Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

As part of their dissolution of marriage, Viola and Gary entered into a mediated property settlement agreement. The district court approved the property settlement, deeming the property and debts "equitably distributed." The court then entered a decree of dissolution. Viola subsequently filed Mont. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(b) motions seeking relief from the judgment, claiming that the property settlement agreement was unconscionable and failed to include a disclosure of assets as required by Mont. Code Ann. 40-4-254. The district court denied Viola's motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions in which Viola alleged that the property settlement agreement was unconscionable and that the district court failed to require a full disclosure of assets. View "In re Marriage of Anderson" on Justia Law

Carl and Karen were married in 1993. In 1995, Karen made Carl a co-owner of certain property. In 2007, the county clerk recorded a quit claim deed transferring Carl's interest in the property back to Karen. When the parties divorced in 2009, the district court concluded that Karen was the owner of the property and that the $100,000 increase in the property's value from 1993 to 2009 was due to market force and had nothing to do with any contributions made by Carl. In 2012, Carl filed a complaint alleging that Karen fraudulently forged Carl's signature on the deed to the property and that Alta, another defendant, notarized the forged signature. The district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the two-year statute of limitations for fraud claims had run. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) correctly determined that Carl's fraud claim was barred by the statute of limitations; but (2) erred by awarding fees and costs to Defendants. View "Kananen v. South" on Justia Law

Jeremiah Bennett died intestate. Jeremiah's two children resided with their mother, Jeremiah's ex-spouse, Sabrina. Jeremiah's father, Abel, was appointed the personal representative (PR) of Jeremiah's estate. Sabrina objected to Abel's appointment and nominated herself as the PR in her capacity as guardian and conservator of the children. After a hearing, the district court removed Abel as PR of the estate and appointed Sabrina as PR. Abel appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Abel failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion or failed to follow the law in determining that it was in the best interests of the estate to remove Abel and to appoint Sabrina as PR for Jeremiah's estate. View "In re Estate of Bennett" on Justia Law

After Edwin and Linda divorced, Linda obtained a New Jersey judgment ordering Edwin to pay $695,477 in unpaid alimony, unpaid child support, medical expenses, and attorney fees and costs. Linda subsequently filed a motion seeking to satisfy the New Jersey judgment with Edwin's interest in a Nevada limited liability corporation (BMR) licensed to do business in Montana and with assets in Montana. A writ of execution was issued against Edwin, and thereafter, the district court issued a charging order and an order for the appointment of a receiver, for foreclosure of the lien, and for the sale of BMR's property. Edwin subsequently filed a motion for relief from the charging order and order for the appointment of the receiver foreclosure of the lien, which the district court denied after concluding that Edwin's arguments were waived because he had foregone earlier opportunities to challenge the two orders on the bases he asserted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly applied the law of the case doctrine to deny Edwin's motion; and (2) because Edwin's appeal was vexatious and filed for the purposes of delay, costs and fees assessed should be solely levied against Edwin. Remanded. View "Jonas v. Jonas" on Justia Law

Mother was the biological parent of four children, including J.W. Before J.W. was born, a Colorado court terminated Mother's rights to two of her children. After Mother gave birth to J.W. and J.W. was removed from Mother's custody, a Montana district court found it was in the best interests of J.W. to terminate Mother's parental rights. The district court reasoned that reunification efforts were unnecessary because Mother had her parental rights to her other children terminated, and the circumstances related to those terminations were "identical" to mother's unfit parenting of J.W. Mother appealed, arguing that her previously unfit parenting in Colorado should not provide a basis for terminating her parental rights to J.W. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err by failing to conduct a permanency plan hearing; and (2) did not err by concluding that the circumstances surrounding Mother's prior terminations in Colorado were relevant to her parenting of J.W. View "In re J.W." on Justia Law

Husband and Wife separated in 2010, after which Wife filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. The district court (1) determined that any interest Husband might receive from his mother's trust did not impact the marital estate; (2) determined that the marital home should be sold and the proceeds split between the parties; and (3) determined that each party should be responsible for their own student loan debt and business loans. Wife appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Husband's interest in his mother's trust from the marital estate; (2) the district court equitably distributed the marital estate; and (3) Husband was not entitled to attorney's fees and costs on appeal. View "In re Marriage of Parker" on Justia Law

The district court terminated Mother's parental rights to her two daughters (collectively, Children). Mother appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Department of Health and Human Services (Department) undertook sufficient active efforts to reunify Mother and Children as required under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA); (2) the Department provided sufficient evidence that reunification of Children with Mother would cause serious physical or emotional damage to Children; (3) the district court correctly determined that Mother had stipulated to the terms of the treatment plan; and (4) all stipulations in ICWA involuntary termination proceedings need not be reduced to writing. View "In re D.A." on Justia Law

Julie petitioned for dissolution of her marriage to William. Because he did not object to the dissolution of their marriage or to Julie's proposed distribution of assets, William elected to default. The district court subsequently issued a final decree of dissolution. Thereafter, William filed a Mont. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion to set aside the judgment, arguing that the decree should be set aside as void because the district court awarded Julie more than she had prayed for in her original pleading in violation of Mont. R. Civ. P. 54(c). The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the district court surprised William by not giving him advance notice that it might award Julie more than she had requested in her petition and by not giving William a meaningful opportunity to contest the distribution of assets before rendering a final judgment; and (2) the district court should have set aside the judgment under Rule 60(b)(1) due to William's surprise. View "In re Marriage of Steyh" on Justia Law

After the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services (DPHHS) was granted temporary legal custody of Child, DPHHS petitioned for termination of Mother and Father's parental rights. After a hearing, the district court terminated both Mother's and Father's parental rights to Child. The Supreme Court affirmed the termination order, holding (1) DPHHS made reasonable efforts to reunite Mother with Child; (2) the district court did not err in concluding that Mother's drug addiction rendered her unfit to parent Child and that her condition was unlikely to change within a reasonable time; (3) the district court had jurisdiction to terminate Father's parental rights; (4) Father's attorney rendered effective assistance; (5) the district court did not err in terminating Father's parental rights based upon his incarceration for mitigated deliberate homicide; and (6) the district court correctly concluded that termination of Mother's and Father's parental rights was in Child's best interest. View "In re A.D.B." on Justia Law

When Father and Mother divorced, the district court ordered Father to pay child support. After Father failed to make child support payments, the Child Support Enforcement Division (CSED) of the Department of Public Health and Human Services (Department) placed a support lien on all of his property. After Father and Mother's divorce, Mother married Plaintiff. Plaintiff and Mother subsequently divorced pursuant to a final decree of dissolution in which Mother assigned to Plaintiff her interest in the child support lien. Thereafter, Plaintiff commenced a proceeding against Father seeking to foreclose on the CSED support lien. The district court granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, ordering that Plaintiff could foreclose on the child support lien. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff was precluded from obtaining an enforceable interest in the support lien, as, under Montana law, the Department alone held the rights to and was authorized to foreclose on the child support lien. Remanded. View "LeCount v. Davis" on Justia Law