Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

C.R., D.B.J.'s step-father and guardian, appealed the termination of his guardianship of D.B.J, who was adjudicated to be a youth in need of care. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not violate C.R.'s right to due process by excluding him from a show cause hearing and a permanency plan hearing; (2) the district court complied with the requirements of Mont. Code Ann. 41-3-432 by holding an initial show cause hearing nineteen days after the filing of the initial abuse and neglect petition; and (3) the district court properly removed C.R. as a guardian pursuant to the best interests of the child standard at Mont. Code Ann. 72-5-234. View "In re D.B.J." on Justia Law

Sarah Wheeldon petitioned for dissolution of her marriage to Corey Wheeldon on April 20, 2009. Following a bench trial, the district court issued findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a decree of dissolution that dissolved the parties' marriage and divided the remaining marital estate. Corey appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding (1) based on all the evidence, the district court acted within its discretion by granting Sarah primary residential custody of the children; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in its division of the parties' marital assets and liabilities. View "In re Parenting of Wheeldon" on Justia Law

The Montana Public Employees' Retirement Board (MPERB) denied death benefits to Petitioner Erene Briese (Erene) because her deceased husband, who had originally named her as his beneficiary under the Montana Sheriffs’ Retirement System (SRS), had later filed a new designation, dropping her as a beneficiary, while marital dissolution proceedings were pending. Erene appealed to the District Court, which affirmed the MPERB’s order. Erene then appealed the District Court’s order to the Supreme Court. "At a minimum," the Supreme Court agreed with those courts that have held that "a court has equitable power to order a return to the status quo when a party violating a temporary restraining order has died. Thus, in this case, the District Court should have invalidated the husband's 2006 change of beneficiaries because it was made in violation of the statutorily-mandated restraining order, and should have determined that his 2001 designation of Erene was "the most recent membership card filed with the board." View "Briese v. MPER Board" on Justia Law

Birth mother N.S. (Mother) and birth father K.R. (Father) appealed a district court order that terminated their parental rights to their four-year-old twin daughters, T.R. 1 and T.R. 2. Mother also appealed the District Court’s order denying her a new trial. The issues on appeal were: (1) whether the District Court abused its discretion by terminating Mother and Father’s parental rights; (2) whether the District Court erred in finding it was in the children’s best interests to terminate those rights; (3) whether the District Court erred in finding the Department of Health and Human Services (the Department) made reasonable efforts to reunify the family; (4) whether the District Court adequately addressed the appropriateness of the treatment plans in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Furthermore, Mother asserted that the District Court abused its discretion by denying her a new trial based on new evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court found substantial evidence in the record to support the District Court’s findings that the conditions rendering Mother and Father unfit were unlikely to change within a reasonable time, and that it was in the best interests of the children to terminate the parental rights. "It [was] manifest on the face of the briefs and the record that there was not an abuse of discretion." View "Matter of T.R.1 and T.R.2" on Justia Law

In 2011, the State filed identical Petitions for Emergency Protective Services, Adjudication of Youths in Need of Care, and for Temporary Legal Custody in two causes involving K.H. and K.M., the daughters of Appellee K.H. (Mother). The children were two and five years old, respectively, at the time of the petition. The petition was ultimately dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence. Counsel for the children appealed the dismissal. The issues before the Supreme Court were whether the children had standing to appeal the dismissal of the State's petition for their adjudication as youths in need of care, and whether the district court erred in dismissing the State's petition. Upon review of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Matter of K.H. & K.M." on Justia Law

John Hood appealed a district court's decision to deny his motion to amend the parties' parenting plan. The parties had a "great deal" of difficulty working out a parenting and visitation plan though they lived n the same city for several years following their divorce. The district court concluded that it was in the children's best interests for both parents to reside in the same city, there was good reason for Tenile Hood to move to Utah with her parents so that the children would have care while Tenile completed her education and got a job. The court stated that as of the hearing, Tenile had no job, was on public assistance and was not in school, and that if she continued that lifestyle, she should remain in Montana. The court then adopted Tenile's proposed parenting plan, but that it should be modified from time to time to provide for additional reasonable visitation. John began filing motions to hold Tenile in contempt of court regarding the parenting plan contending she failed to abide by it, and that she continued to frustrate his contact with the children. After a year, he alleged Tenile failed to complete her education, failed to get a job and failed to enroll in college. Tenile refuted these allegations. The district court determined that because Tenile had always been the primary residential parent, she should continue to be the residential custodian. The court denied John's motion to amend. Upon review, the Supreme Court determined John failed to meet his burden of proof that the children's best interests would be better served by requiring Tenile to relocate to Montana or by granting primary physical custody to John. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's order. View "Hood v. Hood" on Justia Law

R.T. was born in 2009; his mother was killed in a car accident a year later. R.T.'s biological father was a minor at the time of the mother's death, and was living in a halfway house. R.T.'s maternal grandfather petitioned for guardianship/conservatorship of R.T. A year after the guardianship/conservatorship was granted, R.T.'s maternal grandmother (then living in Hawai'i) petitioned to be substituted as R.T.'s guardian/conservator, claiming it was not in R.T.'s best interest to remain in the grandfather's care because he was exposed to second-hand cigarette and marijuana smoke within the grandfather's home. She further alleged that R.T.'s developmental needs were not being met because the child was always left with babysitters. A hearing was held on the grandmother's petition, and the district court eventually granted the grandmother's petition. The grandfather appealed, arguing that R.T.'s father's parental rights were not terminated and therefore the district court ruled in error. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error in the district court's decision and found the record supported the court's conclusion. View "In re R.T. a Minor" on Justia Law

