Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Phil and Valerie married in 2003 and commenced dissolution proceedings in 2005. After five years of litigation, the district court held bifurcated bench trials to address three separate aspects of the dissolution: the parenting plan, child support obligations, and division of the marital estate. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court in all respects, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining and distributing the marital estate; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the couple's children would reside primarily with Valerie under the final parenting plan; and (3) the district court did not err in calculating Phil's child support payments. View "In re Marriage of Tummarello" on Justia Law

Kevin and June Funk were married in 1990. In 1996, Kevin inherited several acres of lakefront and non-lakefront property, several vehicles, and an undisclosed amount of cash. June filed for dissolution in 2009. In distributing the marital assets upon dissolution, the district court included Kevin's inherited real property in the marital assets and awarded a portion to June. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's award of one of the vehicles to June and its valuation of Kevin's lakefront property; and (2) remanded for the district court to assess the factors set forth in Mont. Code Ann. 202(1) in determining the legal basis for an award to June of a portion of the value of the lakefront property. View "In re Marriage of Funk" on Justia Law

Husband appealed from the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree of dissolution entered by the district court, which dissolved the marriage of Husband and Wife, determined Husband's child support obligation, and adopted a parenting plan. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it (1) imputed $90,000 in annual disposable income to Husband for purposes of calculating his child support obligation, and (2) did not follow the recommendation of the parenting evaluator that Husband be allowed "make up" visitation days for those days he missed visitation while working out of town. View "In re Marriage of Everett" on Justia Law

The district court entered an order for contact between Grandmother and Granddaughter, whose parents were incarcerated. The court's order was entered over Mother's objection. Grandmother subsequently filed a petition for additional grandparent contact. After the district court held a hearing on that petition, Grandmother appealed. No written judgment or order disposing of the issues raised at the hearing appeared in the district court record, however. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal after noting that the Court was left with a record that was impossible to properly review as to the three issues raised on appeal. Remanded to the district court with directions for the court to enter written findings, conclusions, and an order addressing the issues raised by Grandmother's petition and at the hearing. View "In re Vistation of Larsen" on Justia Law

Mother and Father's twin sons were born with physical and mental disabilities and required full-time care and supervision. Upon his divorce from Mother, Father was ordered to pay child support. Father's obligation to provide child support ceased upon the twins' graduation from high school. Mother later requested continued child support from Father once the twins turned nineteen. The district court concluded that Mont. Code Ann. 40-6-214 did not allow an order imposing such support but that the statute provided the court with authority to order a parent to support an adult child who is poor and unable to maintain himself if the parent does not do so. Mother subsequently filed a second petition, and the district court found it had the authority to order Father to support the twins based on information he was not providing for them to the extent of his ability. The Supreme Court consolidated the two proceedings on appeal and affirmed, holding that the district court had the statutory authority to order Father to support the twins and that section 40-6-214 imposed a duty on Father to support the twins "to the extent of his ability." View "In re M.A.S." on Justia Law

Husband and Wife had been married for almost seventeen years when Wife petitioned for the dissolution of the marriage. A temporary order of protection was issued against Husband to protect Wife and the couple's three children. The district court subsequently issued a final order of protection (FOP) requiring that Husband stay 300 feet away from Wife at all times and that he have only telephonic and supervised in-person contact with the children. The marriage was then dissolved. Husband later filed a motion to dissolve the FOP. The district court left the FOP in effect, reasoning that under Mont. Code Ann. 40-15-204(5), it did not have the legal authority to terminate the FOP without Wife's request for termination. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court misinterpreted the law as set forth in section 40-15-204(5), as a district court has the authority to continue or terminate an order of protection notwithstanding the petitioner's desires. Remanded. View "Albrecht v. Albrecht" on Justia Law

Mother and Father's parental rights to their children were terminated by the district court. Before the district court's judgment, Mother had moved to transfer to the case to a tribal court as allowed under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). However, the case was never transferred. The district court maintained jurisdiction and denied Mother's request to continue the termination hearing and appoint counsel for the children. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court did not comply with the jurisdictional ICWA transfer requirements where the court misinterpreted the ICWA requirement to require an affirmative acceptance of the transfer by the tribe; and (2) because there was an apparent conflict between the children's wishes and what the guardian ad litem concluded to be in the children's best interests, counsel for children should be appointed on remand. Remanded. View "In re J.W.C." on Justia Law

Husband and Wife's marriage was dissolved in Mississippi. The decree awarded Husband custody of Son and Wife custody of Daughter. Subsequently, Husband and Son moved to Montana, and Wife and Daughter moved to Arizona. Husband petitioned the district court in Montana to modify the child support award for Son. The district court denied the petition and declined to exercise further jurisdiction on the basis that it was an inconvenient forum because Husband and Son had moved back to Mississippi and Wife and Daughter were residing in Arizona. The court then relinquished jurisdiction of Son to the Arizona. Husband and Son later moved back to Montana, and Husband petitioned the district court to reduce accrued child support to a money judgment. The district court noted jurisdiction had been relinquished to the Arizona court and declined to exercise further jurisdiction on the basis that it was an inconvenient forum. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court improperly applied the Montana Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) in determining it did not have jurisdiction over the matter because the UCCJEA applies to child custody matters, not child support matters. Remanded. View "Ervin v. Ervin" on Justia Law

The district court terminated Mother's rights to her two minor children after determining that Mother had willfully surrendered custody of her children for a period of six months and that Mother had abandoned her children in accordance with Mont. Code Ann. 41-3-609(1). Mother appealed, contending that she could not surrender custody because she never possessed custody. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that Mother abandoned her children under the circumstances where (1) Mother had physical custody of her children until 2006, and (2) Mother made no manifestation of an intent to resume custody of the children. View "In re E.M.S." on Justia Law

Husband and Wife's marriage was dissolved by a decree that included a settlement agreement and parenting plan. The agreement provided that the parties would share joint parenting of the children but that Wife would be the primary residential parent. The agreement was later amended to provide for alternating custody between Wife and Husband on a weekly basis. Husband subsequently filed a motion to modify child support, alleging that there had been a substantial and continuing change of circumstances as to make the existing terms unconscionable. The district court (1) granted Husband's motion, (2) denied Wife's motion to amend the parenting plan, and (3) ordered that Wife pay Husband's attorney's fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in (1) granting Husband's motion to modify child support where the court's findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence and its determination that the changes in circumstances in this case met the statutory requirements; (2) awarding Husband attorney's fees where the parties' agreement specifically provided for an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party in subsequent proceedings; and (3) determining the amount and reasonableness of the attorney's fees awarded. View "In re Marriage of Damschen" on Justia Law