Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Ray Ramberg appealed the dismissal of his motion to modify the parenting plan regarding his child (“C.M.R.”) with Amber Massey, and the denial of his motion to change venue from Toole to Hill County. Ramberg and Massey were never married but they lived together in Toole County, until May 2010 when they separated. Massey was the primary care provider for C.M.R. Since early 2011, Ramberg and Massey litigated the terms of parenting plans to accommodate for the different needs of C.M.R. as the child grew older. After several changes requiring mediation and litigation in 2011, 2012, and 2014, Ramberg and Massey signed a the parenting plan at issue here on February 17, 2015. C.M.R. had lived his entire life in Toole County, but in April 2015, Massey accepted a job in Havre, Hill County, which was closer to Ramberg’s current residence in Chinook. Massey moved to Havre with C.M.R. The move facilitated Ramberg’s contact with C.M.R. However, shortly thereafter, Massey received another job offer that was more lucrative from her former employer in Shelby. Thus, Massey and C.M.R. moved back to Shelby at the end of August 2015 after living in Havre for three and one-half months. Upon learning about Massey’s plan to move back to Shelby, Ramberg petitioned to modify the mediated Parenting Plan. Ramberg also filed a motion to change venue to Hill County, which was denied. The petition for modification of the Parenting Plan was dismissed without a hearing. Ramberg raised three issues in his appeal to the Supreme Court, but finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decisions. View "Parenting of C.M.R." on Justia Law

Mother and Father, who never lived together, had a child together. After the child’s birth, Father filed a petition for establishment of an interim parenting plan and then a petition for an “emergency de facto” parenting plan. Mother subsequently filed a proposed final parenting plan and a notice of intent to relocate. The district court largely adopted Mother’s proposed parenting plan. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order adopting the final parenting plan, holding that the district court’s findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, and the court’s conclusions of law were correct. View "In re Parenting of C.J." on Justia Law

When Child was just over a year old, Mother executed a power of attorney in favor of Appellant to allow her to care for Child. Mother later recovered physical custody of Child and moved with Child and her new husband to Oklahoma. Appellant commenced the present case by filing a petition for parental interest determination. The district court referred the case to its standing master. The standing master concluded that the district court had jurisdiction to determine Mother’s parental interest petition because Child lived in Montana at the time it was filed and had lived in Montana for two years before that. The district court reversed on the issue of jurisdiction, determining that Montana was an inconvenient forum and should decline to exercise jurisdiction over the matter. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the best forum to resolve Child’s future was not in Montana. View "In re Parenting of M.M.K." on Justia Law

The Department of Public Health and Human Services filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights to K.B. Father opposed his termination but did not argue that he should be given custody of K.B. After a termination hearing, the district court terminated Father’s rights, concluding that Father had not been successful in his treatment plan and that the condition rendering Father unfit was unlikely to change within a reasonable amount of time. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in concluding that it had subject matter jurisdiction over K.B.’s child abuse and neglect proceeding and authority to terminate Father’s parental rights; and (2) Father did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. View "In re K.B." on Justia Law

Father and Mother took Child, who was only a few weeks old at the time, shoplifting at a department store. The shoplifting turned into a robbery. Thereafter, the district court granted the petition of the Department of Public Health and Human Services to adjudicate Child as a youth in need of care. Father was later sentenced to twenty years with eighteen years suspended for the offenses. Upon the finding that Father’s treatment plan had not been successful, the district court terminated Father’s parental rights to Child. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the termination of Father’s parental rights was not an abuse of discretion where the district court did not commit clear error in finding that the treatment plan was unsuccessful. View "In re J.B." on Justia Law

Roy Volk and Pamela Dee Volk had a son, RBV, in the fall of 2000. In 2011, the marriage was dissolved. At the time of the divorce, Roy owned two term life insurance policies. While a statutorily-mandated temporary restraining order was still in effect, Roy changed the beneficiary designations on both policies and designated his sister, Valerie Goeser, as the new beneficiary. Just over four months after the divorce was final, Roy died. Valerie received the life insurance proceeds from both policies. Pamela subsequently filed this action on behalf of RBV against Valerie and Roy’s estate seeking a constructive trust over the insurance policy payouts for the benefit of RBV. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Valerie, concluding that Valerie was not unjustly enriched when she received Roy’s life insurance proceeds. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Valerie was unjustly enriched because Roy’s errors in changing the beneficiary of his life insurance under the statutorily-mandated restraining order invalidated his designations on the insurance policies, and a constructive trust was created on RBV's behalf as a result of these errors. Remanded. View "Volk v. Goeser" on Justia Law

When Daughter was two years old, Mother and Father dissolved their marriage. The district court approved a stipulated parenting plan entered into by the parties providing that Daughter would split her time equally between the parties in their respective homes in different states. Before Daughter was to enter kindergarten, Father filed a motion to modify the parenting plan. Mother responded with her own proposed parenting plan. The district court’s standing master issued an order amending the parenting plan and awarded custody of Daughter to Mother during the school year. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in affirming the standing master’s order amending the parenting plan. View "In re Marriage of Davis" on Justia Law

The marriage of Creed Evans and Dava Bliss was dissolved in 2015. The day before the parties were married, they signed an antenuptial agreement providing that all property held by individually by a party before and during the marriage remained that party’s sole property upon dissolution. During the dissolution proceedings, Evans disputed the validity of the agreement. After a hearing, the standing master issued a declaratory judgment that the agreement was enforceable. The district court issued an order affirming and adopting the standing master’s declaratory judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding the agreement valid and enforceable and in determining that more than 150 firearms belonged to Bliss. View "In Marriage of Bliss" on Justia Law

J.H. was the minor child of Mother and Father. The district court granted the petition of the Department of Public Health and Human Service for temporary legal custody of J.H. The Department later filed a permanency plan that did not include the option of placing J.H. with Father. Thereafter, the district court terminated Mother’s parental rights. The Department later filed a petition for long-term custody of J.H. and a second permanency plan that sought placement of J.H. with J.H.’s maternal great aunt under a guardianship. The district court granted the Department’s petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by (1) concluding that the Department engaged in reasonable efforts to reunify J.H. with Father; and (2) finding that J.H.’s best interest were served by living with his great maternal aunt, and not with Father. View "In re J.H." on Justia Law

In 1999, the Department of Public Health and Human Services, Child Support Enforcement Division (CSED) entered an order requiring Samuel Shelhamer to pay Tamara Hodges $74 per month in child support. In 2014, CSED modified the order and established Shelhamer’s monthly support obligation at $743 per month. Shelhamer, a warrant officer in the United States Marine Corps, requested an administrative hearing. After a hearing, CSED issued its final administrative order setting Shelhamer’s support obligation at $935 per month. The final decision included Shelhamer’s non-taxable basic housing allowance and non-taxable basic subsistence allowance in Shelhamer's actual income to calculate his child support obligation. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a parent’s military housing and subsistence allowances should be included as part of the parent’s actual income when calculating child support obligations. View "Shelhamer v. Hodges" on Justia Law