Mary and David W. Johnson were married on June 12, 1993. In May 2003, David filed a petition for dissolution and in June 2003 the parties entered a Settlement Agreement, which distributed the marital estate. Mary was served and defaulted. A decree of dissolution was entered on June 23, 2003, incorporating the provisions of the parties’ Settlement Agreement and finding it was not unconscionable. The decree stated that “there are no minor children of the parties hereto, and [Mary] is not pregnant at this time.” In 2007, Mary filed an action to set aside the decree, alleging that David had failed to disclose and list properties in the Settlement Agreement, and requesting that the marital estate be re-distributed. On November 25, 2008, in response to Mary’s motion for summary judgment, the district court entered an order setting aside the marital property division. The court concluded that David “knowingly failed to disclose material items of property and assets” and made affirmative misrepresentations to Mary to induce an uncontested judgment, which “constitute[d] extrinsic fraud sufficient to warrant setting aside of the resulting void property rights judgment as a matter of equity in order to fairly and properly account for, value, characterize, and equitably distribute the undisclosed property and assets in consideration of the parties’ prior settlement agreement.” The court ultimately determined that Mary was entitled to a total payment in the sum of $69,948.65 for the value of undisclosed assets, with interest thereon at 10 percent per annum from June 23, 2003. The court ordered each party to bear his or her own attorney fees and costs. The court gave brief mention to frozen embryos the parties had prepared for purposes of in vitro fertilization, stating that Mary testified that she should receive the embryos and that David testified that he objected to Mary receiving the embryos and requested they be donated to science. The court ordered that they be donated to science. On appeal, Mary challenged the District Court’s property distribution and assessment of attorney fees. David cross-appealed the court's grant of some of his pre-marital property. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Mary failed in various respects to carry her burden of proof on many property issues and the attendant issue of attorney fees. Further, the Court concluded the district court did not err in awarding some of David’s pre-marital property to Mary. With regard to the embryos, the Court concluded that the issue was not properly before the courts within this proceeding. The Court reversed the district court's order donating the embryos to science and left the issue to be addressed in the appropriate proceeding. View "Marriage of Johnson" on Justia Law

I.M. (Father) appealed a district court order that terminated his parental rights to his children A.J.M (daughter) and C.J.M. (son). The children's biological mother already had her parental rights to terminated. The Department of Public Health and Human Services (DPHHS) contacted the family and made recommendations, but the parents did not follow through. Father reported Mother to DPHHS in July of 2009 with concerns about her drinking and inability to care for the children. After Father’s call, the children were removed. Upon stipulations by both Mother and Father, the children were adjudicated Youths in Need of Care on August 14, 2009. The District Court found that: 1) termination was statutorily presumed to be in both A.J.M.’s and C.J.M.’s best interest due to the length of time each had been in foster care; 2) Father’s treatment plans were appropriate; 3) Father did not comply with the treatment plans; 4) the conditions rendering Father unfit or unable to parent would not likely change within a reasonable amount of time, and 5) the best interests of A.J.M. and C.J.M. would indeed be served by termination of Father’s parental rights. Father then appealed. Finding no abuse of discretion in the district court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed the termination of Father's parental rights. View "Matter of C.J.M. and A.J.M." on Justia Law

Davie Lin Lloyd (Davie) appealed a Parenting Plan Order entered by the district court. Davie and Brett Camaron Lloyd (Brett) were married in 1997, and are the parents of one minor child, M.K.L. In 2004, the district court issued a decree of dissolution and parenting plan, which awarded Davie residential custody and included an attorney’s fees provision. After the dissolution, Davie moved with M.K.L. from Texas to Oklahoma to Kentucky, and finally, to Florida. In the summer of 2009, the parties’ communication disintegrated when they disagreed over Brett’s summer visitation and as a result, M.K.L. never visited Brett that summer. Due to this communication breakdown, Brett initiated legal proceedings in Montana to enforce the parenting plan. The district court held a hearing on the parenting issues in 2011 and issued its order. The Order gave Brett residential custody of M.K.L., and included a provision requiring that for each vacation M.K.L. would be transferred to the parent with visitation rights on the evening of the last day of school before the break and would remain with that parent until the evening before school would resume. Brett filed a request that the District Court enforce the attorney’s fees provision in the 2004 Parenting Plan and award Brett his attorney’s fees. The District Court approved that request on August 16, 2011, and on August 24, 2011, Davie filed an M. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for relief from the judgment awarding attorney’s fees. Counsel for Brett submitted an affidavit containing a statement of attorney’s fees on August 29, 2011, to which Davie did not object. On September 21, 2011, the District Court denied Davie’s motion and approved the amount of the fees. Finding no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to award attorney's fees, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Marriage of Lloyd" on Justia Law