the child to reside primarily with petitioner where he provided more continuity and stability of care for the child. The court also held that the district court made several errors in calculating respondent's income for purposes of child support and therefore reversed and remanded for recalculation. The court further held that the district court offered respondent a fair trial where it interviewed the child in chambers to determined the child's preference for primary residential parent.

The Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services removed I.B. from his parents' care in June, 2008, when he was about five months old. The parents neglected to provide I.B. with necessary medical care. I.B. was taken to the hospital after suffering a blistering facial sunburn and second degree burns on 20-30% of his body. The Department of Human Services received an abuse or neglect referral and investigated. Due to the nature of his injury, doctors recommended a special feeding technique and schedule be followed once I.B. was released back to his parents' care. Social workers arrived at I.B.'s home unannounced to find that none of the hospital's instructions were being followed. The Department removed I.B. from his home and into foster care, and filed a petition seeking emergency protective services. The court adjudicated I.B. a youth in need of care, and the parents stipulated to treatment plans in July, 2008. Seeing no compliance with the treatment plan, and seeing that the parents' condition was unlikely to change within a reasonable time, the district court terminated the parental rights of I.B.'s parents, B.K and C.B. The parents challenged this termination. Finding that the record supported the decision, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's termination of parental rights.