Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The district court entered an order for contact between Grandmother and Granddaughter, whose parents were incarcerated. The court's order was entered over Mother's objection. Grandmother subsequently filed a petition for additional grandparent contact. After the district court held a hearing on that petition, Grandmother appealed. No written judgment or order disposing of the issues raised at the hearing appeared in the district court record, however. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal after noting that the Court was left with a record that was impossible to properly review as to the three issues raised on appeal. Remanded to the district court with directions for the court to enter written findings, conclusions, and an order addressing the issues raised by Grandmother's petition and at the hearing. View "In re Vistation of Larsen" on Justia Law

Mother and Father's twin sons were born with physical and mental disabilities and required full-time care and supervision. Upon his divorce from Mother, Father was ordered to pay child support. Father's obligation to provide child support ceased upon the twins' graduation from high school. Mother later requested continued child support from Father once the twins turned nineteen. The district court concluded that Mont. Code Ann. 40-6-214 did not allow an order imposing such support but that the statute provided the court with authority to order a parent to support an adult child who is poor and unable to maintain himself if the parent does not do so. Mother subsequently filed a second petition, and the district court found it had the authority to order Father to support the twins based on information he was not providing for them to the extent of his ability. The Supreme Court consolidated the two proceedings on appeal and affirmed, holding that the district court had the statutory authority to order Father to support the twins and that section 40-6-214 imposed a duty on Father to support the twins "to the extent of his ability." View "In re M.A.S." on Justia Law

Husband and Wife had been married for almost seventeen years when Wife petitioned for the dissolution of the marriage. A temporary order of protection was issued against Husband to protect Wife and the couple's three children. The district court subsequently issued a final order of protection (FOP) requiring that Husband stay 300 feet away from Wife at all times and that he have only telephonic and supervised in-person contact with the children. The marriage was then dissolved. Husband later filed a motion to dissolve the FOP. The district court left the FOP in effect, reasoning that under Mont. Code Ann. 40-15-204(5), it did not have the legal authority to terminate the FOP without Wife's request for termination. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court misinterpreted the law as set forth in section 40-15-204(5), as a district court has the authority to continue or terminate an order of protection notwithstanding the petitioner's desires. Remanded. View "Albrecht v. Albrecht" on Justia Law

Mother and Father's parental rights to their children were terminated by the district court. Before the district court's judgment, Mother had moved to transfer to the case to a tribal court as allowed under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). However, the case was never transferred. The district court maintained jurisdiction and denied Mother's request to continue the termination hearing and appoint counsel for the children. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court did not comply with the jurisdictional ICWA transfer requirements where the court misinterpreted the ICWA requirement to require an affirmative acceptance of the transfer by the tribe; and (2) because there was an apparent conflict between the children's wishes and what the guardian ad litem concluded to be in the children's best interests, counsel for children should be appointed on remand. Remanded. View "In re J.W.C." on Justia Law

Husband and Wife's marriage was dissolved in Mississippi. The decree awarded Husband custody of Son and Wife custody of Daughter. Subsequently, Husband and Son moved to Montana, and Wife and Daughter moved to Arizona. Husband petitioned the district court in Montana to modify the child support award for Son. The district court denied the petition and declined to exercise further jurisdiction on the basis that it was an inconvenient forum because Husband and Son had moved back to Mississippi and Wife and Daughter were residing in Arizona. The court then relinquished jurisdiction of Son to the Arizona. Husband and Son later moved back to Montana, and Husband petitioned the district court to reduce accrued child support to a money judgment. The district court noted jurisdiction had been relinquished to the Arizona court and declined to exercise further jurisdiction on the basis that it was an inconvenient forum. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court improperly applied the Montana Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) in determining it did not have jurisdiction over the matter because the UCCJEA applies to child custody matters, not child support matters. Remanded. View "Ervin v. Ervin" on Justia Law

The district court terminated Mother's rights to her two minor children after determining that Mother had willfully surrendered custody of her children for a period of six months and that Mother had abandoned her children in accordance with Mont. Code Ann. 41-3-609(1). Mother appealed, contending that she could not surrender custody because she never possessed custody. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that Mother abandoned her children under the circumstances where (1) Mother had physical custody of her children until 2006, and (2) Mother made no manifestation of an intent to resume custody of the children. View "In re E.M.S." on Justia Law

Husband and Wife's marriage was dissolved by a decree that included a settlement agreement and parenting plan. The agreement provided that the parties would share joint parenting of the children but that Wife would be the primary residential parent. The agreement was later amended to provide for alternating custody between Wife and Husband on a weekly basis. Husband subsequently filed a motion to modify child support, alleging that there had been a substantial and continuing change of circumstances as to make the existing terms unconscionable. The district court (1) granted Husband's motion, (2) denied Wife's motion to amend the parenting plan, and (3) ordered that Wife pay Husband's attorney's fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in (1) granting Husband's motion to modify child support where the court's findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence and its determination that the changes in circumstances in this case met the statutory requirements; (2) awarding Husband attorney's fees where the parties' agreement specifically provided for an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party in subsequent proceedings; and (3) determining the amount and reasonableness of the attorney's fees awarded. View "In re Marriage of Damschen" on Justia Law

Husband and Wife entered into a property settlement agreement (PSA) pursuant to their divorce in which Wife transferred all of her interest in two corporations the parties owned to Husband in exchange for Husband's payment to Wife of $250,000. The parties subsequently agreed that Wife would assume managerial and operational control of the businesses. The district court ordered Husband to provide Wife with access to the businesses' accounts and financial information and to return possession of the business records. Because of Husband's noncompliance with the court order, Wife ultimately was forced to file for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. The district court subsequently (1) found Husband to be in contempt, (2) awarded Wife sole possession of one of the businesses, (3) ordered Husband to pay Wife the receiver fees he had accumulated during his operation of the business, and (4) ordered Husband to pay Wife's attorney's fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not (1) err by refusing to send the dispute to arbitration and by holding Husband in contempt; (2) deny Husband due process; and (3) err in awarding attorney's fees to Wife. Remanded for a determination of Wife's attorney's fees and costs on appeal. View "In re Marriage of Cini" on Justia Law

Husband and Wife's marriage was dissolved by the district court. The order included an allocation of Husband's state employee retirement plan, which Wife appealed. At issue on appeal was whether Wife was entitled to fifty percent of what the account would be worth if Husband were to liquidate it immediately or fifty percent of the marital portion of Husband's benefits at the time he would begin receiving them after retirement. The Supreme Court (1) concluded that Karen was entitled to a percentage at the time of payout under the "time rule" for deferred distribution of pension plans as set forth in Rolfe v. Rolfe, and (2) ordered that the account should be divided by awarding Wife a fraction of each pension payment that represents the amount earned during the marriage. Remanded for a new distribution of the marital estate. View "In re Marriage of Spawn & McGowan" on Justia Law

Shannon and Travis Johnson married, after which Shannon gave birth. Travis was named on the birth certificate as Child's father. Later DNA tests revealed Justin Walak was actually Child's father. When Shannon and Travis filed for dissolution of their marriage, Walak intervened, seeking a judicial establishment of a parental relationship with Child. Shannon and Travis then reconciled and sought to exclude Walak from establishing a relationship with Child. The district court issued an order (Order I) concluding it was not in Child's best interests to establish a parental relationship with Walak. Subsequently, Walak filed a motion challenging the court's factual findings and order. The district court then issued an order vacating Order I (Order II), which granted Walak parental rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion in granting Walak's posttrial motion and vacating its earlier order as it had no statutory or other authority to vacate Order I, change its legal conclusions, and issue a wholly contrary Order II.