Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Mother and Father were the parents of twins born in 2009. In 2011, the district court entered orders adjudicating the twins as youths in need of care. In 2012, the district court approved the Department of Public Health and Human Services' (DPHHS) permanency plan seeking termination of Mother's parental rights. Father subsequently relinquished his parental rights. After a hearing, the district court entered orders terminating Mother's parent-child relationship with the twins and awarded permanent legal custody of the children to DPHHS. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and remanded in part, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Mother's request to terminate the services of Mother's court-appointed counsel; (2) because Mother's affidavit of relinquishment was silent as to the issue of whether Mother received relinquishment counseling, the cause is remanded for a determination of whether Mother received the required counseling or whether good cause existed to waive the requirement; and (3) the district court did not err in denying Mother's request to modify the treatment plan and stay the termination hearing. View "In re B.J.T.H." on Justia Law

After the district court adjudicated A.R.B. a youth in need of care, A.R.B. was placed in foster care with a Utah family. A.R.B.'s mother (Mother), who traveled from Utah to Montana to have her baby, filed a motion to relinquish jurisdiction from Montana to Utah, arguing (1) once Mother went to Utah and the Department placed A.R.B. with the Utah foster family, Montana no longer had exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act; and (2) the district court should decline to exercise jurisdiction because Utah constituted a more convenient forum. The district court denied Mother's motion to relinquish jurisdiction and terminated Mother's parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to relinquish jurisdiction in this case; and (2) the district court was within its discretion in declining Mother's request to declare Montana an inconvenient forum. View "In re A.R.B." on Justia Law

Pam, Allan, and Charles and Mary Lou Dees (the Dees) started a business, Great Falls Portables, Inc. (GFP), with Allan acting as sole manager of the business. Pam subsequently took over management. The Dees later filed a complaint against Pam, GFP, and others. A month later, Pam and Allan, who were married but separated, entered into a settlement agreement that provided that Pam would be responsible to the Dees for any obligation owed them in connection with their interest in GFP. In litigation with the Dees, Pam filed a third-party complaint against Allan, alleging (1) the Dees' complaint arose out of Allan's fraudulent activity (Count I), (2) Allan had fraudulently induced Pam to enter the agreement assigning responsibility for the Dees' interest (Count II), and (3) Allan must indemnify her from liability to the Dees (Count III). The district court granted summary judgment to Allan on all three counts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly determined that (1) Pam failed to plead fraud with sufficient particularity; (2) Pam failed to show reliance on Allan's representations; and (3) Count III of Pam's complaint was dependent on and related back to Counts I and II. View "Fossen v. Fossen" on Justia Law

After Father's four children were removed from his care, the district court terminated Father's parental rights to the children, concluding that Father failed to complete several tasks in his treatment plan. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Father failed to preserve for review the issue of his treatment plan's appropriateness when he did not timely object to the plan; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by terminating Father's parental rights without also terminating Mother's parental rights; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that terminating Father's parental rights was in the children's best interest. View "In re T.S." on Justia Law

As part of their dissolution of marriage, Viola and Gary entered into a mediated property settlement agreement. The district court approved the property settlement, deeming the property and debts "equitably distributed." The court then entered a decree of dissolution. Viola subsequently filed Mont. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(b) motions seeking relief from the judgment, claiming that the property settlement agreement was unconscionable and failed to include a disclosure of assets as required by Mont. Code Ann. 40-4-254. The district court denied Viola's motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions in which Viola alleged that the property settlement agreement was unconscionable and that the district court failed to require a full disclosure of assets. View "In re Marriage of Anderson" on Justia Law

Carl and Karen were married in 1993. In 1995, Karen made Carl a co-owner of certain property. In 2007, the county clerk recorded a quit claim deed transferring Carl's interest in the property back to Karen. When the parties divorced in 2009, the district court concluded that Karen was the owner of the property and that the $100,000 increase in the property's value from 1993 to 2009 was due to market force and had nothing to do with any contributions made by Carl. In 2012, Carl filed a complaint alleging that Karen fraudulently forged Carl's signature on the deed to the property and that Alta, another defendant, notarized the forged signature. The district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the two-year statute of limitations for fraud claims had run. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) correctly determined that Carl's fraud claim was barred by the statute of limitations; but (2) erred by awarding fees and costs to Defendants. View "Kananen v. South" on Justia Law

Jeremiah Bennett died intestate. Jeremiah's two children resided with their mother, Jeremiah's ex-spouse, Sabrina. Jeremiah's father, Abel, was appointed the personal representative (PR) of Jeremiah's estate. Sabrina objected to Abel's appointment and nominated herself as the PR in her capacity as guardian and conservator of the children. After a hearing, the district court removed Abel as PR of the estate and appointed Sabrina as PR. Abel appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Abel failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion or failed to follow the law in determining that it was in the best interests of the estate to remove Abel and to appoint Sabrina as PR for Jeremiah's estate. View "In re Estate of Bennett" on Justia Law

After Edwin and Linda divorced, Linda obtained a New Jersey judgment ordering Edwin to pay $695,477 in unpaid alimony, unpaid child support, medical expenses, and attorney fees and costs. Linda subsequently filed a motion seeking to satisfy the New Jersey judgment with Edwin's interest in a Nevada limited liability corporation (BMR) licensed to do business in Montana and with assets in Montana. A writ of execution was issued against Edwin, and thereafter, the district court issued a charging order and an order for the appointment of a receiver, for foreclosure of the lien, and for the sale of BMR's property. Edwin subsequently filed a motion for relief from the charging order and order for the appointment of the receiver foreclosure of the lien, which the district court denied after concluding that Edwin's arguments were waived because he had foregone earlier opportunities to challenge the two orders on the bases he asserted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly applied the law of the case doctrine to deny Edwin's motion; and (2) because Edwin's appeal was vexatious and filed for the purposes of delay, costs and fees assessed should be solely levied against Edwin. Remanded. View "Jonas v. Jonas" on Justia Law

Mother was the biological parent of four children, including J.W. Before J.W. was born, a Colorado court terminated Mother's rights to two of her children. After Mother gave birth to J.W. and J.W. was removed from Mother's custody, a Montana district court found it was in the best interests of J.W. to terminate Mother's parental rights. The district court reasoned that reunification efforts were unnecessary because Mother had her parental rights to her other children terminated, and the circumstances related to those terminations were "identical" to mother's unfit parenting of J.W. Mother appealed, arguing that her previously unfit parenting in Colorado should not provide a basis for terminating her parental rights to J.W. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err by failing to conduct a permanency plan hearing; and (2) did not err by concluding that the circumstances surrounding Mother's prior terminations in Colorado were relevant to her parenting of J.W. View "In re J.W." on Justia Law

Husband and Wife separated in 2010, after which Wife filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. The district court (1) determined that any interest Husband might receive from his mother's trust did not impact the marital estate; (2) determined that the marital home should be sold and the proceeds split between the parties; and (3) determined that each party should be responsible for their own student loan debt and business loans. Wife appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Husband's interest in his mother's trust from the marital estate; (2) the district court equitably distributed the marital estate; and (3) Husband was not entitled to attorney's fees and costs on appeal. View "In re Marriage of Parker" on Justia Law