Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Wife filed a petition for legal separation, and Husband’s answer requested the court to enter a decree of dissolution. After a trial, the Standing Master apportioned the marital estate, denied Husband’s request for spousal maintenance, and denied both parties’ request for attorney’s fees. The district court affirmed and adopted the Standing Master’s report in its entirety. Husband appealed, arguing that the apportionment of the bulk of the marital estate to Wife was not fair and equitable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in reviewing and adopting the Standing Master’s marital estate division. View "In re Marriage of Kostelnik" on Justia Law

After a trial, the district court entered a dissolution decree dissolving the marriage of Gordon and Nancy Clark. Gordon appealed, challenging the district court’s valuation and distribution of the marital estate. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s valuation of the ranch and the structure of its equalization payment order, holding that the court acted within its discretion to order an up-front equalization payment and that the court’s valuation was supported by substantial evidence; and (2) reversed the final property distribution, as the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider tax liabilities associated with selling the ranch. Remanded for further consideration of such tax liabilities and entry of an amended property distribution order. View "In re Marriage of Clark" on Justia Law

In 2011, Debora Smith filed a petition for dissolution of her marriage to Glenn Smith. After a trial, the district court entered an order dissolving the parties’ marriage and distributing their marital estate. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) the district court abused its discretion by ordering the division of Glenn’s social security benefits; (2) the district court abused its discretion in determining the maintenance award to Debora; (3) because questions of equitable distribution and spousal maintenance were intertwined, the district court may reconsider these issues and the calculation of the equalization payment to the extent necessary to enter a revised decree; and (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding Debora a 2006 SeaDoo watercraft vehicle. View "Smith v. Smith" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned three separate orders entered by the district court during proceedings resulting in the termination of Mother’s parental rights to her three minor children. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in rescinding the Office of the State Public Defender’s (OPD) appointment of counsel for Mother’s youngest child and denying OPD’s motion to appoint counsel after the termination hearing; (2) the district court did not err in concluding that Mother’s conduct or condition made her unfit to parent and was unlikely to change within a reasonable time; (3) the Department of Health and Human Services made reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the children and to reunite Mother with her children; and (4) Mother was not denied her due process rights in the termination proceedings. View "In re T.D.H." on Justia Law

After a hearing, the district court terminated Mother’s parental rights to her child, finding that Mother had subjected the child to aggravated circumstances and that Mother had failed to comply with her treatment plan, and the condition rendering Mother unfit was unlikely to change in a reasonable time. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err when it determined that the Department of Public Health and Human Services had made reasonable efforts to provide reunification services; and (2) did not abuse its discretion when it terminated Mother’s parental rights. View "In re J.O." on Justia Law

Father and Mother, who were never married, had a daughter. Following the end of their relationship, the parties co-parented the child for a period of time before executing a stipulated final parenting plan and formalizing their custody agreement. The parties subsequently each filed a proposed amended parenting plan requesting primary custody of the child. The district court concluded that Mother had been the primary parent of the child and should be allowed to relocate to Elko, Nevada with Mother. The court then approved a final parenting plan that limited Father to one long weekend of visitation per month. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in determining that it would be in the child’s best interests to relocate with Mother to Elko; (2) did not err by limiting Father’s visitations with the child while she resides in Nevada; and (3) did not err by denying Father’s motion for relief from the judgment and request for a new hearing. View "In re Parenting of S.E.L." on Justia Law

Mother and Father were the biological parents of two minor children. After the parents were divorced in Colorado, Mother moved to Montana with the children and registered the Colorado judgment in a Montana district court. Mother subsequently married Husband. Mother and Husband petitioned the district court to terminate Father’s parental rights and to allow Husband to adopt the children. The district court granted the petition, and adoption of the children by Husband became final. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in terminating Father’s parental rights; and (2) did not err in conducting the termination proceedings in the absence of legal representation for Father. View "In re J.W.M." on Justia Law

Julie filed with the district court a dissolution petition that included a marital asset distribution proposal in which William would be awarded ownership of the couple’s real property on Hobson Street in Butte, Montana. On March 16, 2012, the district court held a final dissolution hearing at which William made certain statements regarding the real property at issue. The court largely adopted Julie’s proposed distribution of assets and, on April 3, 2012, issued its final decree of dissolution. The district court denied William’s motion for relief from judgment. The Supreme Court reversed. On remand, the district court concluded that William’s 2012 statements regarding the appraisal values of the Hobson Street house constituted judicial admissions and, therefore, all evidence related to the house’s condition obtained after the March 16, 2012 hearing was properly excluded. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in ruling that William’s statements made during the March 2012 dissolution hearing constituted judicial admissions; and (2) the district court erred in precluding William from presenting evidence relating to the value of the real property at issue based upon these alleged judicial admissions. Remanded so as to allow the parties to present their respective evidence and arguments with respect to the Hobson Street property. View "In re Marriage of Steyh" on Justia Law

A licensed social worker informed the Department of Public Health and Human Services that Mother was psychologically abusing her two girls. After investigating the report, the Department removed the girls from Mother’s custody and placed them into foster care. The Department later returned the girls to Mother’s care. Mother sued the State, alleging that the Department failed adequately to investigate the social worker’s report before removing her children from her care, and as a result, she was wrongfully charged with and arrested for criminal contempt in Wisconsin, was denied custody and visitation with her children, and suffered emotional distress. The State moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was statutorily immune from suit. The district court denied the motion The district court later summary judgment for the State, concluding that the State qualified for statutory immunity. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s earlier decision and order and affirmed the district court’s later judgment in favor of the State, holding that the State was entitled as a matter of law to statutory immunity from Mother’s claims because Mother failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact to support her claim that the State employees involved in the investigation were grossly negligent or knowingly provided false information. View "Weber v. State" on Justia Law

After a hearing, the district court entered an order terminating Appellant’s rights to her four children. The court found that termination was appropriate because the children were previously adjudicated youths in need of care, a treatment plan approved by the court was not completed by Mother, and the conduct or condition rendering Mother unfit was unlikely to change in a reasonable time because of Mother’s drug problems. The court also concluded that termination was in the best interests of the children. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the treatment plan was appropriate when it did not require Mother to obtain a chemical dependency evaluation; (2) Mother’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to advocate for inclusion of a chemical dependency evaluation in the treatment plan; and (3) the district court acted within its discretion when it denied Mother’s request for transcripts of its in-chambers interviews with the children. View "In re T.N.-S." on Justia Law