Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Husband and Wife entered into a property settlement agreement (PSA) pursuant to their divorce in which Wife transferred all of her interest in two corporations the parties owned to Husband in exchange for Husband's payment to Wife of $250,000. The parties subsequently agreed that Wife would assume managerial and operational control of the businesses. The district court ordered Husband to provide Wife with access to the businesses' accounts and financial information and to return possession of the business records. Because of Husband's noncompliance with the court order, Wife ultimately was forced to file for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. The district court subsequently (1) found Husband to be in contempt, (2) awarded Wife sole possession of one of the businesses, (3) ordered Husband to pay Wife the receiver fees he had accumulated during his operation of the business, and (4) ordered Husband to pay Wife's attorney's fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not (1) err by refusing to send the dispute to arbitration and by holding Husband in contempt; (2) deny Husband due process; and (3) err in awarding attorney's fees to Wife. Remanded for a determination of Wife's attorney's fees and costs on appeal. View "In re Marriage of Cini" on Justia Law

Husband and Wife's marriage was dissolved by the district court. The order included an allocation of Husband's state employee retirement plan, which Wife appealed. At issue on appeal was whether Wife was entitled to fifty percent of what the account would be worth if Husband were to liquidate it immediately or fifty percent of the marital portion of Husband's benefits at the time he would begin receiving them after retirement. The Supreme Court (1) concluded that Karen was entitled to a percentage at the time of payout under the "time rule" for deferred distribution of pension plans as set forth in Rolfe v. Rolfe, and (2) ordered that the account should be divided by awarding Wife a fraction of each pension payment that represents the amount earned during the marriage. Remanded for a new distribution of the marital estate. View "In re Marriage of Spawn & McGowan" on Justia Law

Shannon and Travis Johnson married, after which Shannon gave birth. Travis was named on the birth certificate as Child's father. Later DNA tests revealed Justin Walak was actually Child's father. When Shannon and Travis filed for dissolution of their marriage, Walak intervened, seeking a judicial establishment of a parental relationship with Child. Shannon and Travis then reconciled and sought to exclude Walak from establishing a relationship with Child. The district court issued an order (Order I) concluding it was not in Child's best interests to establish a parental relationship with Walak. Subsequently, Walak filed a motion challenging the court's factual findings and order. The district court then issued an order vacating Order I (Order II), which granted Walak parental rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion in granting Walak's posttrial motion and vacating its earlier order as it had no statutory or other authority to vacate Order I, change its legal conclusions, and issue a wholly contrary Order II.

Ed Chamberlin filed for divorce from Trina Chamberlin. The district court entered a decree of dissolution that (1) awarded the couple's house and property to Ed without counting a loan from Ed's father as a liability against the house, (2) awarded Trina's car to her, (3) awarded primary custody of the couple's child to Trina, and (4) allocated parenting time to Ed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court equitably divided the marital estate, (2) the district court properly awarded Trina primary parenting of the parties' minor child, and (3) because Ed's appeal did not rise to the level of lacking good faith, Trina's request for attorney fees and costs was denied.

The district court terminated the parental rights of Mother and Father to their three Children after concluding that (1) Mother and Father had subjected two of the children to chronic and severe neglect under Mont. Code Ann. 41-3-423(2)(a), and (2) the Department of Public Health and Human Services was not required to make reasonable efforts to reunify the children with their parents. Mother and Father appealed the court's failure to require reunification efforts or to order a treatment plan prior to terminating their rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court was within its discretion in finding chronic, severe neglect and terminating the parental rights of Mother and Father without requiring reunification efforts.

Before their divorce, Scott Weiss borrowed $280,000 from Rayna Weiss for an ownership interest in a brokerage service. Upon dissolution of the marriage, the district court determined the loan from Rayna was interest-free. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the loan required the payment of interest at the rate of ten percent a year and remanded to the district court for calculation of interest from the time Rayna transferred the funds to Scott until the amount was paid in full. Upon remand, the district court concluded that Scott owed Rayna $49,954 in interest on the loan with postjudgment interest accruing at the rate of ten percent per annum until paid. Rayna appealed the district court's determination that the principal of the loan was paid back in full and the court's subsequent calculation of interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly determined that the loan was paid off in full by Scott, and (2) district court's subsequent calculation of simple interest on the loan was correct.

Mother consented to the adoption of her two biological children, after which the children were placed in the legal care of Guardians. Guardians later arranged for the adoption of the children by Adoptive Parents and relinquished the children. After six months of living with Adoptive Parents, Guardians moved to have their relinquishment and consent to adoption set aside, claiming their consent was fraudulently obtained by their reliance on a deficient pre-placement evaluation provided to them by Adoptive Parents. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Guardians failed to establish the existence of actual or constructive fraud by clear and convincing evidence, there was no statutory basis to set aside the relinquishments and consents given by Guardians.

Upon divorcing, Holly and Walter Wolf executed a dissolution agreement that was incorporated into a dissolution decree. Pursuant to the agreement, Walter agreed to pay Holly spousal maintenance. Holly later married Joseph Loftis, after which Walter stopped making payments to Holly. The district court subsequently declared the marriage between Holly Joseph to be invalid. Holly then filed a motion for partial summary judgment on her action contesting Walter's termination of maintenance payments, asserting that Walter's maintenance obligation was reinstated after Holly and Joseph stopped living together and arguing that Walter was in arrears. The district court ultimately granted summary judgment to Holly, concluding that the dissolution agreement unambiguously obligated Walter to continue paying Holly maintenance despite her remarriage. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in concluding that Mont. Code Ann. 40-4-208(4) was inapplicable in determining Walter's maintenance obligations under the dissolution agreement upon Holly's remarriage; and (2) under the plain language of the statute, Walter's maintenance obligation to Holly terminated by operation of law upon Holly's marriage to Joseph. Remanded.

After child R.M.T. had been in the custody of the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services for two years, the Department petitioned for termination of Father's and Mother's rights. After finding that Father's attempts to comply with his treatment plan failed to reach the level necessary to complete the plan, the court determined that the termination of Father's parental rights was in R.M.T.'s best interest. The court then terminated both Father's and Mother's parental rights. Father appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the lower court did not abuse its discretion when it terminated Father's rights; and (2) the lower court violated Father's due process rights when at the termination hearing the court declined Father's request to cross-examine the guardian ad litem, who submitted a factual report to the court, but because the report provided no new information to the court, the exclusion of the guardian ad litem's testimony did not cause substantial injustice to Father.

Montana resident Robin Jordan petitioned for a temporary protective order in a Montana county court against Ohio resident Mark Kalin. The court issued the temporary protective order, and Kalin appealed. In the district court, Kalin moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The district court did not rule on the motion but found it had jurisdiction in its findings issued after the substantive hearing. The district court then adopted a permanent order of protection prohibiting Kalin from having any contact with Jordan or her husband. Kalin appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in failing to grant Kalin's motion to dismiss as the allegations of the petition were sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the district court; (2) the evidence was sufficient for the district court to issue a permanent order of protection; and (3) the district court's order of protection did not punish Kalin for exercising his constitutional right to defend himself in court.