Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Family Law
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J.S., born in 1998, was an “Indian child” under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). In 2002, J.S. was adjudicated a youth in need of care, and temporary custody was granted to the Department of Public Health and Human Services (Department). In 2012, the Department filed a petition for legal guardianship. Ultimately, the district court granted guardianship over J.S. to J.S.’s foster family. Father appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State’s failure to provide notice to Father and his tribe at the outset of these proceedings did not provide a basis to overturn the district court’s ultimate guardianship order; (2) 25 U.S.C. 1912(d) did not provide a basis to overturn the district court’s award of guardianship to the foster family based on the State’s alleged failure to make “active efforts” to provide services and promote the relationship between Father and J.S.; and (3) contrary to Father’s contention, 25 U.S.C. 1912(e) did not apply to this case and did not serve to invalidate the district court’s award of guardianship. View "In re J.S." on Justia Law

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C.S., who turned eighteen in March 2012, received special education services from the Butte School District until June 2013. In January 2013, the Montana Office of Public Instruction directed the School District to obtain appointment of a surrogate parent for C.S., who lived with his Foster Father, for educational purposes. The district court subsequently appointed Mary Jo Mahoney as C.S.’s surrogate parent. In March 2013, C.S. filed a motion to vacate the appointment of Mahoney and to substitute Foster Father as his surrogate parent. The court denied the request. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court’s refusal to vacate its appointment of Mahoney was not mooted even though C.S. no longer qualified for special education services from the School District; and (2) the district court erred when it refused to remove Mahoney and appoint Foster Father as C.S.’s surrogate parent for educational purposes. View "In re C.S." on Justia Law

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Michael and Teresa Novak married in 1988. Michael petitioned to dissolve the marriage in 2010, the same year that Teresa received a serious head injury. The district court entered a dissolution order dividing the marital estate and denying maintenance to Teresa. Teresa appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err in its valuation and division of the marital estate; (2) erred by denying maintenance to Teresa based on the court’s incorrect evaluation of Teresa’s income and necessity; (3) erred by refusing to award attorney fees to Teresa; (4) did not err by refusing to hold Michael in contempt for failing to pay part of his military retirement to Teresa; and (5) did not err by holding Teresa in contempt for destroying property awarded to Michael, and awarding attorney fees. Remanded. View "In re Marriage of Novak" on Justia Law

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In 2011, Amber Crowley filed a petition for dissolution of her marriage to Dennis Crowley. In 2012, the district court entered a final decree of dissolution and a final parenting plan. Dennis appealed, challenging many of the trial court’s determinations. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the district court’s apportionment of property and remanded for further findings of fact, holding that the district court’s findings were insufficient for the Court to determine whether all of the parties’ assets and liabilities were properly considered; (2) affirmed the court’s award of arrears for past due family support; (3) reversed the court’s maintenance order and remanded for further findings, holding that the court’s brief findings did not sufficiently address the statutory factors; (4) affirmed the court’s determination to award primary residential custody of the parties’ child to Amber; and (5) reversed the court’s order requiring Dennis to pay costs and attorney’s fees, holding that the evidence was not sufficient to support a determination that the requested fees were reasonable. View "In re Marriage of Crowley" on Justia Law

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In 2012, Mother and Father divorced. The decree of dissolution provided that the couple’s two children would reside permanently with Mother. In 2013, Mother died in a fire. The children’s maternal grandmother (Grandmother) immediately took control of the children. Father subsequently filed a petition for exclusive parental control, and Grandmother requested that she be awarded a parental interest in the children. The district court entered an order granting Father exclusive parental control and authority over the children, concluding that Grandmother had not established a parent-child relationship between her and the children. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court’s decision was supported by substantial, credible evidence. View "Hansen v. Moats" on Justia Law

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After K.L. was removed from her parents’ custody, K.L. was adjudicated a youth in need of care, and the Department of Public Health and Human Services (Department) petitioned to terminate the parental rights of both parents. After a hearing, the district court terminated the parents’ rights to K.L. Both parents appealed the order of termination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in (1) granting the Department’s motion for an extension of temporary legal custody over K.L; (2) terminating Father’s parental rights after finding that the condition rendering Father unfit to parent was unlikely to change within a reasonable time; and (3) terminating Mother’s parental rights. View "In re K.L." on Justia Law

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After the district court adjudicated Child a youth in need of care, the State filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Child was placed with Father before the termination hearing. The district court subsequently terminated Mother’s parental rights and denied Mother’s motion to dismiss the termination petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Mother failed to articulate a substantive due process claim that required the State’s petition to terminate be dismissed; (2) the placement of Child with Father did not require that the State’s petition to terminate be dismissed; and (3) the State’s petition to terminate was not filed prematurely. View "In re L.V-B." on Justia Law

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C.B. was adjudicated a youth in need of care and placed in foster care due to Mother’s abuse of prescription drugs. The district court ordered Mother to complete a treatment plan to deal with her substance abuse issues. The court subsequently determined that Mother had not complied with the conditions of her treatment plan and, accordingly, terminated her parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the statutory criteria for termination were satisfied and in terminating Mother’s parental rights because (1) Mother failed to complete her treatment plan, (2) Mother’s prescription drug abuse was unlikely to change within a reasonable time, and (3) C.B.’s best interests would be served by terminating the parent-child relationship. View "Matter of C.B." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff agreed to an increase in his monthly support obligation. The increase was applied retroactively to the date the child’s mother requested the increase, which created an arrearage in Plaintiff’s account. Although Plaintiff arranged to pay off the arrearage, the State of Montana, Child Support Enforcement Division (CSED) reported the arrearage to national consumer credit reporting agencies. Prospective employers subsequently rejected Plaintiff as an otherwise qualified candidate for being delinquent in his child support payments. Plaintiff filed suit against CSED for its erroneous report to the credit agencies. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court erred in concluding that Plaintiff’s arrearage constituted a delinquency or overdue child support, but the dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint must be upheld because Plaintiff did not avail himself of the statutory and administrative processes for challenging this action by CSED; and (2) the resulting injustice in this case required remand with directions that the credit reporting agencies that reported Plaintiff’s arrearage remove from their data base any reference to Plaintiff having been in arrears or delinquent in the payment of his child support obligations. View "Kenck v. State, Child Support Enforcement Div." on Justia Law

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In 1997, the district court granted Adriana Lockhead a temporary order of protection against Brian Lockhead. In 1999, the court made the order permanent and served Brian with a permanent order of protection. Brian did not appeal the order. In 2012, Brian filed a motion to vacate the permanent order of protection. The trial court denied the motion. Brian appealed, raising multiple issues. The trial court affirmed, holding (1) all but one of Brian's issues on appeal were barred from appellate review because Brian filed to timely appeal and failed to raise the issues with the district court; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Brian's motion to vacate the permanent order of protection, as Brian failed to prove the district court acted without conscientious judgment or in a way that exceeded the bounds of reason. View "In re Marriage of Lockhead" on Justia Law