Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2000, the marriage of Brenda Cadena and Kevin Fries was dissolved. The order approved a settlement agreement that Cadena and Fries had previously entered into that provided that Fries’ Western Conference of Teamsters pension would be equally divided between the parties. In 2013, Cadena filed a proposed qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) proposing her method of dividing the pension. Fries objected to Cadena’s proposed QDRO and submitted a proposed order of his own. The district court issued a QDRO identical to Cadena’s proposed order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Cadena’s proposed method of distributing the pension accurately reflected the division required by the settlement agreement; (2) the district court was correct not to award attorney fees in favor of Fries; and (3) Cadena was entitled to reasonable attorney fees on appeal. View "In re Marriage of Fries" on Justia Law

After a hearing held on the second petition filed by the Department of Public Health and Human Services for termination of Mother’s parental rights, the district court terminated Mother’s parental rights to her three children on the grounds that Mother had not successfully completed her treatment plan and the condition rendering her unfit to parent was unlikely to change within a reasonable time. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) despite delays in holding the show cause, adjudicatory, and dispositional hearings, Mother’s due process rights were not violated by the efforts of the Department and court to provide her with services, a treatment plan, and time to work toward reunification with her children; and (2) the district court did not err when it found that Mother failed to complete her treatment plan and the condition rendering her unfit to parent was unlikely to change within a reasonable time. View "In re A.H." on Justia Law

In 2012, M.C. was born to Mother and Father, who were unmarried. After Mother told Father that she intended to live in Ohio with M.C., Father petitioned the district court for establishment of a parenting plan, proposing that he should become M.C.’s primary caregiver. Mother proposed a parenting plan that would allow her to reside in Ohio as M.C.’s primary caregiver. After a hearing, the district court concluded that if Mother chose to live in Montana, the parties would be directed to submit parenting plans naming Mother as M.C.’s primary caregiver, and that if Mother chose to live in Ohio, the parties would be directed to submit proposed parenting plans naming Father as M.C.’s primary caregiver. The Supreme Court affirmed the parenting plan, holding that the district court did not violate Mother’s fundamental right to travel by ordering that M.C. should reside in Montana. View "In re Parenting of M.C." on Justia Law

I.T., an infant, was adjudged a youth in need of care and was placed in foster care. The district court ordered that the Department of Public Health and Human Services did not need to provide preservation or reunification services for Mother on the grounds that Mother’s parental rights to I.T.’s siblings were involuntarily terminated and that the conditions rendering Mother unfit in that termination proceeding were unlikely to change. Thereafter, the court terminated Mother’s parental rights to I.T. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in terminating Mother’s parental rights. View "In re I.T." on Justia Law

The Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services filed a petition for emergency protective services for seven-year-old H.T., alleging drug use by Mother and domestic violence between Mother and her boyfriend. The petition stated that H.T. “may be an Indian Child for the purposes of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).” The district court granted the motion for emergency protective services. The district court subsequently held a hearing that adjudicated H.T. a youth in need of care. The Department then filed a petition for permanent legal custody and termination of parental rights. The district court held a termination hearing and adopted and approved the termination petition. Mother appealed, asserting that the district court failed to comply with state and federal statutory requirements for terminating parental rights to an Indian child. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) Mother received fundamentally fair procedures prior to the termination of her parental rights; but (2) because the district court applied the wrong statutory standards in its final order, its judgment is vacated. Remanded for entry of a new order on the issue of whether Mother’s parental rights should be terminated. View "In re H.T." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs here challenged the constitutionality of two laws: a 2011 law requiring a parental notification before a minor may obtain an abortion, and a 2013 law requiring parental consent before a minor may obtain an abortion. In 1999, a district court held unconstitutional a similar 1995 law requiring parental notification before a minor may obtain an abortion. Plaintiffs claimed that the 1999 district court order prevented the State from defending the constitutionality of the laws at issue in the current challenge on grounds of issue preclusion. The Supreme Court held that because the laws that were the subject of the current challenge differed from the 1995 law in substantive respects, issue preclusion did not apply in this case. View "Planned Parenthood of Mont. v. State" on Justia Law

Mother and Father divorced in 2012. The parties’ child, B.W., moved with Mother to Washington. Father later filed a motion for modification of the parenting plan requesting primary residential custody of B.W. The parties were able to reach an agreement as to a number of issues. After the district court ruled on the remaining issues, it ordered Father to pay Mother’s attorney’s fees incurred in defending against Father’s motion to amend the parenting plan. The Supreme Court affirmed the award of attorney’s fees and costs, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Father to pay Mother’s attorney’s fees. View "In re Marriage of Weibert" on Justia Law

S.C.B. was born in 2006 to Father and Mother. In 2014, Grandmother filed a petition in Flathead County seeking to establish a parenting plan in which she would be designated as S.C.B.’s primary care giver. Grandmother then moved for a restraining order against Mother and for an interim parenting plan. While Grandmother’s motions were pending, Mother filed a motion for change of venue seeking to transfer the proceeding to Hill County. The district court granted Mother’s motion and transferred the proceeding to a district court in Hill County. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) even if Hill County could be considered a proper county for venue purposes, so too was Flathead County, and because there were two proper counties in which the parenting proceeding could have commenced, it was error for the district court to grant a change of venue; and (2) for purposes of determining the propriety of venue, there was sufficient prima facie evidence of a parent-child relationship between Grandmother and S.C.B. View "In re Parenting of S.C.B." on Justia Law

Mother was the birth mother of L.M.F. and J.A.B. Father was the birth father of J.A.B. Due to Mother’s and Father’s drug use, the Department filed a petition for termination of Mother and Father’s parental rights with respect to J.A.B. and for termination of Mother’s parental rights with respect to L.M.F. After a hearing, the district court terminated Mother’s parental rights to L.M.F. and J.A.B. and Father’s rights to J.A.B. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the district court did not err (1) in terminating Mother’s parental rights to L.M.F. on the basis that Mother failed to complete her treatment plan and that her condition was unlikely to change within a reasonable time; and (2) in terminating Mother and Father’s parental rights as to J.A.B. without reunification services on the basis that they had subjected L.M.F. to aggravated circumstances. View "In re J.A.B." on Justia Law

Gail Patton filed for dissolution of her marriage to Bill Patton. After a bench trial, the Standing Master appointed to oversee the case entered her findings of fact, conclusions of law, and final decree of dissolution. Gail filed a motion for additional evidence pursuant to Mont. R. Civ. P. 59. Gail was subsequently diagnosed with breast cancer and filed a motion to amend the findings of reopen the case to consider evidence of her diagnosis in its division of the marital estate and maintenance (Motion to Amend). The district court declined to rule on Gail’s post-trial motions, concluding that it was not appropriate to take additional evidence about events occurring since the filing of the Standing Master's Report. The district court then adopted the Report with only minor adjustments. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred (1) by failing to rule on Gail’s motion or otherwise to recommit the matter to the Standing Master with instructions to rule on these motions; and (2) by adopting the Report to the extent the Standing Master’s conclusions of law failed properly to consider Gail’s contributions to the marriage as a homemaker and her qualification for maintenance payments. View "In re Marriage of Patton" on Justia Law