Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Wife petitioned the district court for dissolution of her marriage to Husband, who was incarcerated. Husband proceeded as a self-represented litigant, and the district court allowed Husband to appear telephonically at all hearings. When the final pretrial conference was held, Husband did not appear telephonically. Unbeknownst to the district court, Husband was experiencing medical problems that required surgery and hospitalization. After Husband was released from the prison infirmary, he mailed a motion to the district court requesting a sixty-day continuance. The district court received the motion, but after Husband failed to appear at a hearing to consider the motion, the court entered a default decree and declared the parties' marriage dissolved. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under these extraordinary circumstances, the district court abused its discretion in refusing to grant Husband's motion for a continuance. Remanded to allow Husband to appear at a final pretrial conference and trial. View "Eslick v. Eslick" on Justia Law

Larissa Simpson filed a petition for dissolution of her marriage to Dennis, citing serious marital discord. As part of the dissolution, Dennis and Larissa entered into a property settlement agreement and a stipulated final parenting plan. The combined operation of the plan and the agreement entitled Larissa to a $10,000 per month payment from Dennis for the rest of her life, first in child support and later in the form of a property settlement. Later, Dennis and Larissa agreed to amend the court's final decree. The stipulation did not decrease Dennis's total month child support obligation. Dennis subsequently filed a motion to modify child support, alleging that the child support amount was unconscionable in light of changed circumstances. Larissa also filed a motion to invalidate the parties' stipulation amending the final decree. Both motions were denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in denying Dennis's motion to modify child support and Larissa's motion to invalidate the stipulation. View "Simpson v. Simpson" on Justia Law

After Mother filed a petition for dissolution of her marriage to Father, the parties entered a marital dissolution agreement and parenting plan providing that the parties would share alternate two weeks of parenting with the minor children. Mother subsequently filed a motion to modify the parenting plan, stating that she and Father had not followed the plan due to Father's business activities and personal trips. The district court ultimately amended the prior parenting plan and granted primary custody of the children to Mother. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not clearly err in determining that Mont. Code Ann. 40-4-219 did not apply in its case and did not abuse its discretion in relying on the factors listed in Mont. Code Ann. 40-4-212 when deciding the best interest of the children; and (2) did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that the wishes of the children, continuity of and stability of care, and other factors weighed in favor of modifying the parenting plan. View "In re Marriage of Klatt" on Justia Law

Brent Anderson purchased life insurance from Insurer and named three beneficiaries under the policy: (1) his then-wife, Lucia, (2) his parents, and (3) his sister. Brent and Lucia subsequently divorced. Later that year, Mont. Code Ann. 72-2-814 became effective. The statute provides that a divorce revokes "any revocable disposition or appointment of property made by a divorced individual to the individual's former spouse in a governing instrument." Brent died several years later without having changed his designation of Lucia as primary beneficiary under the life insurance policy. Insurer filed an interpleader action to determine the rightful beneficiary under Brent's policy. The district court ruled in favor of Lucia based in part on the fact that section 72-2-814 became effective after Brent and Lucia's divorce. The Supreme Court accepted a certified question from the U.S. court of appeals and answered that section 72-2-814 applies to a divorce that pre-dates the statute's enactment. View "Thrivent Fin. for Lutherans v. Andronescu" on Justia Law

Terance Perry filed for dissolution of his marriage to Karen Perry. Terance named Gail Goheen as his counsel of record. Karen filed a motion to disqualify Goheen after speaking with Goheen over the telephone. Before the disqualification hearing, Karen filed a motion to strike office memorandums and affidavits filed by Terance regarding Goheen's conversation with Karen as privileged communications between attorney and client. The district court denied Karen's motion to disqualify, finding no attorney-client relationship existed between Karen and Goheen. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by (1) denying Karen's motion to disqualify; (2) permitting Goheen to testify at the disqualification hearing; (3) relying on communications between Goheen and Karen in making its decision; and (4) determining that Karen abused the rules of disqualification. The court also found that Goheen did not violate her duty to Karen under Rule 19 of the Montana Rules of Professional Conduct. View "In re Marriage of Perry" on Justia Law

After the district court awarded the Department of Health and Human Services temporary legal custody of Mother's two children, the court adjudicated the children as youths in need of care. The State subsequently petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights. After a termination hearing, the district court concluded it was in the children's best interests to terminate Mother's parental rights and issued an order to that effect. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order, holding that the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the State established by clear and convincing evidence that the best interests of the children would be served by termination of the parent-child legal relationship. View "In re H.R." on Justia Law

Brenette Garrett and Jason LeProwse were the biological parents of T.G. In September 2011, the justice court issued a temporary order of protection (TOP) against LeProwse pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 40-15-201. Shortly thereafter, the justice court case was removed to the district court where the parties had been involved in a parenting action since 2008. The district court held a hearing on the TOP in October 2011 at which it heard considerable testimony from numerous witnesses. In January 2012, the court dissolved the TOP. The Supreme Court dismissed Garrett's appeal without prejudice, holding that the order dissolving the TOP was not immediately appealable because a final decision and resolution of all issues raised in the case had not yet been rendered. View "LeProwse v. Garrett" on Justia Law

After Donald and Lora Wyrick filed for dissolution of their marriage, the district court struggled to resolve a convoluted child support arrangement that festered for nearly twenty years. Donald filed a motion for modification of child support in April 2009. Donald apparently signed an affidavit for his lawyer in October 2008 in support of the motion to modify child support, but Donald's lawyer failed to file the motion until April 2009. In December 2011, the district court determined it could not modify the amount of Donald's payments back to 2008 because Donald had failed to file his motion for modification until April 2009. The court ultimately ordered that Donald pay arrearages and concluded that he continued to owe child support. However, in an earlier order, the court declared that Donald owed no future obligation of child support to Lora and that Donald had overpaid child support. The Supreme Court (1) held that the district court lacked authority to extend the modification date to any date before April 2009, but (2) remanded the case because the district court offered no new finding of fact in its latter finding to support the change from its earlier finding. View "Wyrick v. Wyrick" on Justia Law

After the Department of Public Health and Human Services was given temporary legal custody of D.B., a youth in need of care, the Department developed a treatment plan for Father. Following twenty months of poor cooperation from Father, the Department determined it would seek termination of his parental rights. The district court terminated Father's parental rights to D.B. Father appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the Department proposed an appropriate treatment plan; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Father's behavior would be unlikely to change within a reasonable amount of time; and (3) Father lacked any basis for the Court to determine that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. View "In re D.B." on Justia Law

Gail and Ron Armstrong began raising M.M.G. when the child was approximately one year old. M.M.G.'s mother, Arrah Lane, began leaving M.M.G. with the Armstrongs for weeks at a time until M.M.G. lived primarily with the Armstrongs. From the time M.M.G. was four years old for the next six years, Lane visited the child a few times a year. When M.M.G. was ten years old, Lane informed the Armstrongs she was moving to Wyoming with the child. Armstrongs filed a petition for a parenting plan. The district court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that the Armstrongs could not week a parenting plan unless Lane's parental rights had been terminated. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that if the Armstrongs could demonstrate they had established a child-parent relationship with M.M.G., the district court would have jurisdiction to consider whether to grant the Armstrongs a parental interest in M.M.G. Remanded for a determination of whether the Armstrongs had established a child-parent relationship with M.M.G. View "Parenting of M.M.G." on Justia Law