Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services filed a petition for emergency protective services for seven-year-old H.T., alleging drug use by Mother and domestic violence between Mother and her boyfriend. The petition stated that H.T. “may be an Indian Child for the purposes of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).” The district court granted the motion for emergency protective services. The district court subsequently held a hearing that adjudicated H.T. a youth in need of care. The Department then filed a petition for permanent legal custody and termination of parental rights. The district court held a termination hearing and adopted and approved the termination petition. Mother appealed, asserting that the district court failed to comply with state and federal statutory requirements for terminating parental rights to an Indian child. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) Mother received fundamentally fair procedures prior to the termination of her parental rights; but (2) because the district court applied the wrong statutory standards in its final order, its judgment is vacated. Remanded for entry of a new order on the issue of whether Mother’s parental rights should be terminated. View "In re H.T." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs here challenged the constitutionality of two laws: a 2011 law requiring a parental notification before a minor may obtain an abortion, and a 2013 law requiring parental consent before a minor may obtain an abortion. In 1999, a district court held unconstitutional a similar 1995 law requiring parental notification before a minor may obtain an abortion. Plaintiffs claimed that the 1999 district court order prevented the State from defending the constitutionality of the laws at issue in the current challenge on grounds of issue preclusion. The Supreme Court held that because the laws that were the subject of the current challenge differed from the 1995 law in substantive respects, issue preclusion did not apply in this case. View "Planned Parenthood of Mont. v. State" on Justia Law

Mother and Father divorced in 2012. The parties’ child, B.W., moved with Mother to Washington. Father later filed a motion for modification of the parenting plan requesting primary residential custody of B.W. The parties were able to reach an agreement as to a number of issues. After the district court ruled on the remaining issues, it ordered Father to pay Mother’s attorney’s fees incurred in defending against Father’s motion to amend the parenting plan. The Supreme Court affirmed the award of attorney’s fees and costs, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Father to pay Mother’s attorney’s fees. View "In re Marriage of Weibert" on Justia Law

S.C.B. was born in 2006 to Father and Mother. In 2014, Grandmother filed a petition in Flathead County seeking to establish a parenting plan in which she would be designated as S.C.B.’s primary care giver. Grandmother then moved for a restraining order against Mother and for an interim parenting plan. While Grandmother’s motions were pending, Mother filed a motion for change of venue seeking to transfer the proceeding to Hill County. The district court granted Mother’s motion and transferred the proceeding to a district court in Hill County. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) even if Hill County could be considered a proper county for venue purposes, so too was Flathead County, and because there were two proper counties in which the parenting proceeding could have commenced, it was error for the district court to grant a change of venue; and (2) for purposes of determining the propriety of venue, there was sufficient prima facie evidence of a parent-child relationship between Grandmother and S.C.B. View "In re Parenting of S.C.B." on Justia Law

Mother was the birth mother of L.M.F. and J.A.B. Father was the birth father of J.A.B. Due to Mother’s and Father’s drug use, the Department filed a petition for termination of Mother and Father’s parental rights with respect to J.A.B. and for termination of Mother’s parental rights with respect to L.M.F. After a hearing, the district court terminated Mother’s parental rights to L.M.F. and J.A.B. and Father’s rights to J.A.B. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the district court did not err (1) in terminating Mother’s parental rights to L.M.F. on the basis that Mother failed to complete her treatment plan and that her condition was unlikely to change within a reasonable time; and (2) in terminating Mother and Father’s parental rights as to J.A.B. without reunification services on the basis that they had subjected L.M.F. to aggravated circumstances. View "In re J.A.B." on Justia Law

Gail Patton filed for dissolution of her marriage to Bill Patton. After a bench trial, the Standing Master appointed to oversee the case entered her findings of fact, conclusions of law, and final decree of dissolution. Gail filed a motion for additional evidence pursuant to Mont. R. Civ. P. 59. Gail was subsequently diagnosed with breast cancer and filed a motion to amend the findings of reopen the case to consider evidence of her diagnosis in its division of the marital estate and maintenance (Motion to Amend). The district court declined to rule on Gail’s post-trial motions, concluding that it was not appropriate to take additional evidence about events occurring since the filing of the Standing Master's Report. The district court then adopted the Report with only minor adjustments. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred (1) by failing to rule on Gail’s motion or otherwise to recommit the matter to the Standing Master with instructions to rule on these motions; and (2) by adopting the Report to the extent the Standing Master’s conclusions of law failed properly to consider Gail’s contributions to the marriage as a homemaker and her qualification for maintenance payments. View "In re Marriage of Patton" on Justia Law

In 2013, the district court issued a dissolution decree dissolving the marriage of Melinda Edwards and Jim Edwards. In its decree, the court divided a marital estate valued at $2.25 million. The majority of marital assets were held in Jim’s corporation, Bi Lo Foods, Inc. In an attempt to equitably divide the marital assets, the district court directed Jim to undertake an IRS-regulated divisive reorganization of Bi Lo. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in ordering Jim to undertake a divisive reorganization of Bi Lo; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in valuing and distributing the martial estate. View "In re Marriage of Edwards" on Justia Law

In 2012, the district court terminated Mother’s parental rights to her twins, finding that Mother had received counseling and subsequently executed a knowing and voluntary relinquishment of her rights. The Supreme Court remanded for the district court to make a determination of whether Mother had received the required relinquishment counseling or whether good cause existed to waive the requirement. On remand, the district court found that the counseling received by Mother satisfied the counseling provisions of Mont. Code Ann. 42-2-409. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was substantial evidence to support the district court’s finding that, before signing an affidavit relinquishing her parental rights, Mother received counseling required by section 42-2-409; and (2) a deficiency in the reporting requirement was harmless. View "In re B.J.T.H." on Justia Law

In 1998, Steven and Susan Buck were married in California. For the next twenty years, the Bucks lived outside of the United States. In 2001, while living in Indonesia, the Bucks purchased land near Kalispell and built a house. In 2010, Susan moved to Florida, and Steven remained in Indonesia. In 2013, Susan filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in Montana. Steven moved to dismiss the petition for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because Susan neither resided in nor was domiciled in Montana for the ninety days preceding her petition for dissolution. The district court denied the motion, concluding that it had jurisdiction over the matter. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that any jurisdictional defect was cured when Susan established domicile for ninety days and filed a supplemental pleading alleging as much. View "In re Marriage of Buck" on Justia Law

S.B.C. was a Naive American child whose biological parents were enrolled members of the Blackfeet Tribe (Tribe). When S.B.C. was approximately four months old he was removed from Mother’s care and placed with Foster Mother. The district court later terminated both Mother’s and Father’s parental rights and granted legal custody to Child Services with the right to consent to the adoption of S.B.C. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err by denying the Tribe’s motion to transfer jurisdiction to the Blackfeet Tribal Court; (2) did not abuse its discretion by terminating Father’s parental rights; and (3) did not abuse its discretion by terminating Mother’s parental rights. View "Matter of S.B.C." on Justia Law